Tag Archives: stratfor

STRATFOR gives A New Way to Think About Mexican Organized Crime

Summary: Stratfor looks at events in our southern partner, whose dynamics we ignore but might have a decisive effect on 21st century America. Trade, crime, immigration — Mexico is a central player in all of these, yet we pay more attention to events in Yemen. It’s another example of our cloudy vision, a weakness that can negate even the greatest power.   {2nd of 2 posts today.}

“What nation poses the greatest threat to the sovereignty of the US?”
“Mexico.”
— Q&A following briefing by Martin van Creveld to a US intelligence agency. Twenty years ago they were incredulous. Now it seems more realistic.

Stratfor

A New Way to Think About Mexican Organized Crime

By Tristan Reed at Stratfor, 15 January 2015

Decentralized but more powerful

Since the emergence of the Guadalajara cartel in the 1980s as one of the country’s largest drug trafficking organizations, Mexican organized crime has continued to expand its reach up and down the global supply chains of illicit drugs.

Under the Guadalajara cartel and its contemporaries, such as the Gulf cartel, led by Juan Garcia Abrego, a relatively small number of crime bosses controlled Mexico’s terrestrial illicit supply chains. Crime bosses such as Miguel Angel “El Padrino” Felix Gallardo, the leader of the Guadalajara cartel, oversaw the bulk of the trafficking operations necessary to push drugs into the United States and received large portions of the revenue generated. By the same token, this facilitated law enforcement’s ability to disrupt entire supply chains with a single arrest. Such highly centralized structures ultimately proved unsustainable under consistent and aggressive law enforcement pressure. Thus, as Mexican organized crime has expanded its control over greater shares of the global drug trade, it has simultaneously become more decentralized, as exemplified by an increasing number of organizational splits.

Indeed, the arrest of Felix Gallardo in 1989 and of colleagues such as Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo a few years prior led to the breakdown of the Guadalajara cartel by 1990. Thanks to geographic factors, however, Mexican organized crime was destined to increasingly dominate the global illicit drug trade, soon even eclipsing the role Colombian drug traffickers played in supplying cocaine to the huge and highly lucrative retail markets in the United States.

Continue reading

Stratfor: The Islamic State’s Pretense of Strength in Yemen

Summary:  Today Stratfor provides another bulletin the front (one of the many fronts) in our mad global war on groups we don’t like (excerpt when they’re allies, or we accidentally put them into power).   {2nd of 2 posts today.}

Stratfor

The Islamic State’s Pretense of Strength in Yemen

Stratfor, 18 June 2015

The Islamic State launched multiple suicide bombings in Sanaa aimed at Houthi rebels’ political headquarters and two mosques June 17, the eve of Ramadan. According to the Yemeni Health Ministry, the attacks killed at least four people and wounded at least 50 more.

It was the Islamic State’s fourth attack against mosques in Sanaa. The first and most deadly occurred March 20, when suicide bombers killed over 140 people in the bombing of two mosques during midday Friday prayers. Because al Qaeda has eschewed assaults on places of worship, the attack was unexpected and Islamic State suicide bombers were able to easily sneak into the mosques.

In response to the March attacks, authorities increased security at religious buildings, making it more difficult for militants to carry bombs or weapons into places of worship. To evade security, the Islamic State has adjusted its tactics and started planning more complex attacks. On May 22, the group sent a suicide bomber into a mosque with explosives hidden inside his sandals. Once detonated, the bomb resulted in 13 injuries but no deaths because of the small amount of explosives. Security officers at a mosque thwarted another would-be bombing on May 29 when they detained another Islamic State suicide bomber with explosives in his shoes.

Continue reading

Stratfor asks Why al Qaeda survives the assassination of its leaders?

Summary: Stratfor gives an answer to an oddity of US geopolitical strategy. We have killed so many enemy leaders, yet the flames of fundamentalist Islam continue to spread. See the links at the end for other explanations. But the answers matter not, as our foreign wars run beyond beyond logic — and beyond our control.  {2nd of 2 posts today.}

Stratfor

Why Ideologies Outlive Ideologues

By Scott Stewart at Stratfor, 18 June 2015

“Killing ideologies is harder than killing people.” Last week I made this statement when I was writing about how the al Qaeda form — or brand — of jihadism should not be written off as dead. It is quite possible that the al Qaeda brand of jihadism could even outlast that of its competitor for jihadist hearts and minds: the Islamic State.

The following points are among the several I made to support this argument: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been able to gain considerable strength in Yemen’s current chaos, and high-profile Sahel-based jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar recently denied that he had sworn loyalty to the Islamic State.

However, these particular considerations seemed to dissolve this week when Libyan government officials announced that Belmokhtar had been killed by a U.S. airstrike June 14 and when Yemeni sources noted that the leader of AQAP, Nasir al-Wahayshi, had been killed by a U.S. airstrike June 9.

The death of Belmokhtar has not been confirmed. Jihadists associated with the Libyan militant group Ansar al-Sharia, which was reportedly involved in the attack on a U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi in 2012, provided a list of those killed in the airstrike in Libya that did not include Belmokhtar. It appears that Belmokhtar may once again have escaped an attack that was reported to have taken his life.

Continue reading

Stratfor: A high stakes cage match – Nationalism vs. the European Union

Summary:  The European Union appears to be starting its long-predicted endgame, when its  design flaws create insolvable crises. This analysis by Stratfor goes to the heart of the EU, describing the forces that seem likely to halt or reverse the 65 year-long march to unification. They make a bold prediction which, if correct, will change the course of 21st C geopolitics. {2nd of 2 posts today.}

Stratfor

How Nationalism Undermines the European Union

Stratfor, 29 May 2015

Forecast

  • The loss of economic prosperity has hurt European integration efforts. Member states will now push to devolve power from the European Union to the national level.
  • Nationalist and anti-establishment parties in member states will undermine fundamental EU policy.
  • EU institutions will be able to manage this trend in the short term, but the economy will force Brussels to reshape the European Union.
  • Over time, nationalism will trump European integration and governments will repatriate power for the first time in EU history, leading to the collapse of the union.

On May 29, 2005, French voters rejected a proposed European Constitution in a nationwide referendum. A week later, the Dutch followed suit. This clear rejection of greater European integration was an iconic moment in the history of the European Union. Although it came in the form of a nation-state constitution, the European Constitution would primarily have collated all previous EU treaties into a single document. This symbolic act, plus the granting of more legislative powers to Brussels, would have been a major step toward a unified Europe formulated in the wake of World War II.

A decade since the Dutch and French referendums, the European project is in its deepest crisis. The economic turmoil that began in 2009 and produced the eurozone crisis has awakened nationalist instincts that undermine pan-Europeanism. These centrifugal forces have always been present and, historically, led some members to opt out of certain initiatives. The key difference in 2015, however, is that nations will choose to backpedal on integration — a first in EU history.

Integration and Sovereignty

The contest between nationalism and pan-Europeanism has been at the core of the European Union since it was first formulated in Rome in 1957. The union is an attempt to create a transnational entity out of a group of nation-states defined by different economies and political traditions, divided by a history of conflict. To unify these states, the European Union promised peace and economic prosperity. The resulting organization was a hybrid between a unified pan-European entity and a community of sovereign nation-states. In the ensuing decades, these competing visions have continued to clash, with nationalism succeeding several times in slowing the integration process.

Continue reading

Did we just surrender in the War on Terror?

Summary:  The United States cannot fight a war against radical Islamism and win.  That’s obvious, but we’re doing it anyway.  Here Chet Richards looks at our Grand Strategy as described by George Friedman of Stratfor.

20130118-Uncle-Sam-WOT

.

There are those who will tell you that if you can’t sit in on meetings of our national security apparatus, the best alternative is to read George Friedman. So his most recent column in Stratfor, “Avoiding Wars that Never End“, might be taken as a trial balloon for a less intrusive policy for dealing with the treat posed by radical Islam. Friedman proposes returning to the strategy that proved successful in the two great wars of the twentieth century:

The United States cannot fight a war against radical Islamism and win … But the United States has the option of following U.S. strategy in the two world wars. The United States was patient, accepted risks and shifted the burden to others, and when it acted, it acted out of necessity, with clearly defined goals matched by capabilities. Waiting until there is no choice but to go to war is not isolationism. Allowing others to carry the primary risk is not disengagement. Waging wars that are finite is not irresponsible.

Read the article. Although it seems like a welcome, if belated, exercise in 21st century realpolitik, if you read carefully, you find the same failed grand strategy that got us into our present condition: We will still be fighting an “ism,” primarily with military force.

As Friedman himself notes, this was not our original goal:

That goal was not to deny al Qaeda the ability to operate in Afghanistan, an objective that would achieve nothing. Rather, the goal was to engage al Qaeda and disrupt its command-and-control structure as a way to degrade the group’s ability to plan and execute additional attacks.

Continue reading

Do America’s leaders say “Apres moi, le deluge”?

Summary:  Today Chet Richards looks a recent Stratfor post about the crisis of the middle class, and from there explores some of the challenges facing 21st century America.

20130109-Fear-Wolf

.

George Friedman, Founder and CEO of Stratfor, is always worth reading for the same reason that, say, James Kilpatrick was: You might not have agreed with much that he wrote, but there were usually a few nuggets amidst the infuriation, and he wrote so amazingly well. In fact, in his later years, his columns on writing were all I remember.

Friedman has an important column  in Stratfor, The Crisis of the Middle Class and American Power. He opens with:

I received a great deal of feedback, with Europeans agreeing that this is the core problem and Americans arguing that the United States has the same problem, asserting that U.S. unemployment is twice as high as the government’s official unemployment rate. My counterargument is that unemployment in the United States is not a problem in the same sense that it is in Europe because it does not pose a geopolitical threat. The United States does not face political disintegration from unemployment, whatever the number is. Europe might.

And proceeds to argue most eloquently that the United States faces exactly that. This was also something the late John Boyd (Colonel, USAF) worried about. For examples, here’s part of his discussion of the prerequisites for an insurrection.  From his presentation Patterns of Conflict, slide 94:

Continue reading

CyberSecurity Question Time on the FM website!

Ask any question about cyberwar or computer security, broadly defined. This is a topic area in which, in my experience, there is a great deal of “established wisdom” that is neither wise nor established. We — and others reading the FM website — will attempt to answer it in the comments.   All answers welcomed!

Contents

  1. Questions received so far
  2. Quote of the week
  3. To start the discussion: articles of interest about cyber-issues

(1)  Questions received so far

Click on the title to bring up this post.  Then click on the link below to go directly to that queston.

  1. What’s going on with Stratfor? Are they secure now or what?
  2. How important are SOPA/PIPA?
  3. Should I frequently change my password?  If so, why?
  4. Why hasn’t the credit card system been made more secure?   How secure are ATM cards?
  5. How can chip+PIN for debit/ATM cards be safer than credit cards?  My liability for credit card fraud is only $50 but unlimited for debit cards.
  6. Will the current cyber-bashing between the Saudi and Israeli hackers escalate? Will this be repeated elsewhere?

(2) Quote of the week

“Come on, people. I know that China hacking stories are plausible, but the bar for actual evidence should be higher than this. ”
— Bruce Schneier in his “CryptoGram” blog

(3)  Some articles of interest to start the discussion!

(a)  You leave your right to privacy at the border

Continue reading