Tag Archives: ireland

On Counterinsurgency: On Power and Compromises, the difference between victory & defeat

Summary:  In this third chapter of “On Counterinsurgency” Martin van Creveld describes the operational differences between winning and losing methods of counterinsurgency.  Victory comes to those who take difficult paths. Most nations take the easier path, and lose.

As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of our mad foreign wars winds down — and the second phase expands — we can still learn from this analysis by one of the West’s greatest living military historians. We can still turn off this path.  The passage of time closes options; we might soon pass the last exit to avoid serious war.

Successful counterinsurgency in Hama, Syria

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“On Counterinsurgency”
by Martin van Creveld
From Combating Terrorism,
edited by Rohan Gunaratna (2005)

Introduction

For background see The first lesson of our failed wars: we were warned, but choose not to listen.

This paper has into 4 parts, posted separately.

  1. How We Got to Where We Are is a brief history of insurgency since 1941 and of the repeated failures in dealing with it.
  2. Two Methods focuses on President Assad’s suppression of the uprising at Hama in 1983 on the one hand and on British operations in Northern Ireland on the other, presenting them as extreme case studies in dealing with counterinsurgency.
  3. On Power and Compromises draws the lessons from the methods just presented and goes on to explain how, by vacillating between them, most counterinsurgents have guaranteed their own failure.
  4. Conclusions.

Part three:  On Power and Compromises

According to the well-known proverb, success has many fathers whereas failure is an orphan. However true this may be in respect to every other aspect of life, in the case of counter-insurgency clearly it does not apply.

As noted, entire libraries have been written on counter-insurgency campaigns that failed. Often the authors were the very people who had participated in, or were responsible for, the failures in question. For example, the term “low intensity war” itself was invented by the British General Frank Kitson; having taken part in a whole series of them, he was finally made commandant of the Staff College so he could teach others how it should be done. Very great efforts have been made to analyze the reasons and suggest ways to avoid a repetition. Judging by the way the Americans are conducting themselves in Iraq, to no avail.

By comparison, very little has been written about counterinsurgency campaigns that succeeded. One reason for this is because, since 1941, the number of such successes has been so limited that nine out of ten people cannot even remember them.

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On Counterinsurgency: The Two Methods that Win

Summary:  In this second chapter of “On Counterinsurgency” Martin van Creveld describes the two methods of crushing insurgencies.  We have tried neither; we might lack the capacity to use either method.  Note that both successes were, like almost all defeats of insurgencies, done by governments fighting domestic insurgencies. 

As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of our mad foreign wars winds down — and the second phase expands — we can still learn from this analysis by one of the West’s greatest living military historians. We can still turn off this path.  The passage of time closes options; we might soon pass the last exit to avoid serious war.

Counterinsurgency in Hama, Syria

—————————-

“On Counterinsurgency”
by Martin van Creveld
From Combating Terrorism,
edited by Rohan Gunaratna (2005)

Introduction

For background see The first lesson of our failed wars: we were warned, but choose not to listen.

This paper falls into four parts, each posted separately.

  1. How We Got to Where We Are is a brief history of insurgency since 1941 and of the repeated failures in dealing with it.
  2. Two Methods focuses on President Assad’s suppression of the uprising at Hama in 1983 on the one hand and on British operations in Northern Ireland on the other, presenting them as extreme case studies in dealing with counterinsurgency.
  3. On Power and Compromises draws the lessons from the methods just presented and goes on to explain how, by vacillating between them, most counterinsurgents have guaranteed their own failure.
  4. Conclusions.

Part two. Two Methods to defeat insurgencies

(a)  Syria

In early 1982, President Hafez Asad’s (In Arabic, Asad means “Lion“) regime in Syria was twelve years old and was meeting growing opposition that did not make its future appear rosy. Part of the opposition came from the members of various ethnic groups who took issue with the fact that Asad, like his most important collaborators, was an Alawite. Now the Alawites are one of the less important Islamic sects, traditionally poor and discriminated against. Many in the Islamic world do not even regard them as true Moslems and claim that, instead of Allah, they worship the moon and the stars; it as if Germany had been ruled by a Serbic Mafia or Italy by a Greek one.

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The periphery of Europe – a flashpoint to the global economy

Introduction:  This is the fourth in a series of dashed off speculative opinions.  Normal procedure on the FM website for these topics would be 3 thousand word posts, supported by dozens of links.  I dont’ have the time to finish them, and too many of these outlines have accumulated in my drafts file.  Perhaps these will spark useful debate and research among this site’s readers. 

In this third year of recession of the worst recession since the 1930s, reserves are depleted around the world.  Cash reserves of households, businesses, and governments.  This increases our susceptibility to a shock.  A poor bio-metaphor to this is the poor health of the world’s peoples in 1918.   The global economy remains unstable, as it was in 1929.  Many links in the world’s economic machinery have broken.  Although the global economy might be in recovery, the stress remains great.  Another link might snap at any moment, increasing the stress on the remaining links — some of which might in turn also snap.  Since the data is conflicting (as usual during times of large change), we don’t know how close they (or us) are to the edge.  Central Bankers know this, which is why they keep the petal to the metal while talking about exit strategies.

 One of the most dangerous flashpoints is Europe’s periphery (the USA is another).  Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Eastern Europe up to the Baltics.   The european economy is highly integrated, and collapse in even a peripheral nation might ripple though the region with unpleasant consequences.  So rescue efforts are under weigh by the EU and IMF.  But the people of one of more of the crippled nations will certainly reject the prescribed austerity measures.  Greece is first in line, and general strikes are already being planned.  Red emphasis added.

George Magnus, a senior economist at UBS, comments on these developments in “The Return of Political Economy”, 3 February 2010 — A terrifying analysis expressed in mild words.  Excerpt:

In the Euro Area, the politics are complex. Politically, the chances of some of the sovereign invalids being able to implement required fiscal restraints are small. In others, the changes of doing so over a protracted period without social unrest are questionable. However, politically, nothing short of the integrity of the Euro and the Euro Area are at stake. For this very reason, the issue will probably not come to had in the immediate future, or for some time, because all Euro Area countries have strong vested interests in foreign a path back to stability as quickly as possible, and all the more so since contagion has spread to Portugal and Spain. But what will this need?

Austerity packages never work in a vacuum. One of more of 4 crucial ingredients have to comprise the setting.  These are…

  • currency debasement,
  • a sharp fall in interest rates,
  • monetization of debt, and
  • a bail-out financing package.

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