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Realism and Realpolitik:
Setting the Conditions for America's Survival in the
21st Century

ICAF INDEPENDENT RESEARCH PROJECT

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References

Realism and Realpolitik: Setting the Conditions for America's Survival in the 21st Century

I. Executive Summary

1. Introduction

In his famous work “To a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1798), Immanuel Kant stated that in achieving a perpetual peace between contesting wills: “...it does not require the moral improvement of man; it requires only that we know how to apply the mechanisms of nature to men so as to organize the conflict in such a way that they compel one another to submit to coercive laws and thus enter into a state of peace...” In spite of that pragmatic observation and the successful practice of his realistic, better said realpolitik perspective by many statesmen over the centuries, America remains idealistically fixated. We appear to be emboldened with our geopolitical successes in the 20th Century, and eager to impose the presumed universality of our societal models upon other peoples having different histories than our own. Indeed, the self-assertion and broader acknowledgement of the United States as the “sole remaining superpower” causes others to study each American diplomatic and information related proclamation with intense interest. Likewise, it does not escape the global audience’s attention that we Americans do not shy from acting in direct opposition to the universality of our idealistic principles whenever our national interests call for realpolitik solutions. For the time being our economy, military, and hegemonic reach remain formidable enough to allow us to survive our contradictions intact. We have not yet suffered any irreversible strategic damage from the perceived discrepancies between our words and deeds. However, the 21st Century has just begun, and our position of relative strength cannot be taken for granted in the future. The forces of anti-modernism led today by the reawakened imperial vanguard of the Islamic identity have placed America in its crosshairs. In his book “The Crisis of Islam” (2003), author Bernard Lewis attributes this shift of violent attention to the demise of the Soviet Union. This author will argue that the fundamentalist force of anti-modernism, spearheaded by a Radical Islamic vanguard today, is the greatest common threat to all advanced civilizations, including Russia and China. Yet, we struggle to achieve a committed alliance based on this common interest. The problem may lie in American unreliability, and a message-deed discrepancy that causes secular Islam consternation today, while also alienating our potential great power partners as well. The author has observed that our competitors and our erstwhile allies alike have come to perceive America as posing dangers to global stability as great as those who would reject the premises of modernity altogether. In fact in the eyes of many, a self-righteous America is an imperial enemy in herself, refusing to relinquish the toggles of preeminent power even when realities demonstrate that she is a declining civilization in the context of globalization. As a consequence, our unregulated sole superpower behavior may be inappropriate and come to threaten our own national survival at home, and potentially irreversibly in this modern age of superempowerment.

2. Background

To begin the discussion, we should take notice of a recent formal pronouncement by two of our most significant sister civilizations, namely the reemerging global powers of China and

Russia. Placing their fierce past rivalries aside, these two geopolitical giants and master practitioners of realpolitik appear to be forging a joint way ahead to manage the dangerous uncertainties of globalization on their terms. The notable exclusion of the United States as a partner in this process is noteworthy. On 1 July, 2005, in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin jointly proclaimed an “International World Order of the 21st Century” in Moscow. Among other premises, the world view embraces global multi-polarity and the principle of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations, including each nation’s freedom to choose development paths in light its own conditions. In many respects the Sino-Russian perspective stands in direct opposition to the fundamental precepts, assumptions, and objectives of the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States.

The stark contrast between American principles of foreign policy and those of the Russians and the Chinese would have been understandable during the Cold War given the diametrically opposed ideological outlooks of the socialist and free world camps. But times have changed, with Russia now a struggling democracy and China a more pragmatic mix of socialism and capitalism. Americanization as an ideology based on a liberal free market, capitalism, and western-oriented rule of law would appear to have been the victor in the war of economic ideas since the demise of the USSR. Ironically, this author will argue that America herself appears more alienated from these two great power beneficiaries of our global market creation than ever before. This alienation continues to worsen even as the U.S. redoubles her efforts to clarify her idealistic purpose and achieve energetic unity in the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

3. Thesis

America’s frustration with powerful potential partners may be rooted in the expectation that the broader idealistic American world view must also have universal validity, simply because we survived the Cold War intact and victorious. This U.S.-centrism and idealism is understandably the residual euphoria of having prevailed over the Soviet Union and our consequent unopposed hegemonic extension into the resulting vacuum. Yet, in our rigid self-righteousness, as reflected in the current National Security Strategy, we seem to overlook the cyclical realities of civilizations throughout recorded history, and fail to give credence to the world views of others. From a domestic perspective, there is no harm in America “drinking her own idealistic bath water” as it pertains to our sovereign affairs. However, it can be argued that it is increasingly dangerous for the U.S. to project her ideals into international affairs with what has come to be perceived by many as hypocritical inconsistency. Similarly, it may be unwise to do so at a time when real global power is cycling away from sole American dominance, an issue to be discussed later in this paper. Instead, America will therefore need powerful and reliable allies such as China and Russia in her confrontation with the fundamentalist forces that threaten all of modern civilization.

These anti-modernist forces are the real common global enemy of civilization in the so called long war begun in this 21st Century. Anti-modernism does not suggest the rejection of technology or machines, as they have utility for all antagonists in waging war. It does suggest

the absolute rejection by committed extremists of the decadent fallout of modernity and its various root causes. The subversion of ancient primitive values relating to spiritualism, race, ethnic identity, morality, and societal fairness through modernity and globalization is the trend that anti-modernists combat. The author suggests that Radical Islam serves as the current armed vanguard for the growing number of politically diverse state and non-state anti-modernist soldiers and their sympathizers. Radical Islam's combined conventional and unconventional weapons arsenals and swelling ranks of soldiers logically has the temporary lead in this global assault. While overt alliances to date center on Islamic fundamentalist groups and states, there are signs that the commonality of anti-modernist values may lead to opportunistic alliances with Neo-Nazi and other fascist forces in the near future. For example, direct electronic links to Islamic extremist websites from the white supremacist Aryan Nations website (2006) are compelling evidence of this opportunistic connection.

It is this author's opinion that as a prerequisite to effectively confronting the nihilistic dangers of the anti-modernist menace, we may have to first subdue a self-righteous American demon within ourselves. This internal enemy is largely a product of outgroup ascription. It constitutes a national attitude perpetuated by a volatile mix of outsider perceptions and self-righteous American idealism. It generates rage in our enemies and distrust and alienation amongst our potential friends, and likely contributes to U.S. exclusion from important partnerships, like the Sino-Russian agreement noted earlier. In short, our attitude and actions could be titled Imperial America. In the U.S. context the word imperial should not be understood solely as the projection of military power for expeditions, occupation or subjugation. Instead, it should be understood as America's perceived hegemonic grip on global affairs through capital flow, rule-set creation, and cultural infection. Imperial is therefore meant as the root of Imperialism as defined in Vladimir Lenin's 1917 treatise "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism." This increasingly shared perception of the U.S. is loathed by the Radical Islamists, their diverse anti-modernist sympathizers, and increasingly by great modern powers such as China and Russia.

This author will argue that a humble departure from the crusader-like tone of American idealism in favor of a consistent realpolitik firmly rooted in the coinciding national security interests of America and other global powers will be required for 21st Century survival. As a complimentary step, America should reverse her progressive alienation from Secular Islam, by addressing substantively the issue of our perceived complicity in historical offenses against Islam. Only by these means can we isolate the ideological political forces of Radical Islam from moderate Secular Islam itself. Since armed Radical Islam serves as the armed vanguard for all anti-modernists, including Neo-Nazi and Fascist extremists, once isolated those forces can be destroyed. In sum total, this author will argue that modern U.S. foreign policy must adopt the fundamental precepts of the "clear-eyed" realpolitik advocated by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. The reliability, pragmatism, and national humility of this return to American realism will allow us to tolerate our natural civilizational decline while guaranteeing our physical survival as a nation through the 21st Century.

II. Research Protocol

1. Sequence

The research that was conducted in the formulation of this paper consisted of four phases. The first phase involved the author's participation in a relevant Strategy and Public Policy (SPP) course at the ICAF that looked at U.S. National Security Strategy, the Global War on Terrorism, and other salient foreign policy issues that relate to the subject of this paper. The second phase involved the author's participation in a relevant Regional Security Studies (RSS) course on China. Both the SPP and RSS courses consisted of required and recommended literature reviews, classroom discussion, guest lectures and written research papers. Together, the SPP and RSS experiences culminated in a set of personal assumptions that served as the author's foundation and point of departure for the development of this research paper. The third phase of the research involved the formulation of interview questions and subsequent conduct of an interview with a senior official from the Chinese Embassy. An interview was also requested of officials at the Russian Embassy, but this did not come to pass during the limited research period. Finally, separate literature reviews of materials outside of the scope and assigned readings of the SPP and RSS courses were conducted to cap off the entire set of initial research observations. The additional literature review included a focus on the contemporary politics of Russia and issues of relevance to modern Islam. The set of research protocols and their sequence of execution was determined to be the optimal method for addressing the thesis of this paper within the construct of the ICAF Program.

2. Technique

The need for the U.S. to set lasting global conditions to help guarantee our survival as an intact Republic through the 21st Century constitutes the governing dilemma of this paper, and the basis for a proposed solution. Highlighting the perspectives of two of the great nuclear powers of China and Russia, and discussing how their views have come to diverge so sharply from those of the U.S. in the midst of globalization, is included in this discussion. The issue discussion will begin with an alternative, less-judgmental perspective on the underlying context of globalization that could be affecting the reality-based thinking of Russia and China, as well as others. It will include a closer look at portions of the Joint Sino-Russian vision that could be perceived as being diametrically opposed to idealistically-based U.S. foreign policy and national security perspectives. The discussion will continue with significant events in the recent histories of both nations that have tempered China and Russia's respective, ideologically-fixated 20th Century world views in favor of more pragmatic 21st Century outlooks. The paper will then address the potential points of friction between America, and China, and Russia as touched upon in the aforementioned Moscow joint statement and its potential consequences. Alternatively, this will include the possible positive opportunities for U.S. partnerships given a tangible change of our international approach based on an adherence to a more realistic world view. Furthermore, it will present discussions relating to specific geopolitical flash points such as Taiwan and Chechnya, as well as a potential renaming of the "Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)." Alternatively, the paper will discuss real possible ramifications of a U.S. continuation of the policy status quo, i.e. our continued self-righteous pursuit of global interests according to domestically embraced principles.

III. Report of Research

1. Assumptions

This research project began with assumptions that arose as a consequence of the author's participation in the ICAF curriculum. The assumptions postulate the existence of certain circumstances, described herein, as being widely acknowledged and therefore possibly constituting self-evidence that justified proceeding with research. The first assumes that Americanization has unintentionally placed America's national security in peril for reasons intimately intertwined with rapid, ungovernable advancement of technology and accumulating global surpluses. The second assumes that the natural rise and fall of great civilizations is a rational explanation for America's diminishing influence over the day to day outcomes of global affairs in the 21st Century. This decline is highlighted and exacerbated by the rise of China, Russia, and the Radical Islamic vanguard of anti-modernism as the most important "wills" and politics with whom America must come to grips with as globalization proceeds. These assumptions led to the choice of sources for literature review in support of research completion.

a. Assumption 1: Americanization and globalization imperil global balance

For various reasons, America appears to be at risk of becoming the sacrificial scapegoat for all of the tragedies and evils befalling the modern global community. Our Founding Fathers recognized the complementary characteristics of personal liberty and free trade for the U.S. domestically. Exported through Americanization, these ideals have acted as fuel for an irresistible expression and expansion of the creative will of both individuals and societies. Our forefathers could not have predicted that America and the world would some day confront a closed global geometry constrained by dwindling natural resources and aggravated by rampant technological progress. Most significantly though, their optimism could not have foretold the unintended global moral consequences of their domestic experiment. The contemporary consequences include a radical departure from the values of traditional cultures, values that they as gentlemen and aristocrats probably took for granted. Today, the undisciplined sense of individual and national entitlement that our American model and influence unleashed has a voracious material appetite that is out of balance with the realities of a finite natural world at large.

America's domestic success led to the more ominous outward ideological phenomenon of Americanization defined earlier. In the process we laid the seeds for American economic hegemony and eventually globalization. America epitomizes modernity, and as such logically generated its dialectical opposite, which the author has described as anti-modernism. Wictionary (2006) defines the anti-modernist simply as one who opposes modernism. This author contends that anti-modernism can be employed as an umbrella ideology that captures the common root beliefs of most extremist movements today. From Radical Islamic Wahhabists to Neo-Nazis to the soldiers of Christian Identity and the now-dormant "Order," all advocate returning to a purer state of individual and tribe-like community spiritualism. Race, ideological-religious conviction, and ethnic identities assume primacy as both political means and ends. Anti-Semitism is a common theme in many. Though anti-Semitism has complex origins beyond the scope of this paper, it is this author's contention that the presence of it in so many ideologies appears to treat

Jews as the vanguards of modernity itself, a subject to be considered later. Still, anti-modernists see no contradictions in their liberal employment of technology and capital to battle their materialistic enemies, the very inventors of those means and systems.

This author also observes that anti-modernists perceive, and violently resist the decay of traditional and even primitive values associated with modernity. In the eyes of our ideologically opposed adversaries Americanization has come to define the negative influence that western culture, today led by America, has had on other countries and their spiritual well-being. These include the subversion of self-regulating traditional values of modesty, humility, social responsibility, self-sacrifice, and subordination. The influence of the American brand of materialism has been compared to the destructive transformation that an individual suffers as a consequence of drug addiction. An example is illustrative. Holology is a lesser known anti-modernist movement. Its propaganda posted at “holology.com” captures the absolutist reaction of most anti-modernists to the U.S. as a perceived peddler of global materialism and degeneracy. It states in part: “American culture is far more dangerous than cocaine or heroin...[with] the three major cultural narcotics of choice today [being] religion, television, and money.” This rhetoric could be dismissed as the ranting of harmless societal outcasts if it did not have past parallels in the rhetoric of more potent enemies of the U.S. and western civilization. Wahhibist literature and even German National Socialist doctrine, such as Alfred Rosenberg’s famous work, “The Myth of the 20th Century” (1934) condemn the west for the same reasons. Societal decadence, humanistic indifference, unbridled material greed, and the emergence of self-perpetuating leisure classes were and are denounced as signs that traditional mores have succumbed to western values. For example, the German Nazis propagandized the seedy social excesses of the Weimar Republic as evidence of Germany’s spiritual decay. Similarly, the ideal selfless “Socialist Type” of the Soviet Union and the Red Guards of China’s Cultural revolution were, through ideological indoctrination, supposedly immune to the temptations of the degenerate Capitalist character. In reality, Communists are modernists, to include Karl Marx who accepted the materialistic evils of Capitalism as an unavoidable stage of history whose appearance should be accepted as a logical development rather than resisted. The Chinese embrace of globalization confirms this today. At the same time they recognize and seek to minimize the corruptive effects of capitalism in the Chinese people according to a characteristically Chinese developmental path to be discussed later. In the end, while falling short of a consciously organized conspiracy, the similarity of concerns regarding materialism and Americanization cannot be dismissed as mere chance.

Americanization has spread quickly by any historical measure, but is now running up against the finite space and natural resources of planet earth. Expecting any democratically achieved self-imposition of great individual and societal inconveniences, by Americans or other practitioners of Americanization to stop or reverse the trend would appear to be optimistic at best. This inability of democracies to muster the singular will to combat the worst ills of capitalism has reinforced another widely-held anti-modernist perspective that democracy is fundamentally weak. Bernard Lewis’ book “The Crisis of Islam” (2003) suggests that Radical Islam holds America entirely accountable for this global spiritual degeneracy today. While there is truth to our complicity in some areas, there is little that America can do to return the genie of materialism into the bottle on her own. The worship of capital is no longer confined to America or the west. In fact, almost a century ago, in his treatise “Imperialism: The Highest Stage of

Capitalism” (1916), author Vladimir Lenin predicted globalization and its associated characteristics and ills. Neither America nor any other specific nation was accused then of being the specific societal culprit. Instead, Lenin projected the fully matured form of transnational Capitalism that we see today as the root cause. Also, there is little justification to hold the living generations of Americans solely accountable for the global state of affairs, especially for the plight of Islam. In “The Crisis of Islam” (2003), Bernard Lewis also describes America’s coincidental misfortune that Islam’s modern humiliation and America’s emergence as the dominant 20th Century hegemon both date to the end of WWI. For Wahhabists and other extremist anti-modernists alike, the coincidence of status quo imperial U.S. attitudes and our interventionist foreign policy are politically useful. It is this author’s opinion that ultimately America does have the power to effect some fundamental changes to these conditions in her own national security interests, and these are discussed later. However, some deterministic trends are largely beyond the U.S.’ ability to contain on her own. These trends are discussed below.

(1) The emergence of a global organism

This author suggests that at the beginning of the 21st Century one can compare the globalization of humankind to the emergence of a single biological organism. The common technologies employed by individual and community entities have come to dominate the common experience and tool set of humankind. Subordination of individual identities to communal identities is being eased by such commonalities, with information technology tools as just one example. Currently confined to the finite dimensions of terrestrial earth, technological connectivity enables and causes humans to personify individual cells within communities, and communities to personify organs within the emerging global organism. From a macro perspective, the interdependencies of the growing world population can be predicted to cause discrete traditional races, cultures, and individuals to be progressively synthesized, a process that is evident today. Transnational identities such as multinational corporations, religions, and widely emigrated ethnic characteristics already weaken the meaning of geographically-defined nation states. The author argues that terrestrial earth is a spherical shell culture dish of sorts. Colonies of humankind press against both the ecosphere’s uninhabitable volumes, and one another, as they struggle to dominate the organism.

There is also a concurrent invention of new technical efficiencies to artificially adjust to the closed geometry of the remaining habitable and arable land masses aboard planet earth, allowing population growth to continue. Machine systems and communal organs are also refined to accommodate further growth. From individual life span extension to urbanization, natural long-term balances are artificially overpowered in the interests of the organism. In the process, traditional protective firewalls between individual and community antagonists are disintegrating in the interests of proximity, commerce, and economic specialization. Those firewalls traditionally include continental separation by water and natural terrain barriers. Rather than using our collective intelligence to reverse the trends, generally, we employ that intelligence to accommodate our increasing control over terrestrial processes to ease further integration. As a sign that the organism is becoming a self-conscious reality, local events are beginning to have instantaneous and non-linear global implications, just as one observes in the neurological systems of other organisms.

Since the dominant characteristics of the organism are still being contested today, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between evil cancers and righteous organs. After all the victor of the contest is still undetermined. Within the most technologically advanced western communities, moral judgments have become relative and subjective. Furthermore, modernity negates traditional mores, with the sovereign attributes of nation states giving way to new transnational organs of power that do not coincide with national boundaries. Anti-modernists are agitated as they see the survival of more their primitive values threatened by this progress. These values include spiritualism, individual self-discipline, hierarchical subordination, gender roles, heroic martyrdom, and the universal reifusion of individual character with ancient martial traits. Islamic fundamentalists and Neo-Nazis are opportunistic allies in their anti-modernist alarm regarding the material-technological corruption of the human spirit. Instead of being able to isolate themselves from modern civilization, they are forced into direct contact with unwelcome global, technocratic, and ultimately enemy values. Even the strongest advocates for technological progress have shared some of the legitimate concerns of anti-modernists regarding societal decay and the potential of technology and materialism to corrupt the core of the individual human spirit.

In his essay, “The Demonism of Power” (2001), the 20th Century German Industrialist and Philosopher, Dr. Hans L. Merkle stated: “It is conceivable – and perhaps we have an obligation to face it – that the demonism of power in the future cannot be related to the individual any longer. Power becomes increasingly anonymous but no less dangerous for the free evolution of humanity. Falsification of concepts is the first step toward the development of concentrations of power of a new kind – impersonal, intangible, almost ghostly...and because society so emasculated will not be able to deal with social processes without some mechanism, social tasks will be assigned to organs of a new kind. The despotism of tyrants will be replaced by the despotism of the apparatus.”

At this relatively early stage of globalization where the increasingly transnational, “organs of a new kind” described by Dr. Merkle are still under development, the geographically defined American nation remains at center-stage. The ghostly qualities of largely automated apparatus systems can be seen in counterintuitive American societal decision making today. For example, the “ghostly” inertia of the “Military-Industrial Complex” first identified by President Dwight D. Eisenhower is one prominent case in which an American societal invention defies the ability of individuals to alter its behavior. In a 1961 speech President Eisenhower warned: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence...by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” Indeed, it does persist. As an example, the recent Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) (2006) confirmed that the Department of Defense (DoD) military acquisition processes defy modification more than forty years later. This author is not alone in arguing that the phenomenon drives both the economy and foreign policy in directions that are perhaps against the nation’s best interests. President Eisenhower’s warning constitutes one manifestation of Dr. Merkle’s “concentration of power of a new kind.”

Some might argue that the global evolution of humankind and its institutions and technologies is better described as a mere increase in societal complexity. Complexity is an easier explanation to accept than the controversial assertion identifying a new and increasingly

self-conscious biological-mimicking entity. To this it can be countered that specialization is actually the continuous simplification of complexities, with urbanization, the internet, mass transportation, and increasingly interconnected national infrastructures around the globe as the physical development of a body or body architecture. Over time this entity will move beyond the simple mimicking of biological processes to the “embodiment” of them. Humans increasingly act as highly specialized cells and neurons. The ultimate consequence is an increased density and heretofore unknown systemic integration of humankind. Kinetic and non-kinetic human activities large and small will increasingly have instantaneous global implications throughout the integrated body. This includes implications that could be considered fratricidal or even suicidal, with concrete examples to be discussed later in this paper.

(2) The deterministic power of technological advancement

In “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” (1986), Richard Rhodes quotes Dr. Robert Oppenheimer who once stated: “It is a profound and necessary truth that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it is possible to find them.” It is not mere coincidence that the species-specific quirk of human curiosity is the cause of the technology-enabled efficiencies and machines at the heart of globalization, as is the extraordinary material surpluses to which they lead. Furthering this theme, in his book “The Biosoma” (2003) author Dr. George Bugliarello confirms an acceleration of machine technologies: “Today, the speed of development of new designs is several orders of magnitude faster than in macroscopic biological species, and does not seem to abate [and continues] at a dizzyingly accelerating pace.” (pp.12) This steepening of the machine evolution curve will have as a consequence the further specialization and interdependence of the global organism, yet without the evolved human species maturity to handle the development constructively. In this respect biological engineering and reengineering must be included, as these areas of scientific curiosity exemplify the species maturity doubts today.

The author contends here that over the course of the 21st Century this machine acceleration will certainly cause the emergence of Hans Merkle’s apparatus as modernity proceeds. Calamity will, however, threaten to interrupt further development under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism and sympathetic anti-modernists such as Neo Nazi, Christian Identity, and other violent movements. Today, armed Radical Islamists around the world are carrying the water for the others. However as the ranks and armaments of the others increase this may become a shared endeavor, even if the peripheral baggage of their individual ideologies eventually turn out to be in conflict. At the conclusion of his book “Under the Banner of Heaven” (2004), author Jon Krakauer observes: “There are come 10,000 extant sects – each with its own cosmology, each with its own answer for the meaning of life and death. Most assert that the other 9,999 not only have it completely wrong but are instruments of evil...” (pp.341) Yet, spiritual purity and the corruptive impact of materialism are common denominators of many of these fundamentalist outlooks, and set the stage for convenient alliances as they take their fight to their globalizing hosts. Americans and American values are the immediate targets. In The Crisis of Islam (2003) author Bernard Lewis clarified that it was American materialism’s seductive properties, not perceived U.S. military aggression, that caused the Ayatollah Khomeini to label America as the “Great Satan.” Conversely, Western advocates such as Hans Merkle have observed that in spite of its seductive properties, humankind can lead technological

progress for the common good through strong individual and organizational character. What is important to note here is that a common threat from modernity is confirmed by both sides.

As in the past, most futuristic science fiction visions give way to technological fact over time. More often than not, and because of the inquisitive human spirit that stimulated their creation, their appearances have appeared as strategically significant disruptive innovations. Some have been weapons technology-related, but the preponderance have allowed humankind to materially prosper. The U.S. has held the creative technological advantage in this area in the past, however today we are fast forfeiting our dominant intellectual position to other competing civilizations, such as China, Russia, and others. As evidence, in his book “The World is Flat” (2005), author Thomas Friedman observed that China and India are both out-pacing the U.S. in the production of PhDs related to science and engineering. These future innovators are also increasingly being educated in first class domestic institutions that rival the finest technical universities of the U.S.

As it pertains to national security considerations, manufacturing technologies in particular have enabled an ever-increasing surplus of destructive martial capacity throughout the world. Much of this surplus of war making material and weapons has a long functional shelf life. The useful surplus therefore continues to build up leading to a proliferation of locally available arms through opportunistic market forces. In “On War” (1832) Carl von Clausewitz stated that “...to overcome the enemy or disarm him...must always be the aim of warfare.” (pp.76) Given modern conditions, this aim becomes more elusive for any nation prosecuting a military expedition. Instead there exists today an egalitarian distribution of arms throughout societies that defies true disarmament by any invader bent on pacification or occupation. True disarmament can no longer be reliably verified over time, with America’s conventional challenge in Iraq as a current example. In the future, that egalitarian distribution will likely include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including miniaturized nuclear weapons.

The same technology and surplus-enabled challenge to military expeditions applies equally to U.S. domestic security. Globalization has permitted, better said facilitated the infiltration of threats into the heart of the U.S. and other industrialized communities around the world. In a seeming contradiction, some immigrants who arrive based on legitimate economic incentives are reindoctrinated by fundamentalists and turned into soldiers to destroy the very modernization that drew them to the U.S. and the west in the first place. Some disaffected immigrant communities both shelter and serve as soldier recruitment pools for the waging of anti-modernist warfare. It is the author’s position that the availability of WMD will generally increase as the combination of technological simplicity, miniaturization, and the determination to acquire such capabilities will out-pace non-proliferation efforts. Confounding national security further is the anarchistic employment of the free western press and the internet, inherent vulnerabilities within the nervous system of the emerging organism.

Some say that theories of determinism in human affairs, be they related to social engineering, the outcomes in military conflicts, or any free will-based activities of humankind have been disproved throughout history. This is due to the infinite unknowable alternative paths and the element of chance. The author counters this with the assertion that it is technology alone that has weathered uncertainty, relentlessly advancing, first linearly and since the advent of

industrialization exponentially. Technology, not spiritualism, is shaping all human activity, and this is self-evidence of its determinism. As it pertains to the evolution of the larger organism, technology is leading to communal efficiencies equal to or greater than the preexistent efficiencies between individual human cells in nature. The corresponding singular consciousness of the organism may eventually come to eclipse the self-consciousness of its individual human components. Many would warn that such an evolution resembles communism at its philosophical extreme. The inexorable trend is what it is, so a value judgment, however tempting, may be inappropriate. Neo-Luddites such as author Kirkpatrick Sale (1995) have noted that only massive population “die-offs” associated with ecosphere collapse, an act of nature, total war between great powers, or the victory of anti-modernists could interrupt this process.

(3) Individual superempowerment

Today the power of individuals, whether military or non military, to commit acts of strategic significance is increasing. This is overwhelmingly a function of technology access. The distinction between law enforcement activities and military action is increasingly blurred as a result. The condition tends to erase the distinction between internally directed police activities and externally directed military action, as their differentiation becomes irrelevant in a single integrated body. Aggravating this is the proliferation of the surplus of war-making materials and technologies discussed earlier, giving rise to the modern phenomenon of individual “superempowerment.” In their article “The American Way of War” (2003) VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski and P. M. Barnett stated: “The ultimate attribute of the emerging American Way of War is the superempowerment of the war fighter...as we increasingly face an international security environment where rogue individuals... pose the toughest challenges, eventually the application of our military power will mirror the dominant threat to a significant degree. In other words, we morph into a military of superempowered individuals fighting wars against superempowered individuals.” Therefore, the difference between a criminal and a strategic threat is becoming an issue of scale, as qualitatively they are becoming indistinguishable. The individual human platform designed to deliver catastrophic effects has thereby evolved into the most sophisticated precision weapons delivery vehicle for the conduct of 21st century warfare.

The characteristic of superempowerment grew out of VADM Cebrowski’s concepts of network centric warfare, where individual operators draw their lethality from networks of capabilities into which they and their individual platforms are fully integrated. Admittedly, criticism of network centric premises have appeared, much related to the over-reliance on vulnerable non-kinetic technologies for connectivity. For example, network vulnerability to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) has received attention through the report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from EMP Attack (2004). The narrow perception that superempowerment is entirely network-dependent has therefore caused the concept to be discredited by some in recent years. However, this represents a misunderstanding of VADM Cebrowski’s comprehensive concept. While the network was seen as transforming warfare, so too were the individual platforms that contribute nodes to the network. Their individual kinetic lethality capabilities grow exponentially with modern technologies. It is here that nuclear weapons miniaturization and super-energetic chemically-based conventional explosives will come to superempower conventional and unconventional soldiers. Individual

extremists, driven purely by ideological and religious motivations will be superempowered when armed with such weapons, even in the absence of the network. In fact we have already seen that such adversaries pose a much greater danger when they are effectively “off the network,” and relatively immune to our own counter-propaganda. This is best exemplified by the ability of lethal Al Qaeda cells, guided only by the equivalent of a “Commander’s Intent,” to remain invisible for years prior to striking.

In his McNair Paper titled “Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next ODR” (2000) author Kenneth F. McKenzie described asymmetric warfare as: “Leveraging inferior or tactical or operational strength against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives.” Confirming this, a recent Distinguished Lecturer at the National Defense University (2006) stated a compelling case for acknowledging that terrorism is nothing other than a useful tool of modern warfare. This particular tool is indeed preferred by the superempowered anti-modernist soldiers of the 21st Century. Combining these two complementary observations, the modern tools of the modern nihilist are no less legitimate or effective than any other traditional martial tools of Grand Strategy. As noted above, for our asymmetric anti-modernist adversaries it is less the network and more the awesome power of the individual threat platforms that superempowers them. In highly technical, liberal societies like the U.S., Clausewitz’s disarmament aim of warfare is ever-less attainable by conventional thinking, as enemies are allowed to transparently nest themselves within our societal camp. As a case in point, in “The Turner Diaries” (1978), the fictional extremist soldier Earl Turner succeeded in destroying the Pentagon armed with an acquired nuclear weapon and a small private aircraft. At the time of its publication many dismissed such an apocalyptic scenario as unrealistic, as technological difficulty and Cold War non-proliferation precluded such possibilities. However, today’s technology-enabled superempowerment of discontented fanatics like the Neo-Nazi Earl Turner or Al Qaeda operatives makes the scenario plausible. Timothy McVeigh and the Jihadist martyrs, and their respective acts of conventional carnage are omens of the greater threat, both domestically and globally. Furthermore, the demonstrated psychological resilience of properly indoctrinated superempowered soldiers to U.S. propaganda make preventive actions more difficult and measured punitive responses ever-less adequate. Given the ability of individuals and small groups to effect strategic outcomes from within our midst, creative solutions are called for, and these will be suggested later.

b. Assumption 2: More so than others, four polities will define the 21st Century

In this paper the author proposes that for America to survive as a nation in the 21st Century the complex geopolitical landscape of friends, competitors and enemies must be accurately defined for simplicity and pragmatic action. It is unprompted action on realism-based perceptions that will allow us to form the geopolitical landscape, creating conditions that suit our longer term national security needs in order to head off calamity. In military terminology it is called gaining and maintaining the initiative. The author contends that America must do this to survive intact, even if it requires pulling back from some untenable idealistic precipices. Concrete examples of possible U.S. initiatives will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

Simplification allows us to construct an alternative landscape. This author contends that

America currently has only three “potential enemies” and one “intractable enemy.” This section proposes that Russia and China are two of the three potential enemies of the U.S. They are polities with whom we still have opportunities to avoid alienation and confrontation through *realpolitik*. The third potential enemy is the idealism and self-righteous posturing that permeates the mainstream American political class and its foreign policies. While appropriate for domestic political purposes, school master-like attitudes of moral superiority are counterproductive demons that threaten our very survival in the international sphere of the 21st Century. Slaying the internal demon of self-righteous entails stifling our perpetual tendency to prescribe for other nations what we believe is correct for them when in fact their sovereign affairs are none of the U.S.’ business. Finally, the intractable enemy is Radical Islam as the armed vanguard of all anti-modernists. This enemy will soon include the other absolutist extremists, fascists and ecoterrorists alike, as they grow and arm themselves to appear in the follow-on echelons of anti-modernism. This intractable enemy and its will to fight must be utterly destroyed.

Many will contend that such oversimplification is naïve. For example assuming that China’s role in the 21st Century eclipses that of others such as India, let alone any developing nation, ignores tangible facts. China’s special treatment would ignore a quantitative snapshot comparison of the two giants. Both are great nuclear powers of comparable population, rapidly advancing educational competency, and explosive economic potential. Others might add that Europe, Brazil, Japan, the Koreas, and fascist Iran deserve separate treatment in global calculations. This author argues that distinguishing the U.S.’ relationships with China and Russia from others originates in less tangible, though ominous historical and cultural contexts. Due to these stark contrasts, which are discussed later, the author concludes that China, and Russia, the anti-modernists led by the vanguard Radical Islamists, and our own internal demon of self-righteousness demand focused American attention. Other nations, both rich and rogue alike will follow the pragmatic initiatives of the identified great powers as a function of their individual pragmatic interests. This author further argues that the possibility that the U.S. could “get it wrong” with the identified potential enemies of China and Russia is much higher than with others such as India. Similarly, the corresponding national cost of getting it wrong with them will be much higher than with any other nations or corresponding civilizations, as they, like the U.S. still have the power to set the geopolitical landscape and conditions, for better or worse. In “To a Perpetual Peace” (1795) Immanuel Kant also proposed that nations: “...apply the mechanisms of nature to men so as to organize the conflict...” The above landscape simplification will allow us to insure that our mechanisms are logical in the context of executing a *realpolitik* favorable to the U.S. It will also help us to avoid falling victim to the unfriendly application of *realpolitik* by others.

(1) China

It is the opinion of this author that during the first half of the 21st Century the U.S. should be prepared to welcome China’s ascension and even supremacy over America as the world’s most economically and politically influential global power. Concurring with this perspective, in his recent article “The visit of President Hu to Washington underlines the inevitable loss of America's economic supremacy to China” (2006), author Clifford Coonan observed: “China is rising fast and is expected to eclipse the United States economically in the future - its gross domestic product is tipped to overtake that of America by 2045 [with a U.S.]

realization that its days as the world's economic superpower are numbered.” As a nation, China is undergoing change at a pace, and of a magnitude without precedent in human history. Touting a proud 5000 year history, ethnic homogeneity, and a rich Confucian self-discipline in all societal interactions, the character of the Chinese culture appears ready to weather the turbulence of the social revolution that sudden wealth is bringing. Having survived repeated 19th Century foreign interventions, 20th Century Japanese invasion and atrocities, civil war, and the self-destructive idealism of Mao Zedong (Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia 1990), a pragmatic and nationalistic China is asserting herself with energetic confidence. In his book “The Chinese” (2004), author Jasper Becker observes: “The extraordinary durability of the Chinese state would not seem to depend on any fixed ideology. Quite why China should have survived into the 21st Century against all expectations is not easy to explain but it is undeniable and a source of great pride to the Chinese themselves.” (pp.345) Having conquered her painful past, China appears to be acutely sensitive to her perceptions that outsiders desire to intrusively modify her characteristically Chinese, and increasingly nationalistic course.

While officially Communist in form, China constitutes a capitalistic powerhouse fueled by a universal work ethic, growing literacy, and a combination of technological, manufacturing, and financial competence. Simultaneously, in “China’s New Nationalism” (2005), Peter Hays Gries also notes China’s ultimate hedge against instability due to unforeseen events. China’s nuclear-armed Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) stands prepared to confront all threats to China's sovereignty and national interests, and is equally prepared to buttress national unity internally should the Party-State falter during this period of rapid growth and cautious liberalization. Economically, China also appears well-positioned for continued ascension. According to the CIA World Factbook (2006), her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is now estimated at \$1.8T. At the current growth rate of 9.3% per year China’s GDP is expected to surpass that of the U.S. before 2045. China has also become a chief lending nation benefiting from an impressive trade surplus with the U.S. and others, and is now estimated to hold hundreds of billions of dollars worth of foreign currency reserves, and she continues to accumulate more.

According to a recent Distinguished Lecturer at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, China’s three national priorities can be accurately discerned through the prism of western values. His expert assessment was that they are in order, 1) the stability and primacy of the communist party leadership, 2) the handling of the Province of Taiwan on One-China’s terms, and 3) the sustainment of China’s economic growth. However, this widespread western assessment may have to be revisited when those priorities are superimposed upon an increasingly fierce nationalistic will. In his book titled “China’s New Nationalism” (2005), Peter Hays Gries observes: “Popular nationalists are not just influencing domestic politics; they are also beginning to influence the making of Chinese foreign policy” (pp.134). In recent months American officials, including the Secretary of Defense and the President (2006) have continued to use the western prism in accessing China. This confusion of perspectives is particularly evident in U.S. complaints of an alleged lack of Chinese transparency. In a 2006 “GlobalSecurity.org” article, author Al Pessing reported that Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld recently openly stated: “I don’t really know why [the Chinese] seem to be increasing [their defense spending and modernization].” U.S. hedging against the allegedly unknown intentions of China’s rapid military modernization is clearly reflected in the priorities of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The improvement of China's military is proceeding forward with vigor, and impervious to the concerns and protests of competitors and potential adversaries, including Japan and the U.S. China's nuclear forces boast a modern, survivable family of submarine launched, mobile-land-based, cruise, and long-range ballistic missiles, many capable of striking the Continental U.S. In addition to developing a strike capability that can overwhelm Japanese, U.S., and Taiwanese theater missile defenses, China's future integrated air defense system also guarantees a domestic shield against stealth-enabled precision strike of the sort on which the U.S. has come to so heavily depend in recent conflicts. Furthermore, in cooperation with partner nations China has developed a formidable naval surface warfare capability capable of tracking submarines and neutralizing carrier battle groups in anticipation of a conflict with the U.S. over the Province of Taiwan. It is also reported in the press that China is acquiring a significant counter-space capability to complement her own home-grown national security space program. Finally, China's willingness to engage in all manner of unrestricted warfare to exploit asymmetries with the U.S. and her allies is widely publicized. This doctrine for modern Chinese warfighting has been carefully articulated by PLA Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in a book titled "Unrestricted Warfare" (1999).

Many American experts on China at the National Defense University have cautioned against an overestimation of China's ultimate potential due to internal and external challenges that they see as frustrating her presumed ambitions. Several outside guest speakers were invited to address students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the China Regional Security Studies curriculum, under the precondition of non-attribution. With few exceptions, their assessments of China's development were less optimistic than the author's impression noted above that has been gleaned from a review of literature and China travel. For example, growing domestic environmental damage, an undocumented transient rural population of perhaps 150 million seeking urban work, growing rural-urban wealth disparities, official corruption, a disproportionately large and frustrated male population, and the secessionist forces in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xingjian are said to conspire to curtail China's rise.

Similarly, other visiting experts have noted that the issue Taiwan's political status cannot be over-simplified, as China might prefer. They contend that the status quo Chinese position regarding the inviolable integrity of One-China contained in the three "Joint Communiqués" (1972, 1979, and 1982) between the U.S. and China might have to be revisited. The perspective of the anthropologist Melissa J. Brown is representative of this alternative view. In her book "Is Taiwan Chinese?" (2004) she states that: "The Taiwan problem - the question of whether Taiwan should be a part of the Chinese nation, or its own independent nation - is a political issue. Moreover, it is an issue of identity. These statements are not contradictory, for...identity is political." (pp.211) Separately, in an article announcing Chinese President Hu Jintao's April 2006 visit to the U.S., Gerrit van der Wees, a spokesman for the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) argued: "How does the Chinese self-claimed peaceful rise jibe with the 800 missiles and the rapid military expansion of the Peoples Liberation Army?", and furthermore: "Why doesn't China emulate Taiwan's democracy?" Many American China watchers sympathize with both the anthropological identity and political arguments presented above, as well as with the Taiwanese fear of China's threatening posture towards her. They would point to the benefits, and even duty of America to counter-balance and hedge against

undetermined Chinese regional intentions with a firm strategic bond between the U.S., an independent Taiwan, and Japan.

In order to gain the Chinese perspective to more objectively consider the assertions of the U.S. China experts to whom the author had been exposed, research questions were submitted to the Embassy of the PRC in Washington D.C (2006). Summarized, the specific written questions were: “With respect to U.S.–Chinese bilateral relations, what aspects of current U.S. foreign policy cause the Chinese Government greatest concern...How does China view U.S. declarations contained within the ‘National Security Strategy...What does China consider to be the top three global threats to her own national security...Is the Global War on Terrorism aptly named, or is there a different name that might lead to a more focused and shared understanding of the mutual objectives of the U.S. and China...Does China consider the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act as furthering stable relations between our two countries...Given closer relations, what are areas of U.S. – Chinese shared strategic interest in which great and lasting partnerships could be initiated...” and “If the U.S. could make just one change in her policy towards China today that might lead to a long-term improvement in bilateral relations and broader cooperation during globalization, what would it be?”

In February 2006 a senior government official from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) offered to meet with the author to address those research questions. The interview took place at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC on 1 March 2006. At the meeting, the author’s Chinese government host and interviewee offered the opportunity to discuss the questions in a less formal and more interactive protocol. In this conversational setting all of the information sought by the author in the original questions was provided, however, individual points were topically organized, and not necessarily in the sequence of questions noted above. The interviewee also granted the author permission to take liberal hand-written notes, and those notes were subsequently transcribed by the author and sent to the interviewee for concurrence and/or correction. The consolidated text below constitutes a mutual understanding of the two participants regarding the information communicated in the interview. It also constitutes the formal Chinese government perspective on the original written questions (2006):

(a) “General Introduction”

“China is committed to peaceful domestic development in the context of globalization, and seeks to contribute internationally as a partner in a multi-polar world. China’s leadership is also faced with great domestic challenges, as the people of China have different concerns and interests throughout society. On the international front, China is committed to peace and cooperation. In terms of U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations, misunderstandings have arisen that cause Americans to question Chinese intentions, and the implications of her rapid development. Americans ask, is China a partner to be engaged or a threat to be contained. These misunderstandings can best be mitigated through franker bilateral communications on sensitive issues, including perceiving China and the U.S. through the eyes of the Chinese themselves, i.e. standing in the Chinese shoes. It also includes prioritizing the self interests of our nations as core, vital, and important, and finding the commonalities between them, i.e. the purpose of this interview.”

(b) “Chinese Economic and Societal Reforms”

“With regards to the Chinese economy, America, and indeed most of the world will agree that China’s pace of growth and fast development have been particularly noteworthy. Her sustained growth rate, that has averaged 9.5% per year over the past 26-27 years is without precedent in human history. The Chinese standard of living is rising and educational levels have been rising as a consequence, as are societal expectations. It is balance and stability China desires to preserve during this remarkable transformation. It must be noted here that Chinese characteristically treasure stability. As it pertains to Chinese reform, China’s population of over 1.3 billion people, her geographical challenges, and special history cause her societal approach to differ from the U.S., in both quality and scale. This can cause misunderstandings between our countries, especially on the issues of democratization, rule of law, and freedom of expression that America holds as ideal.”

“China admires these values, in fact China has made significant progress on all fronts since the reforms of 1979, largely by learning from the U.S. and Europeans. In fact China’s transition from a command economy to a market economy has been most dramatic, with influences from the governmental center limited today to macro-policy. Furthermore, China is not an enemy of the internet. There are currently 110 million Chinese internet users, second only to the U.S. in quantity. This number is rapidly increasing, as is the number of websites, currently numbered at over 700,000. Chinese education is another area of tremendous development since the reforms took effect, with China now producing the same number of college graduates each year that she produced over the entire 25 year period that preceded 1979. And the focus of education has turned to science, technology, economics, and education, the skill sets needed for further growth in the midst of globalization. Add to this China’s efforts to resolve civil and other issues in a court of law, as developmental imbalances last year resulted in 70,000 rural protests, freedom of expression unthinkable prior to the reforms.”

“And despite government interest in maintaining stability, this rapid economic growth has aggravated economically, regionally, and sector differentiated gaps. For example, the medium per capita income of the Chinese today is 1,700 dollars. But this increasing national wealth is by no means evenly distributed. While 100s of millions of Chinese are experiencing affluence, 100s of millions are also living in near-poverty. In fact, in 2005 24 million Chinese were actually living in poverty. Urbanization has also taken its toll, with a mobile work force seeking 24 million city jobs in 2005, even though only 10 million city jobs are being created each year. Further demarcations of wealth accumulation favor the East Coast Provinces over the western hinterland regions, and also favor the cities over the rural communities.”

“China believes that the next few years will be critical for maintaining China on a relatively balanced and stable course. As the medium per capital income grows from 1,700 dollars to 3,000 dollars gap tensions will increase, even threaten chaos. This is a focus of government efforts today, with the harmonious balance of gaps and growth stability as the goal. Once the 3,000 dollar threshold is crossed there will occur a much broader diffusion of national wealth and Services, especially to the disadvantaged. Essentially, the floor of subsistence for all will be raised, thereby relieving the tension. This is one of the reasons that the government is

currently so interested in maintaining stability and developing the social nets of Social Security and universal medical care, including health insurance, to have them in place to mitigate the tension.”

“China’s special characteristics require that her evolution towards these ideal characteristics must be thoughtful and deliberate. All Chinese abhor the danger of allowing the anarchic aspects of rapid development to lead to societal instability, degeneracy, and even chaos. The Chinese know well the destructive potential of chaos. The Cultural Revolution was the most recent example of a loss of control of idealistic forces that turned out to threaten the very fabric of her society. The author brought up the issue of the Google search engine, and how this and other unrestricted forms of internet access in the U.S. has been a two-edged sword. The author noted that this the unregulated internet has enabled forms of societal degeneracy and crime that are destructive by any measure, and unprecedented in scale. The interviewee did not dispute the validity of this observation. The ideal of unbridled freedom can be anarchic, with unintended consequences that threaten societal stability and well being.”

“It is clear that China’s path is a challenging one, full of both risks and opportunities. The forces of globalization such as open market economies, multilateralism, and the values noted above, are shared by the Chinese government, as well as others such as the U.S. But stability must be maintained throughout or the value of reform will be for naught for the Chinese people; there will be no reform, no development, no progress, and China will have no global future. Again, America must stand in Chinese shoes to understand why China’s path to development should and must be different from that of the U.S., as the two nations come from fundamentally different circumstances.”

“China notes with concern reference to her ‘rise’ as though it could be compared to that of Colonial or Imperial powers of the past. China’s remarkable economic achievements are the product of a total engagement with the other partners in a globalized world, and according to competitively-oriented, yet peaceful economic rule sets. These rule sets originate overwhelmingly in American open-free market principles, not in foreign conquest or the threat thereof, both anathemas to China’s world view as she herself has experienced colonization in the past. In this light, China would expect that America and others would welcome a highly competitive China to help raise the bar of scientific, technical and commercial excellence for the ultimate global betterment of all nations.”

(c) “Chinese Military Issues”

“As development pertains to her military capabilities, China continues to modernize her capabilities commensurate with her needs to preserve the sovereign integrity of One China and protect her borders. Currently, China shares borders with 18 other nations. Some of those nations have a history of tensions with China, and even fought wars with her as recently as the 1960s and 1970s. Since the institution of reforms, peaceful negotiations with her neighbors have dominated China’s resolution of disputes. Broad past disagreement with Russia over their shared border has now been reduced to peaceful negotiation over a small remaining 1,000 kilometer stretch of frontier. Similar contentions with Viet Nam, Philippines, Burma, Malaysia, India and others are largely resolved. Misunderstandings over outstanding issues in

the South China Sea, such as the Spratley Island chain are being maturely handled through joint development rather than military confrontation. Still, a nation as geographically expansive and populous as China will continue to grow her military capabilities commensurate with the national and international security environment that she perceives, as well as her resources, a right and duty of all responsible sovereign nations.”

“The increases in Chinese military outlays and her fielding of advanced defensive capabilities have caused many in the U.S. concern regarding the strategic purpose of China’s military. This suspicion of China is routinely evident in high level U.S. official statements and documents, ranging from those of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, to influential members of the U.S. Congress, to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These include incomprehensible suggestions that China needs to be ‘contained’ with Cold War logic, as though One China has military or ideologically grounded imperial aspirations, such as those of the old Soviet Union.”

“What is needed most to alleviate a potentially harmful misunderstanding of China’s military intentions is, again, for the U.S. to stand for a moment in China’s shoes. 18 shared foreign borders, a painful past occupation by Imperial Japan, a renegade Province of Taiwan that threatens succession from China, and the continuous presence of American troops in East and Central Asia. China’s understanding of sovereignty does not condone the stationing of foreign forces within the borders of any other nations. Admittedly, the expeditionary presence of U.S. forces adjacent to China’s borders and coasts, in Korea, Japan, and elsewhere has reasonable justification in preexisting alliances and the prosecution of the Global War on Terror, in which China is a committed ally. China accepts this encircling presence with understanding, and does not contest it under those circumstances.”

“At the same time, China has deep concerns that any nation would employ bilateral alliances, or GWOT prosecution as a pretext to exert coercive pressure on China. An example might include Japanese encouragement of Provincial Chinese secessionists knowing that it has a nuclear-armed American ally. China would consider such third party leverage over One China’s sovereign affairs as a clear violation of the past Communiqués that she has with the U.S., and extraordinarily threatening to Chinese national security.”

“By looking out from the Chinese vantage point, it is hoped that those American policy makers most concerned with China’s military improvements might take a moment to see that China’s posture is pragmatic and measured, not chauvinistic. And it also responds to a fluid external military-security environment over which it has little control, other than through communication, negotiation, and deterrence. There is danger that an uninformed action-reaction cycle of tension between the U.S. and China leads automatically to arms escalation over time, as history has shown in previous eras as well. Most significantly, it’s incidental ‘self-evidence’ gives fuel to the arguments of nationalists and extremists in both nations for whom mutual mistrust is a foregone conclusion, and basis for their political legitimacy. Open, frank communication and an absolute adherence to bilateral agreements is the key to interrupting the cycle constructively. In this light, the U.S.’ reliable adherence to all aspects and provisions of the 3 Joint Communiqués, which China cherishes, will have a certain outcome that mitigates bilateral tensions.”

“As it pertains to eliminating military tensions, closer and more consistent military-to-military interaction would be very beneficial, especially during periods of political tension when the personal trusts built into professional military relationships can weather misunderstanding. In the end, China understands the reasons for the presence of U.S. forces in Asia. In fact, China does not want U.S. out of Asia. Peaceful commercial, diplomatic, and military engagement in context of globalization is inevitable, and desirable, so long as the concerns noted above are considered and mitigated.”

(d) “The Province of Taiwan”

“For China, the importance of resolving the issue of Taiwan in strict accordance the 3 Joint Communiqués transcends any other national priority, including stability, balanced development, and sustained economic growth. Its fundamental importance to Chinese national identity eclipses even the issue of the form of government or rulership of China. No matter who governs One China, or under what pretext, Taiwan would always stand out separately as China’s Number One national security priority. It is the core issue at the center of U.S. and Chinese bilateral relations, and a source of increasing concern for the Chinese, a situation that it would be wise for the U.S. and One China to consider deescalating.”

“The Province of Taiwan’s artificial political alienation from One China is a deep emotional wound for 1.3 billion increasingly nationalistic Chinese, as well as fully half of voting age Provincial Taiwanese themselves. America’s is perceived as encouraging Taiwanese independence advocates by means of veiled military assurances in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and the continued sales on modern weapons to the Province of Taiwan that are in blatant violation of the Joint Communiqués, documents that the Chinese cherish as inviolable.”

“The most recent 1982 Third Joint Communiqué reaffirms the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and the 1979 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in restating the U.S. acknowledgement that there is only One China. Furthermore, in that most recent 1982 Communiqué, the U.S. stated that arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, i.e. they would be capped at 1982 levels of capability. It also committed to gradually reducing its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”

“For the Chinese, concerns over this matter are reinforced in American promises of advanced armaments to Taiwanese that violate the agreed provisions of the 3rd Joint Communiqué. Specifically, this involves America’s promises of 150 F-16s, 12 P3Cs, 8 diesel submarines, and advanced Patriot Block III missile batteries, all advanced technologies, most being qualitatively superior to those provided to Taiwan between 1979 and 1982. All told, this \$18B capabilities package also represents an increase in the quantity as well, fueling a growing perception of American disingenuousness on the matter. This also fuels the martial sentiments of Chinese nationalists and further encourages the renegade behavior of the Taiwanese government. Together, these developments are very unfortunate. Whether or not the U.S. intended to fuel the ambitions if Taiwanese secessionists is not the point. What is critical for the

U.S. to understand is that the TRA and violations of the 3 Joint Communiqués is leading to potentially disastrous unintended consequences. This constitutes China's core national security concern today."

"The intent of the 1979 TRA was for the U.S. to attempt to influence the terms of unification under Cold War circumstances, when the Kuomintang (KMT) contended with the Communist Party for rule over One China. The TRA and its associated weapons sales were designed to provide the KMT leverage in negotiations with the Communist Party on the Mainland as peaceful assimilation proceeded over time. While Taiwan was considered a practical and defensible temporary home for the KMT, it was never seen as a nation distinct from One China. Taiwan was considered a Province, nothing more and nothing less, and all Communiqués reaffirm this fact."

"For their part, the Chinese are in no hurry with regard to a peaceful political assimilation, as One China is and has been a recognized reality in all Communiqués and within the United Nations. Many aspects of Taiwanese economic absorption into One China are already a reality. Massive Taiwanese investment in Mainland China and relaxation of previous cross-strait restrictions on familial fraternization are contributing to an inextricable interdependence over time. This stable path could only be threatened by moves to high jack a Taiwanese identity for purposes of secession, with American military intervention looming as a possibility."

"However, 'President' Chen Shui-bien's recent decision to disestablish the National Unification Council and disregard the National Unification Guidelines threatens the emergence of an irreversible crisis. During its formulation in 1979, China had cautioned the U.S. that the TRA would eventually lead to deep mistrust between China and the U.S., in spite of American confidence to the contrary. The latest moves towards attempted succession are evidence that the Chinese perspective was and remains valid. On several other occasions in recent years the outdated TRA has prompted similar reckless actions by other Taiwanese separatists, as well as unfortunate comments by U.S. Presidents and influential members of Congress. Tacit U.S. encouragement of Taiwanese recklessness is perceived as a clear threat to China's core national security issue."

"During the interview, the author suggested that U.S. support for Taiwan compares approximately to Union concern over French assurances to Confederacy secessionists that international recognition was an incentive worth prolonging the American Civil War for. China does not dispute the validity of this comparison. Like America's emotional commitment to wage total war to prevent Confederacy succession, China today feels compelled to prepare for just such a worst case, including total war with the Province's foreign allies."

"Still, many in the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon site the dangers of appeasing the Chinese, failing to stand up for American values overseas, and traitorously 'walking away from our friends in Taiwan.' They point to the ambiguous language in the Act as preserving flexibility of U.S. options, and insist that arms sales to Taiwan constructively strengthen the province's negotiating position vis-à-vis the Mainland as assimilation is worked out. However, it is reliability that is highly honored within Chinese foreign relations, not empty

rhetoric, and this psychological support to the Taiwanese is an affront to the Communiqués that were negotiated and agreed to by the Chinese in total sincerity. China and Provincial Taiwanese both view the Act through the Chinese cultural prism. Favorable positioning for negotiations is not an issue for One China, no matter how well intended the thinking of naïve TRA advocates.”

“Preserving the status quo TRA is therefore a lose-lose situation. For the U.S. to opt not to come to the military aid of Taiwanese secessionists in a time of crisis her international credibility will be in a shambles globally. Alliances are not options from the Chinese perspective. Conversely, for the U.S. to opt to come to the defense of the secessionists, a conflict with China would escalate to total war with absolute certainty. The integrity of One China is not negotiable.”

“During the interview, the author recalled a passage from the book “The U.S. Marine Corps Story.” In it, J. Robert Moskin related one relevant example of China’s reliability when it comes to her consistency of policy and action on a core issue. The author recalled Moskin’s observation that on 3 October 1950 China’s Prime Minister Chou En-lai warned that if American troops crossed the 38th Parallel in Korea, China, a non-nuclear power, would enter the war against the nuclear-armed U.S. China did exactly what she promised and effectively prevented the unification of Korea, even while suffering tremendous losses at a rate of 20 combat deaths for every U.S. soldier lost. The interviewee neither confirmed nor disputed the validity of the author’s probing analogy. However, he restated clearly that any necessary means would be employed by China to prevent a renegade Province of Taiwan from seceding from One China.”

“Ironically, the advocates of the TRA are the same who ask why China does not do more in support of the U.S. against common threats. In fact China shares great concern for both Islamic extremism and rogue nuclear powers in her region. But China acts pragmatically in prioritizing her foreign relations objectives. Right now a renegade Taiwan is the major threat to her domestic and international legitimacy. Given a favorable resolution over Taiwan, China would deal with other threats, such as Radical Islamists in Iran and North Korea with sincerity and self-sacrifice. Furthermore, long-term partnerships in alternative energy, peaceful nuclear power, the environment and other common global interests are a certain outcome.”

“Conversely, the continued perceived interference by the U.S. in this core Chinese issue at the center of our bilateral relations, whether conscious or unintentional, is extraordinarily dangerous. A peaceful long-term full resolution is always preferred by China, as per the Joint Communiqués, and all possible tools will be employed to avert regrettable options of nearer-term last resort. But any incident that leads to a proclamation of independence by the Province Taiwan will cause China to react decisively, with physical implications being irrelevant on this emotional issue. Chen Shui-bien’s recent activities come dangerously close to inciting just such an irreversible crisis.”

“As it stands, the TRA and America’s continued violations of the three Joint Communiqués are a deeply unfortunate source of concern for China, over a core issue in which compromise is not an option. In fact, the Chinese see this Act as an unfortunate burden on

the U.S. that risks placing U.S. interests and her forces at risk for a misguided cause. In 1972, 1979, and 1982 the U.S. was not signing up to Taiwanese succession, but rather it was affirming One China, whether it be KMT or Communist party governed in the future. In fact the Joint Communiqués explicitly forbade Taiwanese succession. It is China's sincere hope that the formal elimination of the TRA and a recommitment to the strict upholding of the Joint Communiqués will become priorities for both the U.S. President and Congress."

"China has invited an open dialogue with Chen Shui-bien and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). But unlike the KMT, the DPP has increasingly evolved into an Independence Party, refusing China's communications overtures. This enables a small renegade party, elected to power on the slimmest of margins and whose democratic procedures are still in question, to hold the U.S. hostage to the whims of irresponsible leadership and the tensions of brinkmanship. With the TRA and weapons sales in place an irreversible and unintended domino scenario is conceivable."

"Neither China nor the U.S. could possibly want total war with one another over Taiwanese succession, but China will certainly employ any and all available means to prevent it, however destructive the tragedy that might ensue. In the end, this core emotional contention remains fundamental to the identity of over 1.3 billion Chinese people, and it is not negotiable." [End of the Chinese Government's and the author's joint recollections of the contents of the interview]

In many respects the observations of U.S. China watchers noted earlier are not that different from China's own candidly expressed concerns regarding the future of China's domestic development. The Chinese government appears to be clear-eyed and realistic in its assessment of the many domestic and international challenges that lie ahead. What China insists upon though is that she be able to pursue her domestic development path on her terms, whether they be driven by cultural value-sets or political convictions.

On the issue of Taiwan the Chinese Government position is clear and uncompromising. Taiwan will not be allowed to secede from China as an independent nation, and China will certainly employ any and all available means to counter any attempt by Taiwan or her sympathizers to effect such independence. The rationale for her rapid military modernization is therefore transparent indeed. Here, it is important to note that a recent high-ranking U.S. Government lecturer at ICAF who is intimately familiar with U.S. policy perspectives on China and Taiwan refused to be pressed into acknowledging the One China assumption that geographical Taiwan is a province of China. Instead he employed the term "the entity of Taiwan" to describe the contemporary U.S. Government view, implying a legitimacy to an independent Taiwan that is not consistent with the three Joint Communiqués. He also verbalized that China is "another country" distinct from Taiwan, thereby reinforcing that official U.S. departure from the Communiqués. The official firmly reflected the characteristically idealistic perspective of the U.S. Government of late that commits itself to supporting democracies and like-minded polities without consideration to international agreements and obligations, or real shifts in the global balance of power. This idealistic departure from preexisting obligations will be discussed later.

It has been this author's observation that the heartfelt U.S. sympathies for the secessionist ambitions of Taiwanese, Tibetans, the Muslims of Xingjian and our desire to see China, and indeed the rest of the world emulate our domestic societal example is understandable. Americans have long grown accustomed to executing interventions with impunity. However, the author will argue that the ability of America to intervene in those sensitive internal affairs of One China without suffering a backlash that jeopardizes our own national security, perhaps irreversibly, has passed. This author argues that in the case of China realpolitik on these issues will have to prevail because the U.S. does not have the advantage in "weighted" military power. This weighting includes a relative lack of American political will in a coming crisis to back up our persistent scolding of China for following her own characteristically Chinese path. Our will to intervene must be contrasted against China's determination in any military conflict with the U.S. over her core interests, a conflict we would likely decisively lose, as we did in Korea. China's ability to independently prevail over severe and vast hardships without suffering irreversibly destabilizing social unrest has been repeatedly demonstrated over the millennia. Some observers, such as Jasper Becker in his book "The Chinese" (2000) have referred to this resilience as a strength that has been built into the Chinese culture and psychological template over the millennia. It is true that the communal orientation, work ethic, positivism, and focused individual and societal self-discipline are the products of a rich Confucian heritage which abhors both anarchy and instability. To a great extent, Communism with its centralized orientation and emphasis on individual self-discipline appear to complement aspects of the Chinese character well, perhaps to a greater extent than any other traditional culture. Combined with today's prevailing spirit of nationalism, this set of Chinese characteristics appears to uniquely position her to survive any challenges and sustain her ascension. Wise nations might be better off befriending, rather than offending China and her core priorities in the 21st Century, just as others have been wise to befriend the U.S. in generations past. In terms of coming to grips with this reality and a Chinese history of reliably acting on her critical-core priorities, a recommitment to the Communiqués and other rational acts of realpolitik, to be discussed later might be in America's best interests.

(2) Russia

The author believes that the reemergence of Russia as a potential enemy must also receive close attention to avert unintended consequences and conflict. As with her rising Asian neighbor to the south, Russia has few historical peers that can claim a comparably rich cultural heritage, nor any that can boast of an imperial tradition and "special path" that have left as great a mark on Eurasian civilization. Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropedia (1990), indicates that these achievements and imperial conquests came while overcoming an unforgiving environment and vast expanses that includes one of the largest and least hospitable land frontiers on earth. The and psychological hardness and physical endurance of Russians is legendary. In his book "On Infantry" (1981), author John A. English described how these special characteristics generated fear in soldiers of the Third Reich. So, although ravaged by WWI invasion, a revolution, civil war, collectivization, military and intelligencia purges, and near military defeat following the surprise invasion by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union emerged from those trials as one of the two superpowers. In fact it is felt by many, such as Professor Erwin Marquit of the University of Minnesota (1981), that the Allied victory over Germany in WWII was in large part decided by a combination of Russian blood and American material, with emphasis on the former.

The imbalance in battlefield victories and human sacrifices of the Great Patriotic War are compelling arguments ingrained in Russia's sense of potency even today. Furthermore, in his lectures Professor Marquit explained (1981) that during the Cold War, high levels of education and societal involvement were achieved by the majority of the population, including women and minorities. When combined with today's secular attitudes and a mobile class structure, residual socialist-like emphasis on universal education has led to superior integration of various minorities in the mainstream culture, and sets that nation above many developed nations. Russia's credits include a superior universal technical education, a wealth of Nobel Prize winners, patents, and publications. This heritage of technical and scientific innovation that rivaled America's own achievements during the 20th Century is therefore institutionalized within the Russian culture, in spite of the Soviet Empire's demise.

Still, Russia has suffered since the fragmentation of the the USSR. In an article titled "Searching Out the Golden Nuggets" (2002), author Dr. C. W. (Bill) Kauffman confirmed that during the Russian transition since 1991 and particularly during President Yeltsin's reign, Russia's native intelligence was frequently exported out of economic necessity. Sometimes this was done just through communication and sometimes through the outright emigration of Russia's intelligencia. Like China, if economic conditions improve and longer-term stability returns domestically, conceivably this Russian exodus will cease, increasing her national potential. Much of Russia's substantial and once world-class defense industry has deteriorated due to a lack of funding. However, with a view to the future, she has continued to nurture key weapons technologies and systems, capabilities that threaten surface fleets and ballistic missile defenses to an extent that challenges U.S. global strategies. She has also preserved one of the world's two most formidable and survivable nuclear arsenals. Her recent operationalization of an advanced generation of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), having maneuvering reentry vehicles capable of defeating and penetrating the state of the art in missile defense shield capabilities, is the latest sign of her reemerging superpower military potency. A large world market for Russian conventional weapons also appears to be generating the revenue needed to revitalize areas that have been allowed to atrophy since the USSR's demise. These developments may serve as a springboard in Russia's reemergence as a global imperial power with broader Eurasian ambitions.

In her book *Putin's Russia* (2003), author Lilia Shevtsova chronicles Russia's crisis of introspection that followed the general disenchantment with Socialism under the Soviet Empire. The dissolution of the USSR had not been achieved without severe and lasting physical costs to the Russian Federation. The newly independent satellite nations contained the majority of nonfreezing ports and many of the most productive industrial regions benefiting from key pipeline, atomic power, and high technology industry infrastructure built up by the now defunct Soviet center. Russia herself was left with the less lucrative remnants of the USSR's centralized state planning processes, namely the heavy and military industry enterprises.

In spite of the disadvantages, under President Yeltsin Russia experimented with a liberal democratic political system and free-wheeling market economy as the first attempt to replace the strict centralized planning and controls of the Soviet era. Yeltsin's experiment ushered in corruption and undermined Russia's national sense of security and stability, the orderly characteristics of Russian society that her citizens treasured from more authoritarian

times. The competing ambitions of an agitated political class, powerful oligarchs, and wealthy tycoons enriched through questionable state property auctions brought Russia to the brink of anarchy. Independently confirming this near catastrophe, in a recent interview for Time Magazine conducted by Sally B. Donnelly (2006), former President Mikhail Gorbachev commented that “[Former President Boris] Yeltsin ruined the country. He allowed the wealth of the country to be taken by a few people.”

Liberal democracy such as that introduced chaotically under Yeltsin had not been an organic outgrowth of the Russian historical experience. Therefore, it is evident in Lilia Shevtsova’s description (2003) that its hasty implementation, however well-intended, placed Russian stability at great risk. The aversion of Yeltsin’s successor, President Putin, to social experimentation that is outside the comfort zone of the Russian experience is entirely understandable. In Putin’s Russia (2003), author Lilia Shevtsova detailed this political shift under President Putin. However, she noted that in spite of his movement towards more authoritarian rule, President Putin pays close attention to the independent polls that are routinely conducted amongst the Russian electorate. Putin’s sustained approval ratings, enviable by any western standard, are tied directly to his efforts to return order and discipline to Russian society, even when done at the expense of freedom of the press and democratic processes. Public satisfaction with the personified presidency of Putin is overwhelming due to the traditions of authoritarianism within the Russian historical experience. In the aforementioned Time Magazine interview (2006), former President Gorbachev continued: “I think President Vladimir Putin is correcting the mess that Yeltsin made. ...Putin is trying to move toward more social-democratic policies — to improve health care, education and the like.”

So, today, in spite of many challenges, Russia is reemerging as a global power to be reckoned with. According to the CIA World Factbook (2006), Russia’s GDP had increased to over \$1.5T in 2005, making it the ninth largest economy in the world. Furthermore, GDP growth has averaged 6.4% since 1998. This has been achieved in spite of a massive debt accumulated by the former Soviet Union that Russia has assumed full responsibility for repaying. Russia has also achieved this with a population base that is less than 140 million, or less than 50 percent that of the Former Soviet Union. At the writing of this paper President Putin’s fresh initiative to incentivize ethnic Russian motherhood to reverse the population decline is a hopeful sign of a coming turn-around. If Russia’s impressive average post-1998 economic growth rate can be sustained, she is expected to become the second largest European economy and the sixth largest in the world within a few years.

Adding to the optimism, since 2003, exports of natural resources such as oil and gas have begun to decrease in relative economic importance as the internal market has strengthened considerably. This is not to say that recent spikes in oil prices have not been economically beneficial to the Russian economy. It does however imply that her relative dependence on such revenues is declining. This has been largely stimulated by intense construction, as well as consumption of increasingly diverse goods and services. Investor confidence has been raised over Russia’s prospects in its second decade of transition. As evidence, in recent years, the economy has also been driven by growing internal consumer demand that has increased by over 12% annually in 2000-2005, showing the strengthening of its own internal market. Moscow and her surrounding communities have merged into an affluent

metropolis with a per capita income that favorably compares to the wealthiest European nations. Other great Russian cities are similarly blossoming, including Saint Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Ekaterinburg, as well as the rural areas surrounding those urban centers. Although this development is still very uneven across the country, the tendency appears to be towards further progress and future wealth diffusion.

It is this author's opinion that, having victoriously weathered invasions and social upheaval, and being hardened by those experiences, Russia's dormant superpower potential appears to be ready to reemerge in its traditional grandeur, and on characteristically Russian terms. As hardened realists, Russians are keenly aware of the danger that when any ideology, whether it be Socialist, Fascist, Religious, or Capitalist, is left to run idealistically amuck, anarchy, reactionary tyranny and severe societal suffering are certain to follow. This clear-eyed rationalism came from hard-earned, first-hand Russian experience, primarily during the 20th Century. From Leon Trotsky's Internationalism to Boris Yeltsin's Byzantine anarchy described in Lilia Shevtsova's "Putin's Russia" (2003), over-shot optimism has consistently brought disenchantment and suffering to the Russian sense of security. Lilia Shevtsova also discussed how many members of the Russia's political elite nostalgically resurrect memories of Russian physical imperial extension, including a national sense of unfulfilled Eurasian and European destiny. Putin's Russia (2003) describes how the public is regularly reminded by the formidable Communist Party of the Russian "special path," as well as the domestic stability and intellectual achievements under the USSR. The disruptive tendencies of liberal democracies are considered dangerously anarchic by many Russian traditionalists, and increasingly by the public at large. President Putin's reassertion of centralized authority to moderate the country's transition away from Soviet Socialism is rational in this light. American and European expectations regarding democratic reforms and free market economy must be balanced against the unique Russian historical experience and national character. We must first "stand in the Russian's shoes."

In terms of external relations, Russia's Eurasian identity and European aspirations, as well as her concerns with one-time subject states of Ukraine and Georgia are all relevant here. Yet, this author contends here that Russia's imperial aspirations pale against the significance of the apparent connectedness of conflict with Turkic minorities in Central Asia, the secessionist forces of Muslim Chechnya, and a global awakening of the imperial Radical Islamic will. Realpolitik would permit America to see that she has much more in common with Russian national security interests than she has differences. Further authoritarianism and centralization through a westward and southward hegemonic expansion, with characteristic Russian flavor may indeed be out of a self-determined security necessity, not aggression. In fact they parallel a similar strengthening of American Presidential powers and corresponding unilateral U.S. actions.

Instead of acknowledging Russia's remarkable strengths and her renewed ascension, detractors have pointed to Russia's declining birth rate, a drain of emigrating intellectuals, persistent environmental disasters from the Soviet era, organized crime, and the great wealth disparities between affluent city dwellers and rural citizens. They also down-play apparent economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation with China as purely opportunistic and short-lived based on alleged deep fears of imperialistic Chinese designs on Russia's sparsely populated and resource-rich eastern frontier. However, in ways precisely parallel to China, Russians possess a demonstrated resilience to hardship generally that consistently results in

western underestimation and subsequent regrets. Furthermore, the American elitist assumption that less democratic authoritarian regimes have only elite buy-in and conceal mass envy for American habits may be misguided. The popularity of President Putin and the corresponding longing of a significant portion of the population for Soviet style order and discipline are both evidenced in polls and elections. It is also a potentially catastrophic mistake to underestimate the depth of Russian and Chinese joint interests, both in terms of coming to grips with the interdependencies of globalization, and their shared concerns for American imperial behavior.

Commenting again on Russia's rise in the Time Magazine interview, former President Gorbachev observed with some consternation that: "...just as Russia is beginning to rise again, the West does not accept it. America is intoxicated by its position as the world's only superpower. It wants to impose its will. But America needs to get over that. It has responsibilities as well as power. I say this as a good friend of America." Based on former President Gorbachev's candid advice, and the shifts in global balance, it is the author's opinion that, as with China, wise nations will seek to befriend Russia in the 21st Century. Sincere constructive and less judgmental relations are responsible relations, and can lead to great economic, scientific and security partnerships. As will be discussed later in this paper, a pragmatic and respectful realpolitik with Russia should govern our relations.

(3) Radical Islam as the armed vanguard of anti-modernism

As it pertains to the American national security today, Carl von Clausewitz's 1832 description of war is pertinent. In *On War* he described war as: "...an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." The enemy was taken to be a separate physical being with a corresponding will, i.e. a national organism clearly distinguishable from our friendly national being. Geographical boundaries corresponded fairly well with national, religious and ethnic identities. But this has changed, with the economic incentives of mass migrations causing competing wills to come into immediate transnational proximity of one another. In this the traditionalist Muslim communities that have left geographical Islam are the most resistive to assimilation. As the armed vanguard of anti-modernists around the world, as per the earlier definition, Radical Islam is worthy of a closer look, as it will remain our primary intractable enemy into the near future.

In his book "The Crisis of Islam" (2003), Bernard Lewis explains that Muslims are less likely to be receptive to western notions of ethnic assimilation into host nations, secular tolerance, and adoption of the moral value sets associated with globalization. The Muslim identifies him and herself as a citizen-soldier of the community of Islam first, and has only an administrative interest in the largely artificial nation state identities imposed by non-Muslims at the end of WWI. As a result, Muslims have maintained a resilient ancient Islamic identity capable of surviving the mobility and diversity of modern specialization and global migration. Though Islam defies the static geographical quantification of conventional nation states, it nonetheless retains a self-conscious identity, social cohesion, and an unconventional martial potency, with Radical Islam as a recent imperial political component. While a self-righteous and imperial America stands out as the targeted enemy of Radical Islam today, our neutralization would hardly be more than an operational victory for these radical anti-modernists, just as the demise of the Soviet Union was towards the end of the 20th Century. In the long war, Radical

Islam's strategic ambitions are much more spectacular. The reawakened and Wahhabism-motivated imperialist forces of Islam are obliged to subjugate Europe, China, Russia, India, and any and all non-believing successors to U.S. hegemony-empire.

It has been this author's observation that since the declaration of the GWOT, western nations have insisted on viewing Islam through the liberal western lens. In essence while Islam is the spiritual home of a Muslim's personal faith, it must be separate from the political forces that cause terrorism. The American difficulty with this view is that we view Islam strictly as a spiritual community, finding its closest parallel in our modern notion of Christendom. In this view religion should remain secular and effectively harmless. The ingrained western notion that state and religion are fundamentally separate entities prevents us from looking at Islam through the eyes and emotions of Muslims themselves.

In "The Crisis of Islam" (2003), Bernard Lewis explains that in actuality, since the time of the First Caliphate, Islam has constituted one physical nation and identity. Islam's geographical national boundaries and area are defined by the sum of Islamic polities in the eyes of all Muslims, who identify themselves as citizens of Islam first. Furthermore, that identity is reinforced with a deep learned historical insight, a collective self-awareness of religious history that is unparalleled in western, Judeo-Christian societies. With the exception of Egyptian, Persian, and Arabian national boundaries that retain some ancient pre-20th Century validity, there is at best an administrative interest, and at worst a disdain for the non-organic national boundaries and identities impressed upon larger Islam by non-Muslim westerners following the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI, a legitimate source of resentment throughout Islam. Also, separation of religious matters from those of state is a logical impossibility for Muslims. It is noteworthy that the father of the Iranian Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini, once stated that (B. Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, 2003) "Islam is politics or it is nothing." (pp.8) For the Muslim, spiritual faith is the conscious and proper execution of physical life itself, as a unitary experience. This fundamental difference between the Muslim and western notions of faith has had consequences for all concerned throughout Islam's existence to the present day.

One noteworthy historical Islamic absolute has to do with the unacceptability of imperial reversals as Islam expands. Polities subjected and converted to Islam as a spoil of war, as well as lands settled by Muslims through immigration are not conditional or negotiable in the future. Acquired land becomes Islam by default, and for all time. Furthermore, whether Islamic conversion was voluntary or coerced, if the "Faithful" renounce Islam in favor of an earlier belief, it is far more sinful than the original "unbelief," and those that desert Islam stand condemned for a treasonous act. By the same token, fundamentalist Islamic polities that have been empowered through democratic elections are unlikely to relinquish power by similar processes. As Bernard Lewis observes in "The Crisis of Islam," (2003): "For Islamists, democracy, expressing the will of the people, is the road to power, but it is a one way road, on which there is no return...One man, one vote, once." (pp.111) America should soberly consider the real longer-term ramifications of democratic elections in Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere. As author Dr. Henry A. Kissinger observed in his book "Diplomacy" (1994), Germany was, after all, a democracy under the Weimar Republic before it was a dictatorship attained by the same means and processes. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others are keenly aware of this danger, and

many elites shake their heads in disbelief at the stubborn idealistic crusade of Americans who propose democracy as the cure to all ills associated with tyranny. Admittedly, there is an enviable strength in the overriding Islamic identity, loyalty, and purity of conviction that can muster such popular though rebellious majorities. But, if the forces of Radical Islam are to be effectively neutralized at the social root the counter-force must be at least as willful, resolute, and ruthless. Conversely, our foreign prescriptions for democracy are recipes for disaster in terms of U.S. national security interests.

By the logic of radical Islamists there is a discrepancy between Islam's current imperial reach and her corresponding imperial aspirations. On the surface it would appear to be a snapshot of the difference between the furthest extension of the Empire achieved under the Caliphates, and the geographical sum of all Islamic nations today. Many Muslims believe that the humiliating end of the last Caliphate following WWI has incurred an unpaid western debt to Islam. But the real imperial danger to the west is more advanced. Islam's penetration can be measured in the extent of industrial age Muslim immigration into the hearts of the civilian communities, primarily in Europe. This is a new development and opportunity for Radical Islamists, as it has peacefully extended Islam's geographical reach into regions that were never part of past Caliphates. While such immigration has overwhelmingly been driven by immediate economic necessities, it is leading to a "clash" of at least two civilizations, of the sort defined in Samuel P. Huntington's book "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (1996). Fueled by escalating cycles of radicalization, with increasingly oppressive host nation reaction as an automatic by-product, there is little possibility for graceful disengagement.

Still, Bernard Lewis observes that Greater Islam as a national identity and civilization had once been secular and tolerant. Even during the First Caliphate so-called "Unbelieving" non-Muslim communities were permitted to peacefully coexist and practice their religions, even on the Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, a long history of criminal western inconsideration, first Colonial European and later Imperial American, have been perceived to exploit and victimize Islam, resulting in a deep resentment. This has awakened a passionate, savage militant political component, separate from Greater Islam. The fact that the ancient Islamic faith has been high jacked in order to justify militancy is commonly understood. Given what is known of the Saudi Arabian-financed Wahhabist Radical Islamic teachings in western mosques and prisons, some conclusions can be drawn. First, through a combination of naiveté and economic opportunism the U.S. and Europe have allowed the en masse immigration of a defensive culture that resists assimilation into the unmitigated proximity of what Islamists perceive as native unbelieving "degenerates." This cultural insulation has been tolerated, indeed protected by host western nations. This has empowered Muslim communities to preserve the exclusivity of their uncompromising Islamic identity and loyalties. Second, the isolation nurtures many religiously conscious and socially discontented youths that are ripe for recruitment as passion-filled, indoctrinated Jihadist soldiers. It is this author's opinion that the shielding of Muslim communities combined with western tolerance for their cultural exclusivity serves as the exact equivalent of Trojan Horse vessels or communal shells concealing increasing numbers of superempowered storm troopers. Those vessels now stand within western communities unopposed, especially in Europe. As a consequence the modern reach of Wahhabist-Inspired Radical Islamists discussed by Bernard Lewis is, practically speaking, much greater than the maps of Islam from antiquity would indicate. In this regard, in Osama Bin

Ladin's declaration of war against the United States cleverly stated that the Jihad is a "defensive" war. This was particularly ingenious, as it requires all able bodied Muslims to defend Islam from where they stand, including from within the western societies. Objectively, this constitutes an imperial extension through simple in-place annexation. Within traditionally Islamic nations, a similar annexation has and may continue to be achieved by the ascension to power of fundamentalist regimes that end secularism by force and introduce Shari 'a Law. Iran is but one example of such imperialist annexation by radicals, within the confines of once-secular Islam itself. Give a further alienation of Islam from the west generally, this trend could accelerate and spread to other secular Islamic nations.

The more severe consequences of this Radical Islamic expansion of terror into Unfaithful communities are still to be experienced. The attacks of 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid, London, and Russia, are omens of much greater violence to come. The attacks to date can be said to have been executed by small groups of elite soldiers with special weapons. The future may involve what one could consider masses. More ominous were the acts of rioting, arson, and train high jacking perpetrated by masses of Muslim youth in France and Muslim-non-Muslim violence in Australia. While many will argue that the violent outbursts were expressions of economic and social discrimination, the coincidence of religious and ethnic identities with economic discrimination will be exploited for radical political purposes. The more recent global rioting in response to a Danish artist's caricature of the Prophet, whose inflammation was stoked by Syrian and Iranian agitation, represented another such wave. In this author's opinion, with time, the globally bulging mass of youthful and passionately fired soldiers will attain superempowerment through greater ideological unity, wider technological and information access, and WMD proliferation. Elite specialization that we associate with past terrorist attacks will no longer be prerequisite for the desired effect, as sheer numbers will compensate. The impotence of Europeans in particular to resist this immigration-enabled threat is repeatedly illustrated, most recently in the political cartoon caricature that enraged the Muslim world. Powerless to defend the free speech rights of its ethnic European artists against personal threats, the artists have instead been forced into hiding. One sees that the Wahibist-influenced Trojan Horses have already begun to coordinate and discharge their warriors into the soft underbelly of western tolerance. Other anti-modernists, particularly Neo-Nazis and other white supremacists, opportunistically lie in patient wait until their turn comes to exploit the successful destabilizations of vanguard Islamists.

The primitive forces of anti-modernism cannot be bargained with, for compromise and chivalry are perceived to be rational and humane characteristics of softer, civilized peoples. Like Earl Turner's closed-loop ideological simplicity, today's martyrdom-motivated and superempowered Radical Islamic suicide attackers are seemingly impervious to all the sophisticated propaganda and other psychological tools the west can muster. By Carl von Clausewitz's definition of combatants, anti-modernist extremists would be considered hardened soldiers. Their savagery aside, they are passionate warriors battling rational and civilized peoples bent on modernization in spite of modernism's evident subversion of traditional mores. The political objectives of the Radical Islamist are not unlike those that underpinned the respective cultural and racial philosophies of the Third Reich and Imperial Japan. Radical Islamists too seek the outright annihilation of their enemies as soon as the physical capacity for such annihilation matches reawakened fundamentalist ambitions. The ancient notion that blood

signifies belief and unbelief is energized. From the American perspective, the lethal German and Japanese racist cancers demanded earliest liquidation, just as a hopelessly infected limb would require immediate amputation, as an appropriate biological characterization. Patient, in-stride rehabilitation through containment and propaganda was determined futile. Unconditional surrender was the prerequisite, as from a realpolitik perspective, the greater good then took priority, as it does again today with Islamists. Furthermore, as the fascist infection spread to German and Japanese societies as wholes, sympathetic and supportive civilian communities became legitimate military targets. The deterrent value of this ruthless and successful American military precedent will increasingly have applicability to our confrontation with Radical Islam, and this will be discussed later.

Alternatively, other observers of Islam and Muslims will take issue with any notion that suggests a general threat posed by radicalized members of immigrant Muslim communities. For example, some will note that it is important to distinguish the diverse Muslim-American community from other Muslim immigrant communities. In a United States Institute of Peace report titled “The Diversity of Muslims in the United States” (2006), author Qamar-ul Huda notes that: “American Muslims do not see contradictions between Islam and such ideals as democracy, pluralism, or political activism...” Furthermore, the author continues: “Many [U.S. Muslim] organizations emphasize the importance of self-scrutiny and education in relation to the larger Islamic heritage.” This American phenomenon would appear to be unique in the world, i.e. the larger experience with Islam that is well documented in Bernard Lewis’ “The Crisis of Islam” (2003). It could be true that the U.S. has a robust, if perhaps temporary insulation against radicalization by other groups existent elsewhere in the world. Still, in an age of individual superempowerment a small committed force is sufficient to cause strategically significant devastation even when broader public support is temporarily lacking. The power of the 9/11 hijackers, Timothy Mcveigh, and the future emulators of the fictional Earl Turner are examples. Just a handful will have the capacity to initiate the cascade-like destruction of America’s version of the highly specialized apparatus that Dr. Merkle had warned against. For a concept of scale, the destruction of Hurricane Katrina, a force of nature, may pale against the devastation unleashed by superempowered individuals who obtain certain WMD. The majority Muslim opinion will be irrelevant in many cases.

In stark contrast with Qamar-ul Huda’s report, non-American largely transnational Europe is at a severe disadvantage. Europe’s native ethnic populations could find themselves fighting for their very legal and ethnic existence in the long total war that is now being waged with Radical Islam. Neo-Nazis and similarly inclined anti-modernists will exploit this democratic impotence as soon as their numbers and armaments allow them to do so. Whether the Neo-Nazis appear first as allies of Radical Islamists due to shared core moral concerns or whether they appear as racist defenders of white European national identities, their armed appearance is inevitable.

For reasons noted throughout this paper, the author has observed that outside of Islam itself, China and Russia are the only great ethnic and cultural identities that still possess the resolute “hardness,” the uncompromising societal character that will be required to confront the array of savage anti-modernist threats as they appear. Returning to the thesis of this paper, America must get it right with China and Russia above all others to survive a savage anti-

modernist expansion in the 21st Century. Furthermore, acknowledging and acting substantively on the legitimate concerns of the Secular Islam in the Mideast and elsewhere such as the U.S. will help separate and isolate committed extremists, and permit their more precise destruction. It will also assist the U.S. in helping Secular Islam to gain a sincere alliance with a more humble and enlightened U.S. This requires the slaying of our own arrogant internal “demons” alluded to earlier and discussed below, i.e. the elimination of the third potential enemy, the one within ourselves.

(4) America

It is the author’s opinion that competing extremist and anti-modernist wills seek increased influence over or secession from modern western polities. America is currently perceived by the armed vanguards of this anti-modernism as the governing imperial despot. It is this author’s conviction that America’s self-righteous expressions and deeds fuel the negative perceptions. America’s perceived imperial arrogance is therefore largely complicit in the birth and perpetuation of its most savage enemies. In fact we appear to welcome and find comfort assertions that the U.S. is the “world’s sole remaining superpower.” The author proposes that this singular status is actually a curse for the U.S. First, it leads to an unqualified self-assurance, some have even called it an idealistic arrogance, that America’s perceived elements of national power are incontestable, and somehow ordained. Second, it permits our adversaries, both modern states and the vanguards of anti-modernism, to opportunistically identify a common foe in the U.S., even when at their roots they too are adversaries. This combination represents a global “out-group ascription” of the U.S. in operation. The world ascribes to the U.S. sole superpower status, the U.S. then believes its own press and continues to act like one. In the process, America and the world draw a new fault line of hostility between each other. This fault line threatens to erase all of the residual good will that America had earned from her sacrifices and leadership in the last century. Anti-modernists and civilized great powers alike perceive that the egotistical American will “possesses” the modern “apparatus,” and that this American will must be exorcized in the 21st Century. In effect, America has unintentionally become the scapegoat of opportunity for the rest of the world. It is this perception, not our true intentions, that forms the reality that our adversaries and competitors act on violently. Even though there is an isolationist element in U.S. politics that would surely be a welcome comfort to many foreign nations, until isolationism becomes mainstream policy it receives no international recognition. It is this author’s observation that America’s outward image is imperial, as per Lenin’s description, whether or not we intend it to be.

The mainstream of America’s majority political parties maintain unwavering optimism when it comes to the moral superiority of the U.S. model over all ideological competitors, especially those having an anti-modernist agenda. While each acknowledges room for improvement at the margins, the spirit of a global Manifest Destiny that should not be interrupted permeates U.S. foreign policy. For example, the Democratic National Committee website still states (2006): “...as a nation and a Party, we must continue to move forward in the 21st Century. We must work to incorporate all Americans into the fabric of our nation...” “Forward” presumes the righteousness of an ordained destiny grounded in precedent. Similarly, the Republican National Committee website (2006) quotes President Bush’s last inaugural speech: “This young century will be liberty’s century. By promoting liberty abroad, we will build

a safer world...Like generations before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom...Now we go forward grateful for our freedom, faithful to our cause, and confident in the future of the greatest nation on earth.” Since both dominant parties would appear to agree that America is “moving forward as the greatest nation on earth,” warnings of decay and decline would probably fall on deaf ears. Instead, the self-image of the American political class causes it to redouble its efforts to increase America’s and her western allies’ domination of global rule-set development.

In “The Decline of the West” (1922), the historian Oswald Spengler presented an alternative view. He observed cyclical patterns of all great civilizations, very much akin to the life stages of organisms and the seasons of a year. With regard to western civilization, Spengler recognized an advanced stage of maturity. Even in the 1920s he concluded that liberal democracy, the media, and capital were conspiring in a moral decay of the principled pillars that originally gave life to idealistically-inspired western thought. With a realism validated in his understanding of history, Spengler noted: “The future of the West is not a limitless tending upwards and onwards for all time towards our present ideals, but a single phenomenon of history, strictly limited and defined as to form and duration, which covers a few centuries and can be viewed and, in essentials, calculated from available precedents.” The cycles and experiences of the Greek civilization and the Roman Empire contained significant lessons in his 20th Century comparisons and analyses.

Unfortunately, the referencing of Spengler’s determinism by the German National Socialists and other rejectionists of western mores has, perhaps improperly, caused the discrediting of his controversial scholarly views. Today, as though subconsciously intent on forcefully refuting Spengler’s determinism, a spirit of permanent civilizational superiority has found its way into the U.S.’s actionable foreign policy agenda. The 2006 National Security Strategy is the most notable example. Interestingly, the issue of western decay and decline has appeared independently in the diverse ideologies of Neo Nazis, Bathists, Wahhibists, Green Parties, and Christian fundamentalists. Even the conservative American scholar, Robert Bork, commented with alarm on issues of moral degeneracy in his book “Slouching Towards Gomorra” (1996), issues that in principle are similar to those of Spengler and the diverse collection of other ideologies noted above. Warnings against a further indiscipline exemplified by American example have picked up in militant intensity since the 1960s. Renown past examples include Paul R. Ehrlich’s famous, though ultimately premature, book “The Population Bomb” (1968). Even today, his warnings come at a time when material comfort and the accumulation of wealth are on an accelerated upswing. A broad sense of entitlement that transcends economic classes causes renewed warnings to be generally poorly received. Deadlines such as Ehrlich’s population and pollution toleration thresholds pass without any consequences as technology and further efficiencies temporarily avert crises and population die-offs. With regards to the moral issues of family dissolution, sexual permissiveness, corruption, the growing gaps between rich and poor, and other forms of decay the American public appears to have become numb through slow desensitization and moral relativism. It is however moral issues that are at the heart of many anti-modernist passions. When stripped of other political baggage, at their core these moral concerns common to Radical Islamists, Nazis, Fascists and other absolutists have legitimacy, and this legitimacy fuels the intense will and determination of their causes. America’s relegation of such views to a criminal category causes us a severe gap in

understanding, a missed opportunity to understand the source of the psychological strength of our intractable enemies.

Admittedly, the overwhelming impact of American ideals on modern humankind generally cannot be denied. Assuming the outward ideological mantle of Americanization, they have proven to be so compelling that imitation in our economic image has been practiced globally, and at least in the past, to America's profit. The declaration of the great Chinese reformer Deng Xiaoping (1978) that: "To get rich is glorious," and the later dissolution of the Soviet Empire at first glance appeared to be evidence of the victory of America herself over the most intransigent communist tyrannies of the 20th Century. The enticement of democracy and free markets invited mimicking by non-communist, traditional societies as well, overpowering reluctant forces from within. In the battle of great civilizations, the American world economic view, or at least its universal political ideals, appeared to have been victorious. But America's in the civilizational goodness of the 20th Century is rapidly being forgotten, and replaced anger and frustration with our perceived imperial conduct. Americanization may indeed be threatening to destroy what is important to the core of all humanity, in its individual form. Subverted is the natural, primitive balance between values that are spiritual and those that are material in their essence.

It is this author's opinion that from our self-righteous perspective this victory appeared logical. Reflecting on our American origins, we came to enjoy our position of power and prosperity based on the economic and political ideals of our forefathers. But, the American appetite has turned out to be far from modest, moral, or gentlemanly. Globalization is nothing more and nothing less than a largely voluntary, greed-driven international submission to Americanization. Bernard Lewis observed that for the Radical Islamist Ayatollah Khomeini, the "Great Satan" America was not a frightening demon, but rather a seducer, and Americanization became the tool of material seduction. Returning to President Eisenhower's 1961 speech noted earlier, he warned of the hedonistic American trend, stating: "As we peer into society's future, we...must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage." Earlier in the 20th Century, Spengler's analysis had in part been motivated by such excesses of western culture, as they began to first appear in both Europe and the U.S. after WWI in the Weimar Republic. Those conditions largely set the stage for the German National Socialist ascension to power, and the Nazis' eventual overthrow of that democracy.

Furthermore, our American insistence on dictating economic and political rule-sets concerns many, and is seen as a refusal to recognize leadership may be naturally cycling away from the U.S. in the process of globalization. It particularly bewilders some of America's staunchest traditional advocates. For example, in the recent interview for Time Magazine conducted by Sally B. Donnelly (2006), former President Mikhail Gorbachev was also asked if he thinks that U.S. judgmental behavior is moving both nations back towards a Cold War? Gorbachev observed that "I do not think the U.S. can impose its will on others. This talk of pre-emptive strikes, of ignoring the U.N. Security Council and international legal obligations — all this is leading toward a dark night."

The school master-like, dictatorial tone of the U.S. National Security Strategy (2006) shows no sign of moderation in its second 21st century incarnation. In it the President reasonably states that: “Bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed.” Logic would dictate that bilateral implies symmetrical reciprocity and mutual respect. Yet in what seems to be a direct contradiction to that observation, the strategy continues that: “We will encourage all our partners to expand liberty, and to respect the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, as the surest way to...cement close relations with the United States.” This is a myopic extension of the U.S.’ domestic presumptions regarding the differing values of other nations and cultures. It is also a direct violation of the spirit of bilateralism. This could be dismissed as harmless nationalistic chauvinism if it did not have executive authority. Unfortunately, it is given teeth when it continues with a United States admission that it will intervene in the sovereign domestic affairs of others by “...be[ing] prepared to act alone if necessary...to influence the calculations on which the choices [of sovereign nations] are based.” Finally, the 2006 Strategy promises to “...hedge appropriately in case states choose *unwisely* [author’s italicized emphasis].” This assumes that U.S. policy makers can stand in their subjective shoes alone, and still hold school on the wisdom of foreign nations, cultures, and values to which it does not domestically subscribe. It was U.S. resistance to the dictatorship of foreign universal moral and political prescriptions for humankind that steeled the U.S. to endure World War II and the Cold War in the 20th Century. The loathing of dictatorships of foreign ideas and their imperial tyrannies girded young Americans to sacrifice their lives in fighting utopian Communists, National Socialists, and Fascists alike. One question worth asking today is has America embarked on a similarly arrogant and idealistic path in the 21st Century, apparently “...intoxicated by its position as the world’s only superpower,” as former President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested? Countries such as China and Russia today may be asking the same important questions regarding America’s intentions, as we asked of the intentions of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s, the answers of which led us to war.

In fact many have become weary of the American brands of democracy, free markets, permissiveness and individualism, as they have been globally unleashed through Americanization. The American brand of liberty is becoming a dangerous, selfishness-based source of instability for humankind. Permissive rules of law cause capitalist principles to dominate our resource decisions which are limited to a market analyst’s short-term horizon rather than the longer-term scientific foresight so desperately needed. A recent Islamic Distinguished Lecturer at ICAF (2006) went so far as to describe the voracious materialism of Americanization as a “virus,” and in other traditional cultures it has been equated with a cancer. The speaker was in fact a moderate and western-sympathizing statesman. The focused rage of uncompromising and materially disenfranchised Wahhabist-inspired Radical Islamists must also be understood through this lens.

It is the author’s observation that domestically, America’s cultural decline has gained a downward momentum, perhaps irreversibly. Individualism-based ideals increasingly penetrate and subvert whatever traditional forces of internal self-discipline remain from our preceding generations of hardened realists. Today, the insatiable lust for material profit and consumption act much like a narcotic, again with the seductive properties observed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Inappropriately enormous fortunes and estates are amassed, willed and inherited, often in total disregard for the economic disparities that coexist amongst classes of

fellow Americans, and the world at large. This is not to say that traditionalists don't flaunt similar wealth and class gaps. But there are no contradictions there; what stands out with America is the message-deed discrepancy, i.e. the American hypocrisy. Other examples include artificial geriatric life extension being made a priority for retired leisure classes at great social cost simply because it is technologically possible. This tremendous cost is incurred even without first bringing up the life expectancy of our poorest and potentially most productive classes of citizens. Conversely, birth rates of educated classes are declining as child bearing and rearing is considered an inconvenience for ambitious and materialistic careerists. These new generations increasingly measure success based only on personal capital and property accumulation, rather than by successful execution of societal responsibilities and a view to the collective future. Fossil fuels are depleted and the environment degraded in the name of convenience and competition, based on laziness and market forces, not on long-term global considerations.

The fact that the engine of American economic appetite remains so out of balance with nature today in spite of the evidence serves to undermine our moral authority globally. The U.S. constitutes less than 6 percent of the world's population, yet our commodity, agriculture, and product consumption greatly exceeds what any reasonable outsider would consider to be a "fair share" of the earth's limited resources. If we are unable to mitigate or eliminate our unnatural sense of entitlement through self-discipline, discipline will be imposed on us against our national will by less than democratic mechanisms, either from within or by an exasperated and globally interwoven world at large. There are many who, for ideological reasons, reject such imposed societal self-restrictions as "socialist" in spirit, and therefore un-American. On the other hand it can be argued that the liberties we have come to take for granted as natural individual rights and entitlements must be moderated or disappear in the name of collective human survival. In the process America will change and the individual will certainly be marginalized. Spengler referred to this advanced phase as the later period in the "Caesarian" winter of civilization when despotic tools, including tools that some might define as socialist, emerge as means of societal self-preservation. It is noteworthy that this late period is also an age of opportunity when fresh ideas and ideals could seed new and vigorous civilizations, spawning a new spring.

Returning to Hans Merkle's essay, America has already seen forms of the dehumanization he projected as a result of "concept falsification." Our unnatural American confusion of material entitlements with natural rights, well beyond basic necessities, is a false concept that has fueled hedonistic appetites and a cultural disdain for physical discomfort. As evidence, American citizens refuse menial jobs such as agricultural picking as it is physically difficult or below their perceived station, even though the agriculture sector is key to any nation's survival. The traditional competence of the individual to exhibit sound subjective character in judgment has also been corrupted by greed, self-service. Personal judgments have increasingly been replaced by the cold illogic of Merkle's inhuman and "despotic apparatus." The confidence in individuals' ability to make sound decisions and pass responsible judgments has thereby been weakened, not necessarily by democratic processes, but by automated processes, especially in the west. Reliance has instead been placed increasingly in systems, and rules of law today are often arbitrarily applied in ways beyond the common sense comprehension of individuals. Future human judgment is being removed from decision making processes. In other words the undercutting of the free evolution of humanity alluded to by Dr. Merkle has

begun, and our abandonment of traditional values of modesty and self-restraint is largely at fault. This weakening of the role of individual character, self-discipline and sheer will are cornerstone complaints of the ideologies of many anti-modernist extremists.

As with other global trends, this degeneration is initially an American phenomenon. As goes Americanization, so go others as we appear to be leading the “decline of the west.” Voluntary self-regulation mechanisms within the anarchic democratic framework are unlikely. The genies of American individualism and liberty are out of the bottle, and expecting the self-imposition of great personal inconveniences by a vast majority is likely utopian optimism. Curbing the genies will require undemocratic mechanisms, perhaps the sort of tyranny that Spengler predicted, and our Founding Fathers and more recently Dr. Merkle had warned against.

Capitalism, especially in this advanced stage of globalization, tends to subvert traditional cultural mores and nationalistic barriers that resist the “flattening” processes described by Thomas Friedman in his book “The World is Flat.” (2005) Given the contents of his treatise “Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism” (1915) Vladimir Lenin, would not disagree with Friedman’s observations. Nor would Lenin discourage the accelerated flattening and disintegration of those barriers, in order to mature a global identity of a different sort, one that distinguishes itself from national and ethnic identities. “Flattening” would polarize the true remaining dialectical contradictions for decisive resolution. Ironically, in the eyes of many, Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 declaration noted earlier appeared to be a Communist concession to American values. Since American ideals had prevailed, it logically followed that America should reap the material and national security rewards. Instead, China proved to the world to be independent. Today, faced with stiff foreign competition from the rise of China, as well as that of India, South Korea, Japan, and others it is this author’s observation that the reality has become quite unsettling for Americans. The direct beneficiaries of the national power derived from the ideology of Americanization are ever-less American citizens and institutions, and ever-more her global competitors. This clash between reality and the superior American self-image is completely consistent with both Friedman’s observations and the national non-specificity of Lenin’s imperialism. Energetic and entrepreneurial non-Americans have now become the most exemplary practitioners of our own American economic strategies. The author argues that these students of America are “hungrier” than Americans themselves, and stand to inherit the competitive advantages that Americans are relinquishing in their accelerated decline.

In response, many Americans choose to react by denying the trends. They counter that we now constitute a Service economy that has advanced beyond the need for the past competitive technical skill sets and industrial capacity, except in the cutting edge regime of advanced technologies. Far from being in decline, they would contend that America is in a perpetual trend-setting ascendancy, and that foreign competition will never challenge our hegemonic influence except by rule-set violations. Our asymmetric advantages would be claimed to reside in innate and unparalleled American creativity, vision, and managerial skill, cultural gifts that are not associated with regimented Asian culture or other civilized thought processes. Likewise, these advocates of American supremacy would contend that Americans are not experiencing any general character corruption from materialism. As evidence they would present their showpiece of American mental and spiritual health, namely the all-volunteer U.S.

military. As a professional force second to no other, U.S. military capabilities serve as proof-positive that American values are superior and globally applicable. Finally, they would observe that remaining societal disparities in America are still the engine of excellence for developing the competitive spirit, especially now that glass ceilings have been removed. In summary, they would say that free and liberated America today is the antithesis of a civilization in decline.

America's steady relinquishment of competitive advantage is entirely consistent with the cyclical nature of great civilizations and even Vladimir Lenin's general predictions. At the same time, America's decline in national influence is completely incompatible with her perpetuation of a chauvinistic imperial image. The contents of our National Security Strategy and the preemptive posture of our expeditionary military capabilities are the surest indication that the U.S. stands ready to forcefully contest any would-be deterministic inevitabilities as they might pertain to her own fate. Combined with the rapidly increasing powers invested in the American Presidency, the signs of an evolution to a Caesarian tyranny could be convincingly argued.

Coincidentally, a top-level U.S. Government official who visited ICAF as a distinguished lecturer in 2006 made independent observations that parallel Spengler's. Speaking on the coming American fiscal crisis he reminded the audience of the Republic of Rome and the causes of its failure after only 500 years. He pointed out three causes, namely: 1) the downfall of both morality and political comity/civility, 2) Rome's imperial over extension and over confidence, and 3) her fiscal irresponsibility. His speech strongly suggested that in terms of fiscal irresponsibility America may have passed beyond a point of no return, short of drastic intervention. The author observes that drastic implies less democratic and more centralized and Caesarian, i.e. Spengler's civilizational winter. The evermore evident moral degeneracy within the U.S., political contentiousness, and our self-righteous foreign policies may not be coincidences, given history and the ICAF speaker's blunt observations. Regarding contrived efforts to resist cycles of decline, Spengler (1922) noted: "We have not the freedom to reach to this or to that, but the freedom to do the necessary or to do nothing. And a task that historic necessity has set will be accomplished with the individual or against him." (415) Realism and realpolitik are therefore worthy of discussion as means of setting the conditions for America's graceful decline in this century, while averting our outright demise.

IV. Report of Findings

The research began with the assumptions described above. Those assumptions were then subjected to the scrutiny of a broader literature review in order to validate or disprove them. In brief summary, the assumptions identify China, Russia, anti-modernists led by the armed imperial vanguard of Radical Islamists, and the reactionary inertia of American idealism as the most important forces with which a declining America must come to grips with in the 21st Century. Those state and non-state entities were then superimposed on the modern global context that is increasingly modified according to the material reality of technological determinism and globalization assumed above. The following findings resulted.

1. General Finding

The United States is alienating her most critical potential allies during a dangerous phase in globalization. Idealistically-inspired American attitudes, policies and actions are increasingly perceived as condescending and arrogant by others, and their inconsistent application causes a lasting resentment that is at the root of many global crises. America has emerged as a perceived threat in herself whose foreign policies lead to competitor military modernization and opportunistic alliances, better said axis,' to counterbalance our dominance and expeditionary over-extension. The forging of deeper security ties between China and Russia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2001, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC), also known as the "Shanghai Five," the inclusion of other Central Asian nations and now the invitation of Pakistan and Iran as observers is the most significant development in this regard.

It is the author's opinion that Americans are generally dismayed at being excluded from any global power-brokering organizations in the post-Cold war era. We labor continuously to hone our information campaign in response, struggling to differentiate between our selective-truth-based information campaign and traditional notions of propaganda. Still, it is the rapidly propagated and often accurate negative perceptions of US actions, not necessarily the truth of our intentions that cause our opposition to materialize. The tone and priorities of both of our 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies would seem to aggravate rather than mitigate this image dilemma, with their school teacher-like tone of moral judgment. Our demonstrated kinetic actions often transparently favor domestic interests rather than the universal principles we tout. As a result, however correct judgmental attitudes may be at their core, they are dismissed as hypocritical by many in the larger global audience. The public statements of the governments of the exclusive sitting membership and invited observers within the SCO are evidence of a dismissal of U.S. political judgments.

This perception is unintentionally reinforced by our self-contradictory approach to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the only political area where the U.S. had some shared understanding with SCO members. Support for the U.S. led GWOT may be waning as a result. Our U.S. tone and often, from a foreign perspective, incomprehensible unilateral actions, such as those in Iraq, have caused many nations to question the sanity of our policies and our overall reliability on matters that are important to the global community as a whole. For example, we state a commitment to fighting a global terrorism campaign that is obviously inspired by Radical Islamic thought, yet we criticize Russia for employing a heavy hand with savage Muslim

secessionists who are inspired by that very anti-modernist, barbaric ideology in Chechnya. Adding to the inconsistencies, we meet secretly with and even provide political asylum for separatist Chechen terrorist leaders. The question could be asked by others; how we in the U.S. are sincerely committed to fighting terrorists when we harbor and protect terrorists whenever it is politically expedient for us to do so? We have intervened in a sovereign affair of Russia's with calculated Cold War-style opportunism to maintain leverage over a crisis that is extraordinarily threatening to Russia's national security. Our actions are far from transparent. In a chinadaily.com article titled "Putin: Complicit West harbors terrorists" (2004) President Vladimir Putin made this clear. Interviewed shortly after the massacre orchestrated by the Al Qaeda-allied Chechen Islamist Shamil Basayev, an attack which constituted Russia's modern equivalent of America's 9/11, the article reported "Putin said the West's "patronizing and indulgent attitude to the murderers amounts to complicity in terror."

Similarly, we seek from China a moderation of her own domestic economic objectives to assist us in internationally isolating Iran and helping us to promote regime change in North Korea. At the same time we appear to contradict ourselves by threatening One-China legitimacy by openly courting a direct relationship with secessionist factions in the Provinces of Taiwan and Tibet. We also appear to turn an indifferent eye to China's own struggle with the domestic terrorism perpetrated by Muslim Uighur secessionists inspired and supported by Al Qaeda. This dangerous internal threat to China's stability had been detailed even before 9/11 in the book "The Chinese" (2000) by author Jasper Becker. To the author's knowledge, China's struggles with Radical Islam in Xingjian Province and elsewhere have never been noted in America's GWOT. America's lack of consistency and reliability on these and other core issues has undermined much potential Russian and Chinese good will and cooperation. It is precisely that good will that will be required to effectively prosecute the long war against the anti-modernists currently being led by the imperial armed vanguard of Radical Islam.

As stated in the earlier assumptions, U.S. relations with China and Russia must come to dominate our considerations. In this respect, their confidence or lack thereof in the U.S. as a worthy global partner are and will remain critical, if not pivotal to our national fate. In his book "Diplomacy" (1994), Dr. Henry Kissinger asked with concern: "Can the United States afford to...resurrect in the name of domestic preferences the Sino-Soviet alliance?" Based on a review of literature, we have apparently succeeded in doing just that, and in the early 21st Century when the long war has just begun. Recent joint military maneuvers, Chinese-Russian basing agreements, the sharing of indigenous military technologies that overmatch key U.S. capabilities, and discussions of a larger Asian security arrangement of the "Shanghai Five" (2001) that excludes the U.S. entirely are indisputable evidence. This ominous alliance would appear to have one objective over the longer term, namely eliminating U.S.' global access and influence, not out of greed, but rather to put a lid on an imperial America for the sake of world stability.

Left uncorrected, this author contends that a broader apathy towards any future American plight, of the sort that a few rogue nations expressed following the events of 9/11, can be expected. As a further consequence, plausibly deniable, unconventional axis alliances can be expected to form, perhaps even containing the odd-couple integration of the lethal passions of Radical Islamists and anti-modernists with the rational objectives of civilized great power competitors. At worst, maintaining the capacity to defeat America in total nuclear war will

remain a developmental priority and policy option for both China and Russia, an unfortunate regression to old tensions based on new sources of mistrust and capabilities. Unbridled American idealism in the form of American Imperialism not unlike Lenin's past descriptions is a primary causal demon in this dilemma.

2. America is at war with Radical Islam, as the armed vanguard of anti-modernism not terrorism

As Americans, this author observes that we remain convinced of our domestically formulated justifications for waging a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). We have shared our perspectives with all other potential coalition allies in the hope that our logic is universal. Indeed, the broad acknowledgement of the United States as the sole remaining superpower does cause others to carefully study American definitions of friend and foe in this war on terror. Few allies in this war have objected to our definition against an unnamed willful enemy who 'terrorizes' us. Yet identifying terror as an enemy is a particularly ambiguous and situation-specific notion for many, and a lack of clarity is contributing to doubt in our common cause.

For example, as it pertains to our western definitions of terrorism, in his Industrial College of the Armed Forces treatise titled "What are the impediments to an enhanced coalition, and how do we overcome them to strengthen our ability to build coalitions and operate with allied forces in this conflict?" (2006) Egyptian Army, Brigadier General Hamdy Osman observed: "...no one [in the west] defines as terrorism Great Britain's occupation of Egypt for 79 years [that involved the stealing] of Egyptian natural resources (including the Pharaoh's statues) and the killing of Egyptians everywhere. And no one defines as terrorism the French occupation of Algeria for more than 100 years that killed one million Algerians." (pp.4) General Osman notes that western definitions of terrorism also ignore the violent Zionist expropriation of land from the indigenous and peaceful Palestinian people in 1948, a theft illegitimately justified under a treaty between foreign colonial powers. He convincingly probes the reader "Is this terrorism or is it not?" He continues: "Not only have these historical events brought Arab Muslims to the forefront as 'terrorists,' but so have the undeveloped lives and economies, unmodernized education [systems] and hopeless poverty [of Arab nations] that have resulted [directly] from those occupations." (pp.4)

One of America's strongest allies in the long war remains the secular Islamic nation of Egypt. In spite of these obvious western contradictions, and in the face of a dangerous internal threat from the Radical Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, she stands shoulder to shoulder with the US in combating Radical Islamists. Clearly, the US can do better in return to justify that alliance. Yet, it is this author's observation that we perpetuate an ambiguous and even hypocritical understanding of terrorism that is perceived by others as a license to justify actions based on a selective application of criminality. The past motivation for many to sympathize and ally with the U.S. in this war following 9/11 is now steadily diminishing. Based on the assumption noted earlier that an imperial component of Radical Islam has been reawakened, which includes such subversive political dangers to our secular Egyptian friends, what follows is a discussion related to a possible faulty definition of the current war, and the role of Imperial America as a root cause.

While America's direct actions in the war can perhaps be justified from the perspective of

parochial national interests, they often defy understanding by many potential allies, diminishing others' enthusiasm for our stated cause. Alternatively, the United States could effectively galvanize an energetic and willing coalition by identifying a more sensible common threat than terrorism. Given a more compelling definition of a common enemy that generates a sense of urgency throughout the civilized world, we can perhaps motivate a more sincere commitment from powerful allies, especially Russia and China. In this regard, both terrorism and Radical Islam are worthy of comparison as candidate enemy designations.

a. The logical absurdity of a "Global War on Terrorism"

With respect to the current war, United States national security strategy equates terrorism with an opposing will that must be eradicated as an attainable U.S. political objective. The definition of terrorism employed by the United Nations (2005) states in part: "Terrorism [is] an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed [for] political reasons, whereby human victims of violence serve as message generators." Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense (2005) defines terrorism as the use of violence to: "...inculcate fear... intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." This definition highlights the criminality of terrorism as well. In the GWOT contest of opposing wills where the outcome has not yet been determined, the legitimacy of the techniques employed can only be judged by a future and as of today still undetermined victor. It is the author's opinion that in all other respects short of that objective, the targeting and terrorizing of combatants and non-combatants for military ends remains rational if it serves the political, religious, or ideological ends of one or both opponents. Returning to General Osman's treatise, he convincingly states: "But those who practice [terrorism] may perceive themselves to be soldiers in a real, if undeclared war. Terrorism is a form of political warfare to be used as an instrument of political subversion, as one of the tactics and strategies." (pp.3) In this light, terrorism appears no less legitimate than any other ruthless tool of warfare, and it has become the weapon of choice for superempowered modern soldiers, especially for the conventionally disadvantaged Radical Islamic soldiers.

It is the author's observation that on 9/11 Al Qaeda specifically selected the political target of the highly symbolic financial nerve center of the World Trade Center, and the legitimate military target of the Pentagon. They did not fly their high jacked aircraft into densely populated but impoverished Harlem and Anacostia with the simple objective of achieving indiscriminate U.S. carnage. With respect to technological disadvantages, it is also worth noting that the tool of terror is often the necessitated employment crude field expedient weapons in war. For example, in the case of the 9/11 attacks, airplanes served as powerful precision bombs. If Al Qaeda had commanded heavy bombers, or even nuclear weapon-tipped missiles like those the U.S. maintains, they might well have preferred them in order to more effectively level the New York financial district and all Federal Government Headquarters in Washington, DC. It is only the still incomplete acquisition of those means by our enemy that delays such destruction in the spirit of total war and societal annihilation.

It is the author's opinion that conceivably, from a Radical Islamist's perspective, America merely benefits from greater resources and better tools for waging such warfare with greater precision. For example, Predator Drones armed with Hellfire missiles can more precisely target

a leader of Radical Islam in a private residence in Pakistan or Afghanistan. But even America's best weapons cannot prevent the significant collateral loss of innocent lives, as has been shown in such attacks. In both cases, the violence had political objectives, and soldiers were the perpetrators. One can therefore argue that 'terrorism' itself is merely a neutral noun, i.e. a practical tool of warfare. It is logically absurd to declare war against the military tool of terror or the weapons that it employs, especially when we want to maintain those very same tools in our own in-extremis kit of options, as per the following discussion.

b. The military utility of terror

It is the author's observation that terrorism is a tool of warfare that has been deliberately and effectively by all sides, including ours. Clausewitz would agree that one can only wage war against an opposing will, a conscious entity having a political objective, and not against a mindless 'thing' such as a tool or weapon of terror that. While efficient and ruthless, martial tools that terrify cannot be characterized with qualities of good or evil. Explosive fragments are dumb and will not discriminate between hero or villain, they simply maim and kill, and thereby possess utility. Opponents of this simplification will point to a perpetrator's target selection as the indicator of the just or unjust martial application of force. To this the author counters that the blurring of boundaries between strategic and tactical, military and law enforcement, combatant and non-combatant, and religious and political noted throughout this paper neutralize all judgments on violence and mischief. The global organism and technological determinism that necessarily brought individual superempowerment into existence are the cause of this modern neutrality. We can wish that it was not so and cloak ourselves in an idealistically-inspired sense of righteousness to feel better about our self-restraint, but we cannot change the facts. So, what we have come to term Radical Islamic 'terrorists,' for example, are actually soldiers, having politically inspired objectives, not a self-absorbed, sadistic, murderous intent. We should not be confused by their decidedly un-western expressions of passion or their lack of conventional state identification to found their political cause. Their passion is ingrained in their nature that existed before the current conflict began, as per Clausewitz. As for their national identity, it is Islam.

It is the author's opinion, with regards to our current enemy, the unorthodox characteristics of their cruel tactics and weapons compensates for conventional military disadvantages. However cruel, the effectiveness of their unrestricted asymmetric approach has been nothing less than spectacular. An estimated one million dollar investment in 19 superempowered soldiers has caused well over one trillion dollars in damage to the American economy. Their simple acts on 9/11 also served to accelerate the general polarization of Islam from the West, a process that continues today. This included setting previously unthinkable tyrannical mechanisms in motion in western democracies, as the patriotic solidarity inspired by the attacks now gives way to intense political divisiveness over executive powers. While America remains too close to events in time to acknowledge the ingenuity of the 9/11 ambush today, future historians will certainly compare them to the brilliant deception that led to the sacking of Troy, and other pivotal battles in the history of warfare. Only in the future will the west come to fully comprehend that the non-combatant civilian has again become a politically useful and therefore valid military target. This new reality trumps the idealistic American insistence on denying it. Wars with passionate savages force civilized people to overcome legally-inspired psychological barriers of their own construction, but our societal survival is an

irresistible incentive to help us along. The savage soldier and the civilized soldier appear to be 'two sides of the same coin.' All that separates the two is the passion of their cause, and all members of humanity are susceptible.

It is this author's opinion that the Soviet Union under Stalin clearly understood the strategic value of terror. As General Zukov's Armies entered Germany and later Berlin from the east, Stalin's political commissar propagandists had inspired soldiers with a passionate spirit of ruthlessness, though it was rationally calculated as a deliberate pay-back with a view to the future. As per the U.N. definition of terrorism, the horrible acts of terror perpetrated against surviving German civilians and prisoners of war served as the historical message generators, with the vivid imagery communicated by them even today seared into the collective conscience of all Germans. Germans now know to be historical fact that between three and seven million Germans simply disappeared during and following the Soviet Red Army's arrival from the east. However, considering the savage crimes inflicted upon the Russian people by an arrogant imperial Germany bent on annihilation, the heavy hand of Stalin's response at the end of the Great Patriotic War was an act that benefited from a longer view to coexistence. As a result, while Germans and Russians today possess a healthy, rational, and civil respect for one another, Germans also have reason to fear Russians at a primitive level, a fear that is communicated from generation to generation. The racist German spirit of imperialism will not likely threaten the Russian people again, as per Stalin's clear-eyed intent. This outcome is entirely consistent with Kant's application of the mechanisms of nature to men, i.e. a mutual submission to coercive laws that lead to a state of perpetual peace. Moral perspectives on what is savage and what is civilized are endlessly debatable, but the real laws of human nature operate with great certainty.

Even America and her western allies have rationally employed the heavy hand of terrorism successfully in the past. For example, in 1945, Sir Winston Churchill, who personally approved the firebombing of Dresden, acknowledged that the: "...bombing of German cities [is] for the sake of increasing the terror..." Sir Norman Bottomley, Britain's Deputy Chief of Air Staff, concurred. He stated that the fire bombings of civilian population centers for the purpose of inflicting terror was: "...strategically justified in so far as they tend to shorten the war and preserve the lives of Allied soldiers. To my mind we have absolutely no right to give them [fire bombings] up unless it is certain that they will not have this effect." Like the Soviet advance, this responsive capacity of violated Great Britain will long be remembered by Germany and the world. Criminal and savage violations against sovereign nations like her can and will generate a heavy punitive price.

The British view of the utility of terror against an intransigent enemy mirrored that of General Curtis LeMay in his air campaign against Japan. In fact, Wikipedia (2006) states that General LeMay's XX Air Force fire-bombings of Tokyo and other largely non-military urban targets killed more civilians in total than the atomic bombs that followed. The conventional fire bombings had been carried out as a long-term strategy to destroy Japan's ability to produce war materials as well as undermine the Japanese Government's and the populace's will to continue the war. In the context of total war, the large number of Japanese civilians killed by strategic bombing was seen as acceptable by the American administration. Like Sir Bottomley, General LeMay felt that his conventional bombings were saving lives by encouraging Japan to surrender earlier. Former Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe's statement that "...the determination

to make peace was the prolonged bombing," confirmed the correctness of this view. The air crews of the XX Air Force were the moral and heroic soldiers of America's Greatest Generation, not terrorists. They successfully applied the tools of warfare necessary to defeat a formidable savage enemy.

In spite of the formal American history that insists that the fission weapons dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki sought immediate Japanese capitulation, Wikipedia (2006) documents several compelling arguments have been made that those bombings were superfluous. Instead they may have been done following Japanese surrender overtures to serve the message generation purpose of terrorism, beyond immediate strategic objectives with regards to Imperial Japan. Specifically, it is claimed that that they served as an intimidating "shot across the bow" for Stalin's consumption, in anticipation of post-war tension with and Imperial Soviet Union.

Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia (1990) describes several other examples of the successful employment of terrorism for causes that are today heroically legitimized in the official history of the United States. For example, General Sherman employed terrorism against civilians during the American Civil War in a successful campaign aimed at undercutting material and psychological support for the Army of Northern Virginia. The less discriminate effects of his field expedient means were often an unintended function of their crudity. However, their ruthlessness was also beneficial in demoralizing the Confederate home front and encouraging front line desertion. While those techniques ran contrary to the traditional chivalrous norms of military self-restraint in "just war," targeting non-combatants was seen as useful and necessary. From Georgia, to Tokyo, to Nagasaki, to Dresden, the history of America's and the west's application of terrorism is a legacy of strategic victory, and it is celebrated, not condemned. It is the author's opinion that declaring war on terrorism is hypocritical at least, and self-limiting at worst, as we do not want to renounce that option in our warfighting tool kit in the future.

c. The logical consistency of a "War on Radical Islam"

Based on the discussion to this point, the author believes that Radical Islamists, by means of their arms, numbers and organization are serving as the vanguard for anti-modernist forces generally. As discussed below, if any one of those had possession of a nuclear weapon to employ in a major U.S. urban area such an attack would have already occurred. It is only a matter of time, and it is likely the Radical Islamists that will first obtain such means. The acquisition of nuclear weapons must be considered inevitable, so deterrence of a sort that will have an intimidating and deterrent effect on the political will to employ them is the next level of consideration. Accordingly, the war must be renamed in order to focus on today's real enemy in order to create a focal point for the American political will and application of resources. When other ant-modernists join the fray in coming years the name of the war must again reflect their inclusion in the set of targets for annihilation.

A Global War on Radical Islam is an accurate portrayal of the confrontation that the political wills of America, Russia, China, secular Islam and others are in fact waging against a common threat, so long as the moderation of imperial American behavior is discussed in the same breath. The distinction between Radical Islam and religious Islam and Muslims is as clear as past distinctions between Nazi, or Imperial Germany and ethnic Germans as well as that

between Imperial Japan and the patriotic Japanese people. Similarly, Radical Islam's political ambitions are philosophically divorced from religious Islamism, just as patriotic America is separate from our internal demon, namely an arrogant Imperial American. Another religiously-tinged example closer to home distinguishes fascist American white supremacy movements from religious Christendom, a realm they have high jacked and profess to be their spiritual inspiration. In this respect, China and Russia in particular might welcome a dose of American realism and clarity on the subject of Islam and Radical Islam, as well as America and imperial America, in preparation for allying with us in a longer war against the former. So, by acknowledging terrorism as a mere tool, and then properly renaming the war as one against Radical Islam, others will be provided an incentive to reinvigorate their contributions to fighting our common political enemy, one they can frame as a threat to themselves. For the U.S. domestically, the renaming the war now as one against the imperial or political component of Islam, not Islam and her personal faith would be useful. It would achieve long-term clarity for the long war, independent of which party that happens to be in the Presidency at different times.

Many will object that our moderate, secular Muslim allies will have severe inhibitions with respect to religious sensitivities to such a renaming of the war. Understandably, no secular Muslim nation that we consider to our allies today want to hear the word Islam in reference to a common foe of civilization. Our willingness to acknowledge Imperial America as an absolutely equivalent political threat that must be overcome internally, and concurrently, is the key to achieving understanding. Rational statesmen can intelligently see that Islam is half a word in our context.

3. Radical Islam is the immediate threat to America, China, and Russia, and Secular Islam

In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal titled "Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam" (2005), Mr. Abdurrahman Wahid, the former President of Indonesia observed that Osama bin Laden has obtained a religious edict justifying the use of nuclear weapons against America. As a globally respected Islamic statesman, President Wahid ominously and frankly stated: "Islamic fundamentalism has become a well-financed, multifaceted global movement that operates like a juggernaut in much of the developing world, and even among immigrant Muslim communities in the West...transforming Islam from a personal faith into an authoritarian political system...ultimately, bringing the entire world under the sway of their extremist ideology." President Wahid continued: "Expansionist by nature...Islamic warriors raiding from New York to Jakarta, Istanbul, Baghdad, London and Madrid are only the tip of the iceberg, forerunners of a vast and growing population that shares their radical views and ultimate objectives." He continues by urging us to consider that: "It requires great emotional strength to confront the potential ramifications of this fact...Imagine the impact of a single nuclear bomb detonated in New York, London, Paris, Sydney or L.A.! What about two or three? The entire edifice of modern civilization is built on economic and technological foundations that terrorists hope to collapse with nuclear attacks like so many fishing huts in the wake of a tsunami..." Finally, President Wahid urged an effective counterstrategy: "...based upon a realistic assessment of our own strengths and weaknesses in the face of religious extremism and terror...before the global economy and modern civilization itself begin to crumble in the face of truly devastating attacks." Little can be added to President Wahid's qualified and candid assessment. As a first step in developing a coordinated strategy, the origins of today's American, Russian, and Chinese

confrontations with Radical Islam must be discussed in their particulars.

a. America's struggle with Radical Islam

America is a nation founded by, and even today predominantly composed of a citizenry nurtured in the spirituality and culture of the Judeo-Christian tradition. In the civilized strengths of Islamic civilization it has encountered a worthy spiritual neighbor. The differences in the philosophical foundations of our world view are fundamental. In his book "The Crisis of Islam," (2003) Bernard Lewis defined those differences in great detail. The deeply rooted, conscious connection of every Muslim to his and her collective Islamic history back to the Prophet Mohammad constitutes life in total, not a mere non-kinetic religious life as westerners understand. The long-term peaceful coexistence of these two great monotheistic entities was frequently in doubt, but before the advent of post-Cold War globalization geographical expanses and strength disparities buffered us sufficiently.

Bernard Lewis also made clear that the roots of the current conflict are deep. While Judeo-Christian America's struggles with Radical Islamists could be said to date to the first European Christian Crusades, events of great significance to Muslims. Those events are etched into the collective consciousness of Islam. While they may be considered by most Americans to be irrelevant ancient history for which blame has long since evaporated, we dismiss their contemporary significance for Muslim's at our own peril. The Crusades and the centuries of conflict and Muslim humiliation that have followed ultimately guarantee inheritance of the rage of a collective consciousness by the most suitable contemporary embodiment of the ancient enemies of Islam; America. As a byproduct of her perceived position as the most formidable obstacle to Islam's full realization, America has inherited the broader blood debt of that focused rage. Her attributed crimes include all imperialist power humiliations committed in the 20th Century against Islam, such as the arbitrary partitioning of the defeated Ottoman Empire and subsequent exploitation of the Mideast. The fact that European colonial powers actually executed the partitioning is irrelevant, as Imperial America is the hegemon, the Great Satan to be contended with today, and we have thereby inherited that debt in its entirety.

With those preexisting humiliations as a pre-Israel backdrop, American and British support for the accelerated establishment of the modern State of Israel in Palestine following WWII was emotional gasoline on the smoldering fire. The Zionist dream of a Jewish Homeland advocated by Theodor Herzl in the 19th Century and later legislated in the Balfour Declaration, held that Jewish State implementation called for harmonious acceptance and integration in the indigenous Palestinian population as a precondition. However, Nazi Germany's treatment of Jews set a new standard for industrial evil, so the accelerated imposition of the Israeli State in a partitioned Palestine in 1948 seemed timely and just to those Allied victors, i.e. a lesser evil. Also, the focus on great 19th and 20th Century fascist and socialist ideologies caused a marginalization of concerns for longer-term aggravation of ancient religious antagonisms. Nor did the indigenous Islamic peoples of the Mideast seem capable of competently threatening the existence of Israel then or later, by the projections of that time. Zionists successfully employed arms provided by France, Czechoslovakia, and even the Soviet Union in prosecuting conventional and terrorism to secure their interests against indigenous Palestinians and neighboring Arab nations, following the establishment of Israel in 1948.

It is the author's opinion that over the decades America has inherited the sin of the establishment of Israel in the Mideast of Islam, even though that perception may not be historically correct. In the book "The Arab Israeli Wars" (1988), until 1973, the martial capacity of members of the Arab League to contest her existence had been underestimated. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, the accumulation of oil wealth, and the ranks of Radical Islam's formidable superempowered soldiers, that now include the states of Palestine and Iran, America confronts a threat not only to Israel's physical existence, but to her very own. America and Israel appear to be joined at the hip. America's long-term military commitment to Israel's defense are now a given, to the point that American foreign policy is perceived by the Islamic world to be one and the same as Israeli policy. Frequent interviews of the "Arab Street," where the superempowered soldiers of tomorrow are cultivated, conducted by major news networks over the years reveal perceived American complicity in all matters pertaining to Israeli interests. Therefore, that single street-level perception on this volatile issue is the actionable reality for the disenchanting members of the youth budge of the entire Islamic world.

Iran's emerging nuclear weapons capability is noteworthy here. At a recent ceremony marking the 27th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (2006), President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated: "We ask the West to remove what they created sixty years ago and if they do not listen to our recommendations, then the Palestinian nation and other nations will eventually do this for them." Whether or not Israel and/or America are able to negate the apocalyptic threat that is beginning to threaten Israel's very physical existence in coming months is of little long-term significance. With or without Iran's participation, Israel's physical existence is in doubt in an age of Radical Islamic superempowerment. With reference to Clausewitz the "conflicting interests" are absolutely important to both Israel and Radical Islam. The former will fight total war for survival, while the later will fight a total war for annihilation. Israel is at a decided disadvantage and her eventual demise can be predicted under these circumstances. In this respect her own nuclear arsenal will only delay the final outcome.

Bernard Lewis (2003) described America's dilemma with Islam is America's broad, direct, and largely inconsiderate contact with the Islamic world during the past century. America's and Europe's critical dependence on Mideast oil, as well as the Cold War objective of denying the Soviet Union a warm water port as a part of a containment strategy have aggravated interdependencies and Infidel contact with the Islamic world. Recent and on-going military conflicts with Islamic peoples from Libya to the Philippines have increased the US blood debt significantly. Given the confluence of deep-seated Islamic rage, the Trojan Horse-like penetration of Islamic enclaves into the heart of American communities, and the deterministic forces noted earlier, the U.S. will require formidable allies to survive the awakening of imperialist ambitions amongst Radical Islamists in the 21st Century. Unfortunately, imperial American attitudes and policies remain the most frustrating obstacles to solidifying those alliances.

b. Russia's struggle with Radical Islam

Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia (1990) describes how Russia's bitter struggle with Radical Islamists has deeper historical roots. As long ago as the 10th and 11th centuries when

the state of Kievan Rus became the largest and most prosperous in Europe, the seed of Russian conflict with Islam was laid. Kievan Rus' prosperity stemmed from its diversified trade with both Europe and Asia, and the intercultural contacts that resulted. Contact led to conquest, and in the 13th century this Russian area was conquered by the pagan Golden Horde Mongols and by Turkic-speaking Muslim nomads. These invaders, eventually known as the Muslim Tartars, plundered the Russian communities for over 200 years, and assumed rule over the southern and central expanses of present-day Russia. The western region was lucky to be incorporated into, and come under the European rule of Lithuania and Poland. The northern part of Russia also escaped the horrors and atrocities associated with imperial Tartar rule and was able to retain some degree of autonomy during this desperate period in Russian history. However, the disintegration of the Kievan Rus trade node separated the northerners from the Belarusians and Ukrainians further west (Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia [1990]).

Unfortunately, those Russians to the south and east who were cut off from European influences were not spared. As with other regions conquered and ruled by Muslim nomads and Mongols, both Russia's economic and social development were severely retarded, her democratic institutions corrupted, and her rich cultural inheritance threatened. However, the oppressed Russians were eventually able to revive themselves militarily, embarking upon a war of reconquest which finally led to the eviction of her Muslim enemies and the annexing of their ill-gotten lands. In fact, following the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the fall of Constantinople at the hands of Ottomans in 1453, Russia emerged as the only surviving and functional Christian state on the Eastern European frontier (Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia [1990]).

The Wikipedia (2006) chronicles how this ancient struggle has carried over to the present day. In spite of this respite, Russia's clash with Islamic imperial ambitions was far from over. Chechnya is an Islamic polity in the Northern Caucasus that has been plagued with a violent history, waging warfare against its non-Islamic neighbors since 15th Century, including the Christian Georgians and Cossacks. Most Chechens are Sunni Muslim, with the country having been converted to Islam between the 16th and the 18th century. Since Chechnya also contains a sizable ethnic Russian minority, it was eventually incorporated as a republic within Russia in the 18th Century. The current attempt at secession from Russian incorporation began later in that century when Chechens allied themselves with other imperially-inclined Muslim polities throughout the Northern Caucasus in an effort to establish a Trans Caucasus Islamic state under Shari 'a Law. This effort consistently fell short of success under Tsarist Russia, and resistance ceased entirely in favor of peaceful assimilation within the Soviet Union, a wise pragmatic decision based on the steely determination of the USSR to maintain good internal order and discipline.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Wikipedia (2006) describes how the opportunistic imperial ambitions of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus have been rekindled, and the 'Chechen Republic of Ichkeria' illegally declared its independence. Having the aim of seceding from the Russian Republic, this declaration led to two major armed conflicts with Russia and a persistent insurgency that has already claimed the lives of at least 100,000 Russian soldiers and perhaps 200,000 Chechens. Most of the civilian deaths have been ethnic Russians, many having been coercively 'Islamized' or cleansed in the conflict. In spite of

Chechnya's declaration of independence it has yet to successfully secede, and remains a constituent republic of the Russian Federation. As a result, the insurgency has become increasingly desperate and savage over time.

Wikipedia (2006) continues to report that in September 1999 Chechen terrorists carried out synchronized bombings of civilian apartment block complexes in Buinaksk, Dagestan, Moscow, and Volgograd in Southern Russia. Since that time, further attacks against civilians have been orchestrated within Russia itself, and have ranged from Beslan schoolhouse slaughter, to mass hostage-takings the Moskou Theater, and the suicide bombings of civilian airliners and at other public events. As a consequence, President Putin has placed the conflict within the guise of the War on Terrorism, comparing the attacks in Russia to those of 9/11 in the U.S. In validation of President Putin's wisdom on the matter, separatists have adopted a strongly Islamist position and have been receiving support from Arab Islamist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. In summary, Russia's concern for the grave risks to her own national security posed by the Chechen crisis remains acute, and her experience with the savage determination of the ancient imperial enemy predates our own by many centuries.

c. China's struggle with Radical Islam

The threat that Radical Islam poses to Chinese sovereignty and national security is ultimately equal to that faced by Russia the U.S. China's own Muslim Uighur insurgency in Xingjian Province certainly helped compel China to sign up to the U.S.' led GWOT by means of endorsing UN Security Council Resolution SC/7158 on 28 Sep 2001. Yet, her enthusiasm for a war against 'terrorism' has not met the standard of urgency and energetic engagement that the U.S. would prefer. 'GWOT' may not be the optimal war title to garner passionate support from China. Instead of passing judgments on neutral, though ruthless tools, the political will of the operators. GWOT assumes terrorism to be the equivalent of a conscious hostile polity, instead of a mere tool of warfare for any belligerent, including America and China that it is in reality. It is the author's opinion that this misnaming constitutes a lost opportunity to rally China's substantial martial capacities against the real common enemy to both our nations, namely Radical Islam. The history of American and western warfighting shows that the terrorization of civilian non-combatants has been and remains a useful modern option for all levels of warfare. America restricts her own hand and the hands of potential partners like China in fighting an unavoidably ruthless war effectively.

Interestingly, and in spite of the public decision of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to ally itself with the U.S. in the GWOT, there is clear evidence that the Chinese consider acts of terror as useful alternative tools of warfare. In 1999, two Colonels within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui) coauthored a book titled "Unrestricted Warfare." It was written with a view to China being compelled to confront the U.S. in the future over issues related to Taiwan or other flash points, while still suffering asymmetric military disadvantages. Having articulated the tactics now commonly employed by vanguards of Radical Islam, overnight the authors both became celebrated heroes within the PRC. It is a tragic lost opportunity that America has failed to redirect those Chinese energies towards our common enemy instead. In this light, our judgmental approach towards the tool of terrorism deserves a second look.

It is the author's opinion that China already realizes that she is at war with Islam's imperialist crusaders, in other words the tangible adversary of Radical Islam. In his book "Understanding China" (2001), author John Byron Starr describes how China's seven-million strong Uighur minority is growing into a dangerous secessionist polity. During the 1980s several militant groups dedicated themselves to the aim of creating an independent Islamic state out of the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). To this end Islamic extremists perpetrated bombings, kidnappings and assassinations that have resulted in hundreds of Chinese deaths and casualties which reached as far as Beijing. Recent Al Qaeda activities have further emboldened this threat. In John Byron Starr continues: "Beijing is particularly concerned about international involvement in these incidents. Chinese authorities cite evidence that Islamic militants in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have supplied weapons to Xinjiang separatists." (pp.171) Furthermore, violent protests organized by ethnic separatists have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years. If China perceived that our presence in Central Asia is solely a war on Radical Islam her concern for U.S. encirclement might be largely mitigated.

4. U.S. relations with China and Russia are pivotal

In his second Inaugural Address (2005) President Bush outlined the American idealism: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." This perspective is a faithful reflection of the contents of the U.S. National Security Strategy that the President published in 2002. In the speech he continued that the U.S. intends to build a more lasting and durable form of global stability through "...a balance of power that favors freedom." This reflects a U.S. self-image of the lone benevolent Super Power having the indisputable moral authority to negotiate or coercively implement "freedom" universally, and on terms. The current U.S. strategy publicly embraces the concept of multilateralism; however in apparent self-contradiction, it affirms that the U.S. will continue to dictate the conditions and terms of the balance of power unilaterally. This perceived self-righteousness and resulting judgment upon nations of differing perspective may come to threaten our own national security at home, as our artificial maintenance of an otherwise temporary hegemony becomes perceived as a global tyranny. Such judgments are perceived as arrogance by China and Russia, and it will be difficult to garner support and allegiance from our most powerful potential allies even when the mutual interests are obvious to all, if that perception is not changed.

It is the author's opinion that contemporary legislative authorizations such as the Patriot Act and an open Presidential willingness to order the broad monitoring of domestic communications without legal warrant are the latest indicators of a longer-term trend. Domestically, we appear to be evolving in the direction of a less democratic authoritarianism, certainly out of a perceived national security necessity. In addition to corresponding with Caesarian tendencies of mature civilizations described by Spengler (1922), it constitutes the U.S. acting on its own interests in its own way.

In the "International World Order of the 21st Century" (2005), China and Russia jointly urge their audience that: "The diversity of civilizations in the world and the diversification of development models should be respected and safeguarded. Differences in the historical

backgrounds, cultural traditions, social and political systems, value concepts, and development paths of countries should not become an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries." The statement is an acknowledgement that the imperfect and diverse global circumstances, while worthy of improvement, must first be pragmatically treated as tangible realities having rational inertia and momentum. Their shared perspective would have been unthinkable communist heresy at the height of their idealistic Socialist excursions in the 20th Century individually, and much less jointly.

For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia (1990) describes Vladimir Lenin's hasty nationalization of industry and elimination of all private property following the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. This idealistic attempt caused great societal hardship and led directly to a policy retreat in the New Economic Policy. That and similar disappointments with collectivization were impressed in the collective memories of most of the Soviet oligarchies after Stalin. The resulting conservatism has been reinvigorated in the present day Federation, following the experimentation with democracy by President Boris Yeltsin. Russians are understandably averse to high risk experimentation in socio-political matters, including democracy, now preferring gradual, reality-based change whose pace and direction remain under strict centralized control.

Similarly, the Chinese underwent radical idealism-fueled swings in domestic policy as Socialism took root under Mao Zee Dong, and the suffering and destruction that those changes left in their wake was at least equal to the Soviet experience. The Encyclopedia Britannica Macropedia (1990) describes the idealistically-inspired disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. As per the author's interview of the Chinese official at the PRC Embassy (2006) those experiences are seared into the memories of the PRC leadership today.

In summary, in 20th Century Socialist societies like the USSR and China, missteps in social engineering tended to have negative consequences for every family, including those of national leaders over the generations. Modern Russia and China do not reject the ultimate idealistic value of capitalism, the rule of law, and democracy and seem to accept America's advertised faith in these principles. But none of those principles can or should be expected to endanger government stability and legitimacy in the process for their own idealistic sake. Both nations resent U.S. and European complaints that progress as defined by those outsiders is not rapid or consistent. This demonstrates our lack of knowledge or appreciation for China and Russia's respective histories, and what their sovereign experiences have taught them.

V. Conclusions

1. General Conclusion

The overarching conclusion that emerged from the author's research is that the original assumptions were confirmed in the broader literature review, and in the resulting findings documented above. For the United States to survive as a geographically circumscribed and culturally intact polity in the 21st Century, realism in global outlook and a corresponding realpolitik will be critical. Simplification of relationships and unilateral, "first causal" initiatives will be the key to prompting a new constructive momentum that allows the global landscape to be set to conditions that are conducive to our survival. Getting it right with the two great powers of China and Russia, and isolating the political force of Radical Islam from Islam as a civilization, are key elements of this conclusion. As the underlying enabler of these changes, America must come to realize that her own imperialistic attitudes and actions are her demons, her enemy within, that must be neutralized in order to change the other conditions.

In 'Diplomacy' (1994), Dr. Henry Kissinger succinctly summarizes: "No Asian country would want to be - or could afford to be - supportive of America in any political conflict with China which is considered to be the result of misguided United States policy." (p.830) In 2006 the same observation can be made, yet now it includes Russia as well as China. The current forging of Asian alliances, such as those between China, Russia, India and others, to the exclusion of the U.S., as well as our inability to slow our polarization from Islam, should cause us to reflect on the reasons for our isolation. It is in this spirit that the following specific conclusions have been drawn.

2. America must adjust to global and historical realities

With or without idealistic America's consent, the world at large is forging a path into the 21st Century. The power of individual incentives and global commerce based on private ownership and a market forces is a great victory of Americanization. But part of America's gamble on Americanization was that we would and should lose direct influence over the free will of over economic and political competitors. This relinquishment of U.S. hegemony, which many legitimately perceive as Imperial America, would seem to represent true liberation, and freedom for sovereign nations who used to gauge their policies and actions upon superpower approval, or at least turn inward to subordination or isolationism. Yet, America does not celebrate their liberation because we have lost control over them in the process.

Well, we "wanted freedom bad and we got it bad," and our cherished ideas and projects are ever-less successful or satisfying. Either democracy is not adopted where it does not have cultural roots, or when it does take root express strong objections with electoral outcomes. Furthermore, we are alarmed that our own material way of life may be threatened by the wealth and productivity of other, more competitive, students of Americanization. Finally, we are forced to confront a long dormant enemy for whom morality and justice in war are dependent on the victor's assessment after the war is complete. In this total war we are in a position of decided weakness, where our traditional views of chivalry and just war only constrain our own actions, and not our enemy's. In many respects we now have the world we wished for during the darkest

years of the Cold War; now we must adjust to the unintended consequences. We have overwhelmingly brought upon ourselves the current bedeviling situation. It is only our initiative that can moderate our decline and prevent it from becoming a path to the abyss of our abrupt national demise. Some suggestions for unprompted US initiative are discussed below.

a. Expressions of national humility to regain global face

America must recognize that the real geopolitical forces at play in the 21st Century do not favor her dominant position as a lone superpower that is free to continue moral self-determination in foreign policy. The opinions of peoples and polities that we have taken for granted due to their relative impotence are rising and awakening to work with or challenge us. In the case of Russia and China, our past differences and perceived offenses through their respective eyes have not yet degraded our relations to the point that we have become passion-filled ‘natural and irreconcilable enemies.’ A substantive and respectful realpolitik will allow us to move successfully into the future. Respect comes in the form of the humble recognition that idealistic American perspectives have validity in the US, but their validity is not necessarily universal. Russians would generally express the same sort of contrition in that Russia has her own special path, and that path does not include imposing her ideals as universal prescriptions. In precisely the same way, the Chinese have a special path that they describe as adapting herself to globalization by means of applying “Chinese characteristics.” If the two great powers of China and Russia can come to perceive a reduction in tension with America through our fresh, reliable, and substantive acceptance of multi-polarity, America will have laid the first stone in a new foundation for positive coexistence in the 21st Century. It will signal the formal self-acknowledgement of the need and intent to end ‘Imperial America.’ A few specific policy suggestions discussed below would serve as signals of our shift from idealistic utopianism to pragmatic realism.

It is the author’s opinion that the second critical foundational stone must come through America’s contrite approach to the legitimate perceptions of Islam as a civilization and identity. We would do well to acknowledge the validity of Islam’s growing perception of America as the “Great Satan” and her Americanized western allies as conspiring and immoral “Infidels,” as reported by Bernard Lewis. In this, our western notions of legal right and wrong are irrelevant to the perceptions of Muslims. Those laws and norms are our western inventions in our own interests, not divine inspiration with any universal applicability. Seen through Islam’s lens, there is indisputable historical evidence that the U.S. has much to apologize and atone for. European states are even more complicit than the U.S. in offenses against Islam, and in the causes of the reawakening of an increasingly popular and savage Wahhabism that is at the heart of the political forces of Radical Islam.

Returning to General Osman’s ICAF treatise (2006), he suggested that if great Islamic allies such as Egypt are to completely share our view that that any acts of Radical Islamists against America and Israel are to be considered terrorism: “The western countries which had occupied Arab countries should [proclaim] officially, publicly and globally before the U.N. their sincere apology regarding their occupation of Arab countries and acts against their peoples in the past.” This should include material compensation through substantial in-kind assistance with “the development of their educational systems, economies, and technology and information

[capacities].” (pp.5)

The Islamic connection between sincere apology for past inconsideration and the practical resolution of violent confrontation otherwise fueled by Radical Islamic rhetoric is confirmed by other moderate Muslim allies of the US. As another case in point, the President of the National Defense University recently requested NDU student body and faculty feedback on a Wall Street Journal article titled “Bonfire of the Pieties” (2006). The article discussed the broad objection of the Islamic world to disrespectful cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. In an e-mail response to the NDU President, Iraqi Army Lieutenant Colonel Salam Serhan stated the following with regards to the Danish government’s refusal to apologize for the indiscretions of a newspaper publisher due to legal insistence on freedom of speech: “Hypothetically, what will happen if the Prime Minister apologizes to a billion Muslims on behalf of his government and the press in order to cool the issue instead of insisting on [maintaining] his attitude? The negative response [of his continued attitude] from the Danish government will give the extremists and fundamentalists, and especially Al-Qaeda enough legitimacy to conduct terrorist activities in Denmark!” Sincere public apologies still play a significant role in traditional non-western cultures, from Islam to China. The face of national character and its reliability are just as central to international relations as they are to personal relations. The traditional view of nations and politics is not unlike the ‘social organism’ assumption discussed earlier.

This author contends that Europeans must be willing to stand accountable for their own acts of greed, abuse, and neglect in the same way that Japan must independently prostrate itself before the Chinese with respect to her past atrocities. That is others’ business, and the US should not answer for the evils of other nation states, no matter how closely allied, politically or culturally. But we can and must answer for ourselves, and as it pertains to Islam today this will involve sincere efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli impasse decisively, as we are deeply complicit in its perpetuation, or prepare for the more likely alternative, an issue that will be discussed further below. The impact of American public apologies for national crimes and indiscretions, past or present, intentional or unintentional, must not be underestimated. In fact, such expressions of contrition and global empathy are keys to exorcizing our own imperial American demon. Conversely, our continued unwillingness to do so would be a sign our societal sociopathy, i.e. a cancer that could bring on an abrupt national fate.

b. Being satisfied with Democracy and Rule of Law in One Country

In an article titled *Creating Normality Is the Real Mideast Challenge* (2006), author Robert D. Kaplan observed: “Political change is nothing we need to force upon people; it’s something that will happen anyway. What we have to work toward -- for which peoples with historical experiences different from ours will be grateful -- is not democracy but normality. Stabilizing newly democratic regimes, and easing the development path of undemocratic ones, should be the goal for our military and diplomatic establishments. The more cautious we are in a world already in the throes of tumultuous upheaval, the more we’ll achieve.” For a U.S. that is becoming fully integrated into a global economy, the U.S.’s zeal to force the spread of democracy to the world at large may be inappropriate. While there may be a kernel of truth to U.S. admiration of individual liberties, private ownership, and democratic processes, global application can only be realized unevenly in time given the diversity of experiences and

historical stages of development.

A discussion of the history of Socialism in Russia is revealing, as the idealistic Soviet Socialists and American freedom advocates today are compelling. The first omens of future Soviet-Russian pragmatic compromise on fundamental principles appeared even before the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. In an article published in 1915, the pragmatic Vladimir Lenin stated the following: "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately." This thoughtful modification led to the eventual doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" under Joseph Stalin, and served as a key enabler of the longevity of Soviet Socialism. This is because it served to moderate the idealistic zealotry of Internationalists like Leon Trotsky with the realities of the imperfect and uncooperative world at large. While Americans might be skeptical gleaned any lessons from the Communist experience, the simple utility of realism for the moderation of American idealism is worthy of consideration. Wishful thinking and impatience will not speed foreign adoption of America's glorified ideals of democracy and the rule of law by great powers having quite different historical contexts and experiences. In fact such American insistence is considered by both Russia and China to constitute inconsiderate meddling, and it is ultimately counter-productive.

We should be clear that those Soviet experiences were the immediate historical descendents of Chinese and Russian peoples today. Neither China nor Russia is going to rush the institution of liberal democracy or any foreign concept of the rule of law if they endanger the stability of the state. In this sense the heavier oligarchic or authoritarian hand employed by either nation is rational within their respective cultural and historical contexts. It is the author's interpretation that realpolitik dictates we do not publicly, or even privately criticize their national paths or milestone timelines for achieving greater personal liberties and reform. We can advise one another as friends if asked, but we do not pass moral judgment. It is their sovereign business, not ours. Instead, we must look with humility at globalization through the lenses of the collective experiences of others for a better understanding, as their respective cultural perspectives are no less valid than our own; they are just different. Maoists, Soviets, and National Socialists have all realized the futility of attempting to presume knowledge of and impose on foreign people's any universal truths of any kind. We should also learn from our past adversaries not to fall into similar ideological traps and their associated euphoric feelings of self-righteousness. Unfortunately, left to her own devices, Imperial America threatens to repeat that arrogant mistake unnecessarily.

Borrowing a saying from an old USSR saying, though having an opposite intention, the U.S. could consider a concept of "Democracy and Rule of Law in One Country" as a declaration of the threshold of success for the American global political influence. Others nations and polities can choose for themselves so long as they do not attack our sovereign sanctity in the process. Unfortunately, the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies and countless recent subsequent Presidential pronouncements would suggest that the U.S. continues to perceive a national mission to impose democratic models and values on all polities, globally. This policy disregards the legitimacy of other national experiences and traditions.

For example, at a celebration of the 27th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution (2006)

noted earlier, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad further stated that the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Palestine and the victory of the Hamas Party: "...clearly showed what the people really want." Then, addressing America and the European Union he added: "You [the west] want democracy but do not respect the outcome...It seems that you only want that form of democracy whose results just repeat your standpoints and only follow your policies." President Ahmadinejad's observation is not incorrect, and highlights what is perceived as an unapologetic American hypocrisy that so enrages the non-western world at large.

Another example was relayed in Bernard Lewis' book *The Crisis of Islam* (2003). In it he highlights how Muslims remain generally incensed by America's past complicity in allying herself with France in subverting democratic electoral processes in Algeria, when a similar fundamentalist Islamic victory became inevitable in 1990. It is predictable that a democratically elected anti-American theocracy in Afghanistan or Iraq would invite identical U.S. interventions in the future, if the past is a guidepost. It is probably not the U.S.'s self-interested efforts to install and maintain friendly regimes in power that angers the world at large. That is the pragmatic "might is right" practice of realpolitik that many nations pursue to maintain control of events. Instead, the real source of global anger towards the U.S. on this matter is a perception of a transparent hypocrisy concerning the outcomes of democratic processes.

It is the author's observation that the credibility of the U.S. is in a precipitous decline. We should keep in mind that our hegemonic military and economic reach is a transient phenomenon, but the global memory of self-contradictions in our information and diplomatic campaigns will outlast the hegemony, and credibility will be difficult to rebuild in our efforts to regain a seat at the global table. For this reason, ceasing what has come to be perceived as America's democracy crusade would be a constructive first step and a hedge against the future. Democracy and Rule of Law in One Country should therefore be considered satisfactory for the U.S. as we begin the 21st Century if we are to avoid repeated and not unfounded charges of imperial interventionism. Robert D. Kaplan's advice should be applied in the Mideast and globally.

c. Gracefully accepting America's decline as a step towards 21st Century survival

The decline of America does not need to be synonymous with the demise of America. The relatively graceful declines of the global empires once enjoyed by France and Britain are historical proof that the cyclical decline in influence by great powers is not a national experience to be resisted or feared. In fact, the greater dignity that a nation displays in this process, the better our chances for a future cultural reascension. Others agree with this perspective. In his article "The visit of President Hu to Washington underlines the inevitable loss of America's economic supremacy to China" (2006), Clifford Coonan also observed that: "Some analysts see America entering a period of 'managed decline' not unlike that which Britain has experienced since the end of the Second World War and the end of empire." In fact neither France nor Britain is a wallflower today, and we are witnessing their reemergent prominent roles in a multi-polar world. Conversely, the declines of fascist Japan and Germany were anything but graceful and dignified. Tensions and animosities generated by their respective 20th Century arrogance and inhuman behavior reverberate to this very day, from China, to Russia, to Israel. In an age of widely proliferated WMD and a lack of any just war-like inhibitions, an abrupt, forced,

precipitous American decline could equate to our national demise, or even annihilation in age of WMD and superempowerment. So, while our cyclical decline may be inevitable, the nature and severity of that decline is up to us. A healthy dose of humility and reality may be in order.

(1) Minimizing domestic corporate influence over national policy

With respect to the U.S.' permissive attitude towards allowing domestic business interests to dictate policy, we may have to institute legal moderation in the long-term national interest. Spengler commented: "The private owners of the economy want free paths for their acquisition of great resources. They want to make the laws for themselves, in their interests, and to that end they make use of the tool they have made for themselves, democracy..." The power that lobbyists and personal financial investments wield over the decision making processes of the U.S. Congress is considerable, and it often is in direct contradiction to the real interests of U.S. national security. For example, American corporate interests, not common sense, play a significant role in encouraging and increasing arms sales to Taiwan even though these are not constructive, and only permitted under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (1979). The Chinese find this direct contradiction of other Communiqués to be extraordinarily disturbing considering the generally accelerated integration of Taiwan within One China. It has not escaped China's attention that the strongest advocates for these TRA-enabled sales are the Defense Contractor beneficiaries. They exert Congressional pressure through mechanisms that range from campaign contributions to organized labor support to members' own wealth interests. U.S. domestic greed could therefore lead to conflict with China. The powerful influence of capital on these processes was not underestimated by Spengler, who continued: "A power can only be overthrown by another power, not by principle, and only one power that can confront money is left...Money is overthrown and abolished by blood." This form of abolishment of financial interests does not need to be, nor should it be required for America to move forward in the face of confrontations that will appear in the course of globalization. Laws that strictly prohibit such domestic influence on foreign policy are necessary. In this light the outdated TRA itself should be revisited, although there are similar corporately contrived crises world-wide that statesmanship and humility can more appropriately solve than arms build-ups that confront great powers.

(2) Lowering domestic material expectations and moderating consumption

The expectation that economically liberated Americans would voluntarily and severely discipline their own consumption habits and personal ambitions in the interests of a larger global good is challenging at best. The genie of American individualism and sense of entitlement has long been out of the bottle, and expecting the self-imposition of great personal inconveniences by a vast majority is nothing less than utopian. Curbing the genie outright would require undemocratic mechanisms, perhaps the sort of tyranny that our Founding Fathers and more recently Dr. Hans Merkle warned against.

Instead, an indirect approach may be more successful here. The so-called "Baby Boomer" generation benefited from the upbringing of parents from the generations that still intimately knew hardship and frugality. These same Baby Boomers also saw their later accumulation of personal wealth and the conveniences of technology as gifts that they could clearly contrast with the difficulties faced by their parents. Personal and societal self-sacrifice

were still considered by the majority as a moral prerequisite to national well-being. Unfortunately, it is this author's observation that the direct connection to hardship is not generally recognized throughout American society today. The contrast is missing, and personal wealth and the conveniences of technology are instead considered entitlements by the children of that generation. The successful avoidance of responsibility and self-sacrifice is instead considered a badge of honor amongst a "virtual" leisure class to which all youth see themselves as members by birth right, even if their actual credentials, contributions, and resources do not reflect such. To avoid the direct draconian measures that a strong socialistic center would have to institute in the difficult times that will soon confront a less competitive America, the concepts and metrics of social responsibility can be reinstated.

It is the author's recollection that the means to accomplish this installation of character and work ethic in society generally in America and elsewhere has been conscription, especially in times of war. This remains the preferred technique today, but in the US this may not be politically palatable today. Conscription itself has been shown during and since Viet Nam to be less than optimal for filling our ranks, since an all-volunteer military can now be raised from a smaller high quality pool of candidates. In either case, the only way of reversing the sense of entitlement bred into the attitudes of our youngest generations is service and self-denial.

Specifically, this author proposes that it must become a foundation of our culture that upon reaching young adulthood, all American youth "start at the bottom" for the sake of appreciation. Military service and other equivalent forms of public service as seen through the lens of risk, duration, and self-denial should be legally prerequisite to exploiting the greatest benefits of American society. If universal conscription remains unacceptable, then perhaps the cost of admission to all colleges and universities, public and private, in addition to tuition and a high school diploma could include a successful and documented tour of public service of the sort noted here. Service performance would be as important for competitive admission as SAT scores; simple completion certificates would be insufficient. Short of conscription and even further short of earning citizenship through service such as that suggested in "Starship Troopers," this system would insure that our military, public works programs, and eventually universities are filled with motivated, ambitious, and capable young men and women. More importantly though, they will have been imbued with the criticality of providing service before receiving entitlement by means of the very hardships and rewards experienced through service to country. Again, outright conscription is avoided, the all-volunteer force is preserved, and the end result of building new generations of Americans filled with energy and a new sense of humility not otherwise impressed in upbringing is assured. This wider distribution of competence and character throughout society, irrespective of class, would be the spark for America's cyclical reascension.

(3) Exhibiting the self-discipline to play by the global rules that we created

It is noteworthy that our resistance to China's hegemonic rise may be a sign that the U.S. does not possess the necessary humility to handle realities of a cyclical decline. To a lesser extent, we had similarly demonized a less ominous Japan in decades past. By demonizing proud and competitive China today, a less competitive America may be telegraphing that she is preparing to abandon her own ideals to attempt protection of an unsustainable material quality of

life. The implication is that a wealthy, though uncompetitive, America could turn to war under contrived pretences before peacefully relinquishing her position of dominance to another great power hegemon. The appearance of “Caesarism” in the form of an ever-more legally-empowered Executive Branch, emboldened by corporate lobbying, is also a sign that the American “winter of civilization” is setting in.

The past and present economic and political leaders of the American hegemon have not just coincidentally been the rule makers of globalization, to date a comfortable status quo. China is now rising to challenge and very probably overtake our dominance in accordance with those very economic rule-sets. This should be acceptable under our free market principles. Our position of competitive prominence for so many decades, and even generations, has led to a leisurely level of comfort and lack of competitiveness that is natural according to a market economy. In “Seeing What’s Next” (2004), author Clayton M. Christensen makes it clear that market-transforming disruption is inevitable. Therefore, it is to be expected that our rule-sets should logically contain the seeds of our hegemonic undoing as part of a natural cyclical process. This highlights both the magic and the risks of the universality of our infectious American ideology. Specifically, the direct beneficiaries of its qualities, profits, and national power are decreasingly the American domestic sphere, and ever-more our foreign global competitors, like China. The self-discipline of the United States to abide by and live with the consequences of its own Americanization rule-sets and ideals will be pivotal to the survival of any moral legitimacy. Alternatively, we would override them with artificial coercive measures at our own peril. Again, decline does not have to mean demise. Reascension of America through her competitive value by means of intensive technical education, reduction in the power of labor unions, lowered material expectations and increased sense of social and global responsibility are key to limit our experience to the former.

d. Modernizing America’s deterrence capacity and mindset

Reality-based prerequisites for establishing peace with the most intransigent of enemies were acknowledged by Kant. Our abandonment of the utopian “moral” inhibitions against employing the most terrifying tools of warfare is worthy of consideration. Such a return to the ancient psychological calculations that allowed the West and East to coexistence and at times to prevail against savages would free us to employ a more credible and effective heavy hand. It is critical to understand that the same sort of ancient calculations that revolt westerners today retain absolutely modern relevancy for effectively dealing with our hardened enemy. Terror is for Radical Islamists correctly considered by them as a mere tool of warfare, not an end in itself, as our unfortunate misnaming of the current struggle suggests.

The imperialistic political arm of Radical Islam today constitutes an expansionist political arrogance that the world has encountered several times in the past under previous Caliphs. Unlike the faith that the Judeo-Christian tradition places in hope and externally derived spiritual strength, and from a position of relative weakness, Islamic self-realization harkens to periods of military conquest and preeminence. While the modern post-Caliphate secular Islamic states under the governance of so-called Apostates do enable the coexistence of Islam with non-believing Infidel civilizations, Radical Islamists attempt to faithfully represent the true Islamic purpose. Peaceful coexistence with other empowered civilizations that impose foreign laws on

Islamic lands or Muslims is not an option. Confronted with this violent absolutism in the past, a ruthless, calculating, and cruel spirit was required by Europeans, Russians, Chinese and others to intimidate, contain, and on many occasions liquidate the determined threat. In fact, non-Muslim civilizations in both the East and the West have the clear-eyed and cold-blooded calculation of their ancestors to thank for their survival through those past clashes of Radical Islam. It is the author's recollection from the literature review that peace with the Islamic imperialism was achieved and maintained by force of arms, not by vain hopes for morally-grounded tolerance. The psychological lessons learned from those past confrontations may be applicable today, and terrorism may have great utility in this regard.

(1) Terror is a legitimate tool of warfare

In addressing savage adversaries in "On War" (1832), Carl von Clausewitz stated: "If the Wars of civilized people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of States in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition [war] is controlled and modified...to introduce...a principle of moderation would be an absurdity...The [savage] then dictates the law [i.e. the technique] to the [civilized opponent], and both proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counter-acting force on each side...it is against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair [just] because the horror of its elements excites repugnance." (pp.76) In this Clausewitz distinguished a cerebral civilized opponent from a savage one, in that savages: "... are ruled by passion..." (pp.76)

There is ample visual and written, media-published evidence that the soldiers of Radical Islam and their presently Wahhabist-inspired leaders are ruled by such passions. Terrorizing passionate fanatics into unconditional surrender, while not a pleasant endeavor for liberal western democracies, will be necessary, no matter how the other alliances fall out in the long war. If we defeat our own imperial tendencies and manage to get our relationships with secular Islam, China and Russia right, the war will be of shorter, but it still must be fought. If however, the majorities of secular Islam find themselves sucked into the vortex of Wahhabism and fundamentalism, the war will be much more lethal and of longer duration. Again, it must be fought.

Unfortunately, the US and Europeans have backed themselves into a self-righteousness corner that constrains their ability to set conditions espoused by Kant. War must be waged in such a way as to generate fear in the hearts and minds Radical Islamists and the other passionate anti-modernists for whom they serve as the vanguard. In this Clausewitz observed that: "Even the most civilized peoples...can be fired with passionate hatred [the emotions of which] will...effect [war] to some degree, and the extent to which they do so will depend on how important the conflicting interests are and how long their conflict lasts." (pp.76) The conflicting interests are vitally important. Therefore, this serves as a caution against the U.S., China, or Russia allowing the war to extend into a very long war. Specifically, a discriminate, light handed approach, dictated by our moral inhibitions, will lead to a prolongation of the conflict. By allowing our scruples to prevent our employment of the necessarily tools over time we will take on the most repulsive characteristics of our opponents. This is because the war

must ultimately become total, i.e. eventually one of annihilation. It is after all a clash between mutually exclusive civilizations from the Radical Islamist's perspective. That savage passion to fight must be decisively crushed to achieve Kant's lasting peace.

This steely determination will invariably become necessary in the course of globalization where Kant's conditional peace mechanisms have not yet been achieved. For example, neither American nor British bomber pilots took pleasure in their gritty annihilation missions over Japan and Germany. Instead they performed their duties to preserve their liberal democratic civilizations. Russian forces confronting fanatical child-soldiers upon entering Berlin during the Great Patriotic War and Chinese confronting the Japanese perpetrators of the butchery and rape of Nanking were both faced with similar gritty, yet ultimately necessary civilization-preserving tasks. B29 pilot and author Arthur J. Pejsa (2006) has relayed how in WW II the U.S. made pragmatic strategic employment of the 20th Air Force in the fire bombing of Tokyo. This interdiction was not just designed to attrite industrial and civil infrastructure deep in the Japanese homeland, but also to terrorize the minds of ruling Japanese Imperialists to deter their fascist and homicidal ambitions. Civilian casualties were not unfortunate collateral damage; they were in fact a central bombing objective. While the necessity of fighting intransigent Japanese finally required such ruthlessness, the psychological effectiveness of that particular operation was extraordinary.

Today, as then, even our punitive tools should adhere to chivalry and avoid unnecessary cruelty, so long as such avoidance does not compromise our strategic psychological objectives. However, we cannot afford to simply live and let live as this will lead to our demise when dealing with Radical Islam and other anti-modernists. Therefore, while we must work for the alliance objectives mentioned throughout this paper, we must plan and arm for the absolute worst case scenario, as we did during the Cold War. In considering the fanatical determination of superempowered individuals who doctrinally integrate the human body as a weapons delivery vehicle, the densely populated communities that cultivate them must realistically be treated as weapons production facilities. We have no other choice. In the end, all empires must be faced with the hard reality that in a globalized world, imperial capacity is nothing more and nothing less than the flesh and blood of their community identities. Radical Islamists understand this clearly, and so must we.

A renewed American, Russian, and Chinese realism might recognize this permanent vulnerability of our enemy, not only in adversaries like Radical Islam, but in themselves as well. Russia and China might agree with this rational and non-hypocritical reality as a fundamentalist Islamic Empire of Wahibist indoctrination would probably liquidate or enslave non-Muslim populations without reservation, given their future physical capacity to do so. With a rapidly growing population that already exceeds one billion globally, the threat of Radical Islamic imperial infection to west and east alike is significant, and far beyond the Trojan Horse penetration already experienced by the industrialized west. Clausewitz would probably agree that savagery must beget savagery over the longer term as a function of survival. Therefore, the radicalized Muslim "youth budes," such as those in Iran and Palestine, may become appropriate targets for early strategic attrition. This would assist in effectively demoralizing and deterring the determined vanguard leadership of Radical Islam, as it is nothing if not the blood of its radicalized communities. Furthermore, the consequences of Radical

Islamist homicidal acts must be immediate and disproportionately lethal, giving the clear impression to the nurturing communities that all acts of homicide will be predictably fratricidal. The fundamental “mechanism of man,” (Kant) common to both unbelieving humankind and faithful Islam is the fact that no political cause is worth fighting for if the benefiting population is at risk of liquidation in the process of achieving it. By themselves, such ruthless techniques will lead to effective deterrence in the 21st Century, setting the conditions for peace discussed in Kant’s treatise. Terror maintains great modern utility for all.

(2) Developing, maintaining, and demonstrating modern tools of deterrence

Many have associated the mere possession by nations of large and capable military capacity and unconventional weapons with their inevitable employment. This certainly began before the 20th Century, with the concern that maintaining an excessively large standing Army would place at risk the democratic governments and processes which they were supposed to defend. Standing Armies took a back seat to nuclear weapons as soon as those particular weapons were fielded en masse by the U.S. and other powers. During the Cold War the race to for, nuclear weapons miniaturization, range, accuracy of delivery and immunity from first strike neutralization became a never ending effort of improvement that only ended with the demise of the Soviet Union. The weapons developers never lost sight of the real objective, and this proved to be fortuitous for the US.

In parallel with the nuclear arms race grew the scientific, environmental, and political movements that opposed the mere existence of such weapons outright, including anti-modernist environmentalists. They were quite successful, leading to treaties that banned atmospheric testing, technology proliferation, new technology development, and eventually to the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties with their various verification and enforcement mechanisms. By the close of the Cold War chapter there was hope in many international quarters that nuclear weapons had lost all utility for maintaining peace in the future, and that their elimination from all arsenals could and should be achieved. This was not only one of the American peace dividends, but also had been written into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NFP) years before as an eventual objective.

Instead of subsiding, the ant-nuclear weapons efforts have gained in momentum in the 21st Century. Efforts by Russia and the U.S. negotiate the further reduction of their respective arsenals continues unabated. In fact, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review unilaterally reduces the ready MX Inter Continental Ballistic Missile arsenal by 10 percent. It also promises to convert some nuclear armed Ohio Class submarines to conventionally armed SSBN missile platforms possessing precision capabilities of modest conventional yield. Weapons yield/accuracy requirements have been obsessively carried over from the Cold War in the confidence that nuclear weapons will be employed similarly, or hardly at all, in the 21st Century. The need for city-destroying weapons in the 10, 20, and greater Megaton yield range have for many decades been considered crude and indiscriminate, lacking military utility. Such weapons have long been phased out of the American arsenal in favor of superior US accuracy and lower yields, having equal or higher probability of kill against hardened point targets. Later in the arms race the US discovered that the Soviet Union also cherished the lives of its citizens too much to lose them to an absolutist cause, and today’s modern Russia is evidence. As much

as we may have feared the Soviet war machine, the element of civilized Russian humanity was always present. We were confronting a people fundamentally similar to ourselves, not suicidal nihilists. But today we face a much different and uncompromising anti-modernist, nihilistic threat that gives even hardened Russian and Chinese warriors pause, let alone American war planners.

Our anti-modernist enemy has ancient motivations and cost versus gain calculations that are completely outside of the psychological bandwidth of understanding of civilized peoples. The global political entity of Radical Islam is recruiting a growing mass of soldiers whose suicidal willingness is no less committed than the Viet Cong sappers of the Indochina conflict or the Kamikazes of the Pacific Theater. As superempowered platforms these modern soldiers cannot be intimidated or deterred by past standards of just and conventional wisdom. They are similarly immune to even the most sophisticated Information Operations tools of propaganda that the west can generate. Yet, as with any human sane human endeavor, they cannot escape the constraints of their political objective. Homicide is not an end in itself for Radical Islam, just as it is not for any other martial cause. There is always a political aim, and deterrence is possible when we recognize and hold at risk the political object that they hold dear. In the case of Radical Islamists that object is the blood of their sympathetic families and communities. While this includes its symbols and lands, most importantly it includes the very non-secular communities of Islam where the soldiers themselves are spawned, nurtured, and indoctrinated.

As the capacity of Radical Islam to hold Western, Eastern, and other communities at risk of liquidation by such weapons grows, as per President Wahid's warning, we cannot afford to look away in revulsion. The sympathetic Islamic communities are the factories that produce the precision vehicles for the delivery of such destruction and our threatened demise. The expansion of those communities or at least the export of their members constitutes the follow-on imperial echelon. In the end those communities must be held at risk of indiscriminate and vast physical destruction. Revulsion at such a task was well within the bandwidth of American Cold War psychology, and our nuclear Triad was manned continuously with that ugly purpose in mind. Today, the target set must be expanded to go beyond centers of national government power, deeply buried and hardened targets, and large weapons platforms. Today, deterrence can only be achieved by holding the communities themselves at risk of liquidation. America must develop the same hardened and determined mind set to survive, and be prepared to demonstrate that resolve.

What this means for the US is the need to reverse our current trend of gradual nuclear and unconventional disarmament. The Triad cannot be allowed to succumb to political forces of pacifism and the axes of budgeters that complain of the dollars spent on maintaining the arsenals in a ready state. America's nuclear arsenal needs to be focused on massive scale anti-personnel application. Additionally, new efforts must be initiated to make nuclear weapons miniaturization, field reliability, and cost-effective mass producability top priorities. Weapons must be placed in the hands of special operations forces and tactical air forces en masse. This should mimic the earlier years of the Cold War when Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs), field artillery special munitions, and air-launched/dropped tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in foreign theaters or with expeditionary forces, and distributed more effectively. In

addition to miniaturization, further efforts should be made at bomb cleanliness through fission efficiencies, new fusion designs and whole families of neutron bomb variants. Our approach to nuclear weapons must be one based on the fact that their usage will become more routine in the long war, and that they must be considered nothing more and nothing less than exceptionally useful “big bombs,” the sort of tools that strike fear into any adversary, including Radical Islamists. Yet, we do not want to unnecessarily destroy infrastructure or hopelessly contaminate the environment in the process of fighting the intransigent foe. Clearly, such a shift in nuclear weapons development and readiness posture should be executed with the full advanced understanding of China and Russia. Likewise, their corresponding reciprocation should be expected and encouraged in the interests of balance, transparency, and cooperation. They are not our enemies; in fact globalization makes them our brothers and sisters. Still, Russia’s experience with Chechen separatists is all the proof that America needs. The degree of intimidation needed in order to apply Kant’s mechanisms to Radical Islam, as it gets energized each time it sheds more blood during its reawakening, will be substantial.

Furthermore, biological weapons research must be restarted in order to look more closely at capabilities that have precision effects. These effects should consider both lethal and incapacitating, as well as the ability to select-out unconcealable target characteristics and activate only within carefully defined geographical areas, thereby eliminating the traditional fears associated with germ warfare. This research can be usefully complemented by nanotechnology developments to reach its optimal potential. Considering the sensitivity of the great powers to this area of research, a single joint weaponization program could be initiated between China, Russia, and America. If the original assumptions are acknowledged, we should not fear the eventual military parity of China or even her superiority. This will be discussed in greater detail below. The cooperation of the three great past rivals on such a dangerous technology set by itself could have a tremendous deterrent effect, not just on Radical Islam, but on other potential imperial upstarts. This deterrence will be especially effective against Radical Islamists, who would prefer to defeat the three great non-believing powers in detail. Only this type of icy intimidation will get the attention of the radical Islamist. But we must first convincingly slay Imperial America.

In the end, the well-intended anti-nuclear pacifists were wrong in their assessment of the utility of WMD generally, and nuclear weapons specifically. The fact that nuclear weapons can be built and employed has long been out of the bottle, as has the extreme attractiveness of their possession. They are the most kinetic capabilities that mankind has ever mastered in a machine, and they and their technological successors will always captivate those with a martial bent. This genie was released through technological determinism, and is now fed by the same phenomenon. Nuclear non-proliferation is absolutely futile over the longer term. What is still possible is for the tempo of cutting edge improvement on their design, manufacturing, demilitarization, and operationalization to be mastered by America and her friends. In the 21st Century, speed and tempo will replace traditional concepts secrecy preservation in insuring our security and survival. By mastering the speed of development and fielding of the most destructive weapons of war, we will neutralize any advantages forfeited through inevitable proliferation. Also, by psychologically preparing for violent engagement well outside of our traditional moral bandwidth we take the wind of surprise from the sails of savage adversaries. Once Radical Islam becomes convinced that her natural foes are capable of true

ruthlessness, real deterrence is possible. Developing, fielding and maintaining the readiness of horrible weapons is not in itself an evil, in fact such standoffs allowed the Soviet Union and America to survive the Cold War intact. If the mere threatening existence of such weapons can affect real deterrence that ultimately precludes their employment, then they become mechanisms of humanity and good, as they will allow civilizations to survive the long war.

Finally, as the long war threatens Radical Islamic violence on an ever-grander scale of death and destruction, unconventional solutions will be sought in desperation. Short of such dire circumstances that threaten the very existence of the impacted civilized states, like the US, the most unconstrained and ruthless means will remain outside the realm of consideration as states as they will resist becoming like their enemy. Once those dire circumstances are visited on the great powers it will be too late to prevent the transformation to savage passions, an unfortunate and preventable event. An alternative is that a well financed non-state, transnational entity would emerge for which the great powers have no knowledge and no known sponsorship connection. It would just appear and disappear as a free and unregulated will. This advocate for civilization would be entirely “off the net,” empowered with the same commitment, tools, and ruthless indiscriminate as the imperialist threats it confronts. This is not Special Forces or any similar covert state capability so that plausible denial would be credible and total. The greatest strength of the group could be that it is composed of a membership that includes several nations, and most certainly include Chinese, Russian and American participants. While the carnage and methods might prove to be revolting to the civilized world, denial would not only be plausible, but it would be total and sincere. The earlier appearance of such a new network would preclude the need for the civilized great powers to proceed down such a similarly savage path as states under more stressing circumstances later. Its emergence can only be wished and suggested; it cannot be assisted, and only time and events will tell of its arrival.

(3) Planning for Israel's evacuation

As suggested earlier, the physical State of Israel is militarily indefensible over the longer term, given individual superempowerment in the 21st Century. The tempo of the maturation of the technological threat is far out-pacing the political/civilizational maturity basis for a resolution and peaceful coexistence. A war of annihilation is a certainty, as soon as the soldiers of Radical Islam acquire the capability to combine the tactics practiced by Iran's non-state vanguard soldiers to-date, with the means promised by Iran and others in the future. The conventional Jihadist suicide bombings to date have been constant reminders that gaining unobstructed access to the heart of Israel's urban areas has been and remains solved. Past attacks can be seen as mere ‘dry runs,’ with the big bombs are yet to come, as they will on the U.S. homeland. Unlike Israel, the U.S. population and infrastructure will be able to absorb several such nuclear surface, low altitude, or port detonations in cities without irreversible loss of national functionality. Israel on the other hand will quickly become untenable.

Today, America, more so than any European nation, has an obligation to avert the 2nd Holocaust, a nuclear Holocaust in Palestine and without any assistance from others if such assistance should not be volunteered. This is both because we can, and because we must. Israel and the Jewish faith have evolved into a core component of America's civilizational identity. Her death today would constitute a catastrophe that contributes, and perhaps leads directly to our

own national demise. As a demonstration of reliability and loyalty, the U.S. has the obligation to plan for the evacuation of those in Israel who are desirous of emergency emigration, or those who are unable to sustain themselves due to injury or desperation. What is proposed here is the largest non-combatant evacuation ever conducted, a challenge indeed, but not beyond America's means. U.S. planning for such an evacuation to the U.S. for resettlement in the U.S. must be done with or without Israeli cooperation or participation. To have every Israeli fight to the death in the nation's defense may be the desire of the government and the vast majority of Israelis today, but the scale of carnage of the coming confrontation may change the sentiments of many. America should be the ally that provides the back door for the preservation of those who decide to leave, before or during the coming conflict. Our military alliance is taken for granted here, as Israel will be one of our military 'moments of truth' as well. But in the larger scheme our backdoor evacuation and resettlement will be much more significant for the nation's survival, as, like her enemies; Israel is nothing if not the blood of her people.

For the moment, Iran assumes center stage as the most potent state threat to Israel. Concerning Iran, the US must carefully take into account the positions and sensitivities of both China and Russia. At the date of this research paper completion, US government officials are openly discussing military kinetic options to disarm Iran, or prevent her from obtaining nuclear weapons. Whether those options are reactionary in support of our ally Israel or unilateral and preemptive, the US is unintentionally at a decided geopolitical disadvantage. Ever since President Bush's 2001 abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Russia has consciously improved the scope and depth of her relations with Iran. In fact, under the umbrella of peaceful nuclear power production Russian scientists and technicians have cultivated relationships with their Iranian counterparts. The presence of large numbers of Russians in Iran and specifically at sites that could presumably be targeted by the US at any given time, cannot be ruled out. Similarly, both China and Russia have developed close oil, gas, and other natural resource trade ties with Iran. It must be assumed that large numbers of their citizens associated with these economic activities must be assumed to be present in Iran. If the U.S. draws Russian or Chinese blood in her efforts to neutralize Iran's nuclear facilities, however unintentionally, a dangerous chill will descend over U.S. relations with both. Chinese nationalists each year recall the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade as a great offense against the Chinese people. As it was during the bombing of Yugoslavia, an apology for collateral damage in Iran would be infuriating for nationalist China, especially if again Chinese agreement to such US actions has not been achieved in advance through the U.N. processes. In our zeal to prevent an Radical Islamic government from achieving a nuclear capability, we should not risk complete alienation or even war with non-Islamic great powers due to miscalculation. In summary, while Israel must fight the actual war of annihilation, America must keep the secure backdoor open for her preservation.

There are many that will passionately dispute the utility of planning for Israel's evacuation to the U.S. They will include Israelis, and Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish. Some will say that the mere act of planning is an admission of defeat in our ability to enforce Israel's right to exist. They will point to Iran's recent suggestions that Israel should be wiped off the map or alternatively resettled in Europe in the nations from which her immigrants arrived in the first place. Still others will insist that all Jews have an obligation to come to Israel's defense, in Israel, and go to their deaths defending her no matter what the ultimate military outcome is.

Finally, the largest number of opponents to this idea will point out Israel's potent strategic arsenal that counts as one of the most formidable in the world. They will contend that what Israel needs most is a U.S. guarantee that we will come to her physical defense in the Mideast, and not send signals to the contrary by planning her evacuation.

All are in some ways correct, and with regards to the third group America must come to her defense as a moral obligation to our civilizational kin even if the consequences there and at home approach that of Armageddon. Fighting for Israel as a last stand will be key for maintaining American national legitimacy in this century. Israel, more than any other polity remotely located from the United States, is the moral equivalent of Taiwan for China. If we were to allow her to become separated from our moral sphere our legitimacy is permanently undermined, just as if China were allow Taiwan to secede from her moral sphere, her legitimacy as a nation would be undermined. Still, the planning must occur. The reality is that as technology access and superempowerment proceed the threats to her existence will appear instantaneously, with the speed of nuclear fission, and not at the 20th Century pace of the maneuver of armored formations described by Chaim Herzog in his book "The Arab-Israeli Wars" (1982). Planning on the other hand takes lead time. Again, Israel is nothing if not the blood of her people, and our national legitimacy is inextricably tied to our ability to preserve her blood.

3. America must respect the sovereignty and priorities of China and Russia

There are other political prerequisites discussed elsewhere in this paper for gaining China and Russia as strong allies in our common global cause in a long war. Given that those can be achieved, we must also stifle our perpetual tendency to telegraph to them that we have scruples over their choice of means in confronting Radical Islam and other anti-modernist extremists. Their approach to preserving their national security in their own way is their sovereign business, based on their own histories of experience with those forces. In the sense of the common discourse, the great powers of the U.S., Russia, and China are all adults, and public judgments based on America's domestically held prescriptions and sensibilities are counterproductive. Unfortunately, China continues to feel the moralistic wrath of much of the west, again led by the U.S., for her actions in response to the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, as described by Jasper Becker in his book "The Chinese" (2000). Russia too has been treated in condescending fashion by the U.S. and Europe, who have criticized her heavy handed approach to the secessionist forces in Chechnya, as described by Lilia Shevtsova in her book "Putin's Russia" (2003). In both cases, acts of self-righteous American posturing have served only to alienate the U.S. as we seek real and lasting common ground. Lingering U.S. moral judgments against China and Russia regarding human rights, freedom of speech, rule of law, and other American-led concerns continue to defy understanding by those two great powers, and serve to isolate us from their pragmatic approach to global affairs. The U.S. should not forget that we have our own parallel histories of similar human rights abuses. From the Kent State Massacre (1970) (Kent State shootings. Wikipedia), to the Mi Lai Massacre (1968) (Mi Lai Massacre. Wikipedia), to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal (2004) (Hersh, Seymour M. [2004]. The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib. New York: The New Yorker) and even other potential war crimes in the Mideast that remain under investigation, the U.S. was not held accountable for those crimes in the same way that the Russians and Chinese are currently.

We Americans enjoy historical circumstances that have allowed our Constitutional principles to flourish in reality due to domestic stability. But our good fortune, in fact our founding principles, are neither divine inspiration nor a broader license to judge other nations and peoples by our standards. Great civilizations differ fundamentally, and one people's reality and necessity-based prescription can be perceived by others as an idealistically-based standard for criminality. As such, it is the author's opinion that one error stands out that is perhaps the weakest aspect of American foreign policy. As a nation and as policy makers we consistently fail to "stand in the shoes" of those upon whom we pass judgment. While this generally represents a lack of statesmanship, it is a choice we have been permitted in the past due to our indisputably dominant global power. But that position of dominance may soon find itself replaced by others China and her pragmatic alliances with other great powers that include Russia. It is critical to America's own survival interests that we look at the world from at least China and Russia's perspectives. By doing so we may have the opportunity reduce bilateral tensions with each in those areas of greatest sensitivity without losing even more national face. Two areas in our relations with both China and Russia can be improved for a dramatic and lasting improvement in respective bilateral, and ultimately our trilateral relations, and they are discussed below.

a. China's sovereign, domestic issues are hers alone

It is the author's perspective that in consideration of China's ever-increasing centrality to global affairs, U.S. approach to bilateral relations may need to change course with the application of realpolitik. Without sacrificing our domestically held national values, we can make fundamental corrections with respect to the Province of Taiwan, the long war, and the deepening of ties with the PRC. The sum total of these changes would create conditions that offer China opportunities and partnerships that might encourage her to pursue our coincident interests with greater vigor, most importantly concerning Radical Islamic and rogue nations with WMD aspirations and arsenals. A unilateral change in U.S. course would also reduce the likelihood that we will confront each other directly in a war that neither country wants, based on causes that are outdated or ill-defined. Above all, in our bilateral realpolitik we must respect China's unique historical, geographical, and cultural circumstances. Again, Dr. Kissinger said in "Diplomacy" (1994): "Equality of status, a fierce insistence on not bowing to foreign prescription, is for Chinese leaders not a tactic but a moral imperative." (p.831) Acknowledging and exhibiting respect for this imperative is a small price for America to pay in the interests of peaceful coexistence, and in more effectively combating the greater global threats.

During the Cold War, and especially prior to Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China seemed militarily weak. Containment was deemed a reasonable option by successive US Administrations, simply because our instruments of national power were overwhelming. As with the USSR, by employing force-against-force posturing and confrontation. The U.S.' diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) advantages were able to hold their ideological line with respect to China, but not painlessly. It is noteworthy that even in a period of apparent weakness, China's shedding of blood in support of both North Korea and North Viet Nam in their respective military victories over the US remain at the forefront of her national consciousness today. In China's New Nationalism (2005), Peter Hays Gries emphasizes that this historical

experience vis-à-vis the U.S. fuels a self-assuredness within an increasingly nationalistic PLA today. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that PLA self-confidence coincides with a different China today, one in which her integrated air defenses, undersea, surface warfare, nuclear, and second strike capabilities are becoming operational, and perhaps second to none.

We should remain particularly wary of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's past caution to Americans (2005), namely: "Seeking to contain China is to risk our nation's fate." (China's New Nationalism, pp.66) Superimposing the formidable Chinese will against the fundamentally altered background of China's modern power, one can argue that America's managing of China's rise should instead focus on America welcoming, and adapting to China's rise. This implies employing DIME for identifying U.S.-Chinese shared interests and opportunities, while avoiding unnecessary tension and confrontation. Instead of using DIME to wrestle with China, we may want to adopt the more sophisticated Tai Chi-like employment of energy redirection in our DIME applications. This approach is better suited to China's national sensitivities, her own foreign policies, and our own domestic national security interests. As a guidepost, Dr. Kissinger's observations on the Chinese leadership serves as a start point for actions, and two core issues are presented here for consideration.

(1) Returning to the three Communiqués as the only positions on Taiwan

Viewed from the idealistic American high ground, democratic Taiwan can be seen as a kindred spirit, a dynamic, free political entity with an innate and absolute right to self-determination. U.S. National Defense University China experts and many distinguished lecturers at the university during the 2006 academic year have emphasized a morally-based necessity for America to stand behind Taiwan's democracy. Furthermore, many do not object to Taiwan's incremental bids for independence under President Chen Shui-bien's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in fact some have encouraged it. They would all contend that arguments for the perpetuation of One China are outdated, now that Taiwan has outgrown the Kuomintang (KMT) as a one party dictatorship. These perspectives are consistent with Melissa J. Brown's observations in her book *Is Taiwan Chinese?* (2004). In it she asserts that anthropologically seen: "Identity is based on social experience, not cultural ideas or ancestry" (pp.xi), and that: "Ultimately, the Taiwan problem is about the new Taiwanese identity forged in the 1990s...following the emergence of a full electoral democracy." (pp.248)

Dr. Brown like many other China watchers is convinced that the western prism on the problem is the correct tool to estimate the optimistic possibilities. Amongst these various experts, confidence is high that China will come to accept Taiwan as an independent nation through cross-strait contact. In the process Taiwanese "...can – and undoubtedly do – discuss Taiwan and the ways it is different from China, including the political differences." (pp.249) Adding to these differences Dr. Brown emphasizes an island aboriginal racial and cultural component to native Taiwanese that distinguishes them from ethnic Han, providing those peoples an additional justification for independence. In the final analysis, the commonality of pro-Taiwan view amongst American China watchers appears to reflect the evangelical quality of Americans to project their satisfaction with the U.S.'s domestic experience onto others a prescriptions for others. The intensity of Taiwanese sympathies may also be strongly linked to residual Cold War resentment over that explosive flash point. However, according to Peter Hays

Gries' book *China's New Nationalism* (2005), many nationalistic Communist Chinese perceive these American sympathies appear as imperial American intervention in China's sovereign affairs.

While Melissa J. Brown takes the view that legitimate Taiwanese identity formation can and has taken place over less than a generation, the Chinese would probably disagree, as evidenced in *China's New Nationalism* (2005). With respect to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki that initiated the modern Taiwan dilemma, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) might share their perspective that Emmanuel Kant expressed in his treatise "To a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795). In it he also observed that no nation [or organic part of a nation – the author's supposition]: "...may be acquired by another nation by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift. A nation is not a possession. It is a society of men whom no other than the nation itself can command or dispose of. Since, like a tree, each nation has its own roots, to incorporate it into another nation as a graft [or sever it from its roots – the author's interjection], denies its existence as a moral person, turns it into a thing, and thus contradicts the concept of the original contract, without which a people has no rights." (pp.2) For the PRC the treaty is criminal as it artificially and illegitimately severed Taiwan from the national mother in which she was rooted, as per *China's New Nationalism* (2005). Therefore, all foreign policies since 1895 that are outgrowths of that treaty are seen as wrongful violations of Chinese sovereignty.

In a Wall Street Journal article titled "Taiwan's Chen Turns Up Heat With Beijing" (2006), author Jason Dean discussed Taiwan President Chen Shui-bien's recent decision to cease the function of the National Unification Council and the application of the National Unification Guidelines. Of the many proclamations of President Chen Shui-bien's and his DPP over the years, this event was particularly concerning to the Chinese. In fact it prompted an expression of concern to the U.S. Government by Embassy of the PRC (2006) in which it warned the United States against sending false signals to Taiwan by minimizing its reaction to Taiwan's independence moves. This U.S. passivity on such statements and actions has led directly to a Chinese perception that the U.S. is directly complicit in an on-going criminal saga. Over the years, similar independence oriented statements by President Chen and his DPP have resulted in the passing of an Anti-Secession Law, as Philip P. Pan reported in his article *China Puts Threat to Taiwan Into Law* (2005). The law codifies China's long-stated threat to use of military force against Taiwan if it moves decisively towards independence.

The Chinese have not wavered in their commitment to national reunification with the renegade Province. As noted in the author's interview of a PRC Official noted earlier, for China, the importance of Taiwan's reunification on China's terms transcends any other national priority including political stability, balanced development, and economic growth. The Province of Taiwan's political alienation from One China is a deep emotional wound for increasingly nationalistic Chinese, as well as fully half of provincial Taiwanese themselves.

As noted earlier, the Chinese are in no hurry regarding a peaceful political reunification, as One China is supposedly universally recognized by the international community. This peaceful path could only be threatened by Taiwanese identity deviation from its past One China perspective under the KMT for purposes of independence. It can be argued

here that the U.S. has allowed itself to be held hostage to the political whim of Taiwan independence advocates. Aggravating the hostage-like circumstances of the U.S. Government is the pressure that Taiwanese-funded Washington lobbyists are permitted to exercise on decision makers throughout the Executive and on members of congress. In her article titled “The Complexity of Taiwan's Ties With Lobbyists” (2005), author Judy Sarasohn brought to light the prestigious private U.S. think tanks and organizations that advocate the independence point of view. All of these activities would appear to undermine the three separate Joint Communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982) in which the U.S. and China have agreed there is only One China, and that Taiwan is a part of China.

The dated Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (1979) has prompted past pro-Taiwanese, independence-suggestive comments by U.S. Presidents and several members of Congress. Specific comments elevating Taiwan over One China even appeared in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Military and civilian government officials that have come to the ICAF to speak on China during the 2006 academic year have sited dangers of appeasing the Chinese and failing to stand up for our friends in democratic Taiwan. Many have pointed to ambiguous TRA language that preserves flexible response options for the U.S. However, it is reliability that is honored within Chinese foreign relations, and both the PRC and the DPP probably view the TRA through the Chinese cultural prism. The Taiwanese President and his DPP would appear by their assertive independence stance in the face of Chinese determination, to secessionists view the Chen Shui-bien and his DPP base count on U.S. intervention. It is the TRA that would therefore appear to embolden independence advocates artificially, and this boldness may also impact the slim electoral majority that keeps the DPP in power. As noted during the author’s interview of the PRC official, China will employ all available means to prevent Taiwan’s secession. America’s military is an accurate indicator of how predictably China acts on her vital interests. This is all the more pressing when one considers a modern, nuclear armed China who is adept at unrestricted, asymmetric warfare.

Even in a localized conventional military confrontation, which neither a rational China nor the U.S. could possibly want, Chinese will be harmed by arms that are “Made in the USA.” In China’s New Nationalism (2005), Peter Hays Gries discussed the U.S.’s accumulation of blood debts of the sort associated with the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. It can be argued that beyond the Taiwan issue, future generations of Americans might be saddled with these past injuries when they stand face to face with the capabilities of a deeply nationalistic and offended Chinese superpower. As it stands, the outdated TRA would appear to be paving the way towards an unfortunate future conflict with China, not to mention obstructing numerous other areas of potential strategic and cultural cooperation.

Alternatively, the execution of the “vacuous” aspect of Tai Chi in U.S. positions on Taiwan could transform the existing policy to one of “emptiness,” or the unambiguous absence of any U.S. policy on the ‘Province of Taiwan.’ Diplomatically this means that all activities with respect to any Province, Autonomous Region, Special Administrative Regions, or Municipalities of China remain Chinese sovereign affairs, save for unanimous UN actions. There can be no exceptions to the One China reality for the sake of U.S. self-consistency and Sino-American relations. The unprompted initiative of the U.S. to unilaterally rescind the Taiwan Relations Act would accomplish this goal in a single stroke. Nor would the rescinding

of the Act cause anxiety amongst the domestic U.S. advocates of the Act's original intent. Many aspects of Taiwanese reabsorption into the Motherland are already becoming a reality, as the economic ideological differences disintegrate over time.

U.S. initiative will serve two purposes, both of which will help deflate nationalist intentions to turn Taiwan into a unifying Anti-American cause. It will also take wind from the sails of Chinese nationalist determination to speed the PRC's armament, as well as provide a business-like incentive for China to cooperate on U.S. national security interests with respect to North Korea and Iran. Secondly, and most importantly, as an unprompted initiative, it would be received as an act of U.S. tribute that marks a desire to move forward cooperatively in areas of shared interest. This will free China of the obligation to regain face domestically and internationally with regards to the last remaining national humiliation of the 19th Century. Initiating the resolution of Taiwan on China's terms might also indirectly relieve the psychological anguish of the Sino-Japanese relationship generated by Japan's complicity in the original humiliation.

Some might express concern that our rescinding of the TRA would have unintended consequences. Specifically, vacating the Act could end the U.S.' ability to have substantive relations with the Province of Taiwan and directly pursue our economic and cultural interests there, other than through Beijing. As a less draconian alternative to complete abrogation of the TRA, others have suggested that the U.S. might come out in high level statements even more explicitly against Taiwan independence. In comments on the author's Research Paper in fulfillment of the China Regional Security Studies course at the ICAF (2005), the grader suggested that: "...the U.S. might come out in high level statements even more explicitly against Taiwan independence." The author argues here that while such high level statements would be useful, they would not be enough. The objective is to provide Taiwanese Independence advocates disincentives to continue on the inflammatory path towards tension and eventual conflict. High level statements should be codified in law in the form of an unambiguous amendment to the TRA itself. Such an amendment should state that any declaration of independence by a government of Taiwan will automatically vacate the original TRA, indicating that U.S. protection against Chinese military action under such circumstances is not forthcoming. The amendment should also specifically terminate U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and the clause that permits them. As evidenced in the author's interview of the PRC Official, eliminating the clause and ending the sales would contribute greatly to a reduction of Sino-American tension. In summary, Taiwan is the key to eliminating Chinese perceptions of an Imperial America.

As an afterthought, there is a not unfounded perception that several components of the U.S. Executive branch are incentivized to continue with status quo brinkmanship has many origins, most of which are noted above. However, the most dangerous pressures to perpetuate the Sino-US tensions over the Province of Taiwan are exerted from within the Department of Defense itself. The Air Force and Navy have watched their political capital diminish since the end of the Cold War, as many traditional threats seemed to disintegrate. That trend has picked up steam in recent years as the ground war in Iraq has politically elevated the actions and sacrifices of the Army and Marine Corps to a political level of preeminence. However transient such immediate trends may be, they could have irretrievable funding implications in many cases.

The major advance acquisition programs of the Air Force and Navy are focused on threats that are not unlike those anticipated throughout the Cold War, i.e. military peer competitors. With the demise of the Soviet Union it has been increasingly difficult for both Services to justify significant expenditures on the Research and Development focused on platforms and capabilities tailor-made for peer threats. Those programs are jeopardized whenever a credible threat cannot be identified, or conjured up. It is the author's personal observation from his Pentagon experience during the past seven years that perpetuating a potential crisis with China over her Province of Taiwan has been politically and fiscally useful for Navy and Air Force. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review is evidence. Taking our actions seriously, China's military expenditures respond to our statements and actions. DoD pressure to perpetuate a potential Taiwan Straits crisis scenario would tend to undermine any potential diplomatic maturity or hope for a fresh look at the One China that both the 's legitimate perspective on the matter. It represents Imperial America in its most dangerous form. Again these DoD forces need to be reined in, i.e. defeated from within.

(2) Deepen DoD to PLA military interactions

In "The Art of War" Sun-Tzu asserted that: "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence." Subjugation should never be an issue with regards to U.S. and China's military relations, but uninterrupted military engagement will be the key to avoiding tensions and maintaining peace between our two formidable nations. Eliminating an abrasive incitement for war can be achieved through deep, sincere, and uninterrupted engagement with those most influential members of our civilized Chinese neighbor's camp, namely the PLA. Some might ask why the U.S. should favor PLA relations over pure political relations. The reason is that the most potent nationalistic components of Chinese politics, now and in the future reside within the PLA, as per earlier discussions. In fact, in future crisis and periods of instability the PLA will be the political Chinese face. They are inextricably interlinked, now and in the future.

Unfortunately, our military-to-military contacts with the PLA have been unreliable due to our own irrational, political reflex to defer to our domestic values and priorities in every PRC internal crisis. Furthermore, America's chronic tendency to distance herself from any nation that considers itself socialist or communist is a further counter-productive relic from Cold War animosities. From Cuba to Venezuela to North Korea, our foreign policies towards each reflect an unconstructive Cold War mindset. We create threats through the phenomenon of "outgroup ascription," whereby our vilifying predisposition causes isolation and the frequent assumption by those nations of the very characteristics that we project onto them. While we can afford to isolate such lesser perceived threats to U.S. national security, however inappropriate such judgments may be in the 21st Century we cannot afford to isolate China in the same way.

America's periodic and moralistically-based distancing and unreliability in this most important relationship understandably feeds mistrust in China and particularly within the PLA. For example, judgmental U.S. political attitudes towards Chinese domestic affairs, such as the Tiananmen Square Protests and our posturing over Taiwanese independence advocates should have no impact on our open door to military-to-military relations. In "Diplomacy" (1994) Dr. Kissinger also observed: "China finds condescending the implication that Sino-American

relations are based not on reciprocal interests but on American favors which can be pursued or shut off at Washington's discretion. Such an attitude makes America both unreliable and intrusive, and unreliability is the greater failing in Chinese eyes." (pp.830) If we wish to see the PLA avoid politicization by anti-American nationalism we must take a different and more reliable tact towards our own military contacts that insulates DoD interactions from domestic objections to China's characteristically Chinese path.

We should remain mindful that in spite of the prognoses of the many American China-watching idealists alluded to earlier in this paper that China will somehow fail, the motivated and nationalistic PLA will likely retain the capacity to prevent China's dissolution in case of a crisis. We expect our DoD to retain the same capacity in the U.S. Regarding the PLA in such a politically opportunistic fashion is disrespectful, and the question should be asked, how would the US feel if our generally apolitical DoD were regarded so shallowly by other nations who seek partnerships with us.

The PLA should be removed from political considerations in our bilateral relationship, if engagement is to have any practical meaning. The PLA, like the DoD, is composed of professional soldiers, and politically-driven out-group ascription is most dangerous in this area. In the future it is also likely that more members of the political classes of both nations will have military experience, and those personal relationships are likely to endure. As the PLA is the most important relationship to nurture between China and the U.S. today, it must be deep and continuous, and without politically-driven interruption. To realize Sun-Tzu's ideal of success without the need to resort to violence we should adapt another old adage. By holding our traditional allies close, and our new Chinese friends even closer during the coming decades of acquaintance we will lead towards lasting transparency and bonds. In fact, DoD-PLA engagement should be redoubled during crises, since military professionals have the greatest tolerance for frank discourse across ideological lines, and also tend to be the most receptive to an adversary's thought processes. Cross-military communication and friendship is key. The comradery that forms between military professionals tends to lead to reliable friendships that bridge the gulf of international mistrust over time.

Ironically, the defenders of the TRA and Taiwanese independence sympathizers ask why China does not do more in support of common threats such as Iran, North Korea, and the War on Terrorism. The U.S. should first stand in China's shoes to see that a renegade Province of Taiwan is her vital national security interest, and the core issue of our bilateral relations. Given a favorable resolution over Taiwan, China would more willingly and assertively engage other threats of vital interest to U.S. national security. Conversely, continued passive and active U.S. interference in this core Chinese sovereign issue is increasingly dangerous.

This observation of this author is confirmed in a recent article titled "Fear of Chinese guns/Best defense is not to offer any offense" (2006) by author Joseph S. Nye Jr. In it he cautioned against ascribing to China the status of a violent hegemon who the U.S. must inevitably confront. He states: "...[we] should recall Thucydides' warning more than two millennia ago that belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes...Each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations which then are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears." This dangerous cycle of

misreading intentions was also confirmed by the Chinese PRC official during the author's interview as it pertains to U.S.-Chinese perceptions. Nye continues: "The fact that China is not likely to become a peer competitor to the United States on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the United States in East Asia or that war over Taiwan is not possible. Weaker countries sometimes attack when they feel backed into a corner, as Japan did at Pearl Harbor or China did when it entered the Korean War in 1950." As if reinforcing Nye's caution, in the book *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, author J. Robert Moskin recalled that "Secretary of State Acheson called what happened after the United States crossed the [38th] Parallel, 'the greatest defeat suffered by American arms since the Battle of Manassas and an international disaster of the first [order]'. Nyes concludes "There is no need for the United States and China to go to war in this century. Not every rising power leads to war -- witness the United States overtaking Britain at the end of the 19th century. And if China's rise remains peaceful, it promises great benefits to Chinese, its neighbors and to Americans. But remembering Thucydides' advice that fear can create self-fulfilling prophecies, it will be important for analysts not to mistake their theories for reality and to keep pointing this out to political leaders and publics."

In conclusion, in an age when bold moves are needed to head off calamity, rescinding, or at least amending the out-dated TRA and committing ourselves to strict adherence to the three Joint Communiqués needs to be a U.S. national priority. Thoughtful realpolitik must govern our future interactions with One China on this explosive issue in order to neutralize Taiwanese independence ambitions being cultivated in the minds of secessionists. It is U.S. initiative that is key to avoiding war and gaining China as a partner, and this author contends it is our move.

b. Russia's sovereign issues are hers alone

For reasons that in principle closely parallel the Chinese-related arguments above, the US must refrain from prescribing for Russians what forms of government and processes she should adopt, when in fact only Russia can determine her special path into the future. As with China, two specific areas unique to Russia are worthy of US policy modification in order to gain Russian confidence in US sanity of global outlook, and trustworthiness as a partner over time.

(1) Embrace Russian war in Chechnya as central to war against Radical Islam

The Russians have long established the connectedness between the uprisings of Turkic minorities in Central Asia, the secessionist forces of Muslim Chechnya, and a global awakening of the imperial Islamic will through Wahibist teachings and Al Qaeda victories. Russian insistence on maintaining Chechnya's incorporation is as intense as the preservation of the American union in the face of Confederate secession. Chechnya was a part of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and hence did not have a right under the Soviet constitution to secede. Furthermore, other ethnic groups inside Russia, such as the Tatars, would join the Chechens and secede from the Russian Federation if they were granted that right, leading to its disintegration. Finally, Chechnya is a major chokepoint in the oil-infrastructure of the Russian Federation. Its loss would cripple the country's ability to control her oil resources and consequently the Russian economy.

Interestingly, Wikipedia (2006) states that as of 2006 the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” has not been recognized by any major existing state, not even the US. For example, in 1997 when the separatists were a major political force, a government was illegally elected. It was only recognized by the Taliban government of Afghanistan in 1999 and it opened an embassy in Kabul, though it closed again following the removal of the Taliban from power. However, several outsiders have interfered in this sovereign Russian matter by granting insurgency members political asylum in European and Arab countries, as well as the United States. The president of this now outlawed government is Aslan Maskhadov. He is currently living under asylum in the United States, even though he is a fugitive facing charges of terrorist offenses in Russia. Such self-contradictory actions by the U.S. and European nations of harboring some terrorists while killing others, based on domestic preference, is a source of great concern for important potential allies in the war such as Russia.

(2) Demonstrate sympathy towards Russian push-back on rapid democratization

America’s domestic enthusiasm for democratic processes is understandable, as they apparently work satisfactorily for us. Russia has never denied this and many even share our joy vicariously. At the same time, Russians are a different people with a different, though no less valid history that causes them to proceed cautiously, as discussed earlier in this paper. However, Imperial America is never at a loss for peddling her foreign prescriptions. Over the years, successive American Administrations have touted the rapid democratization of political processes and the early introduction of the rule of law as the best hedge against a regression to evil tyrannies. Democracy has taken on the characteristic of a universal good, as though it had resulted from a divine inspiration. During the reign of President Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s chaotic democratic processes constituted political anarchy, harming Russian society at many levels. In spite of this disturbing evidence, the US government under President Bill Clinton encouraged the disaster from without, as if unbridled freedom somehow substituted for the good order and discipline that is the Russian traditional way.

Generally, American idealists maintain a blanket confidence in the innate power of democracy to assimilate into the free all political ambitions, even those in states that have no organic roots in such a political system. In this respect Americans overlook the learned wisdom of the Russians themselves, as they know from experience that such a view is optimistic at best, even utopian. For example, Russians clearly remember that Germany was a democracy before it was a fascist tyranny, one whose popular basis was due to public dissatisfaction with the hallowed western form of government. German public angst had been cultivated during the undisciplined period of the Weimar Republic, a hastily-installed post-Armistice democracy having no organic roots. Russian society under Yeltsin had begun to take on some of those same unmanageable characteristics, and President Putin clearly knew that he had to reestablish order. We would do well to acknowledge the familiarity of the current Russian political class with the strengths and pitfalls of democracy generally, in many ways an insight superior to our own.

With respect to the US search for allied support in imposing democracies elsewhere, Russia could again be a source of sage advice. It probably comes as no surprise to Russians that the electoral results in Islamic states do not turn out to US liking, even though

American idealistic blinders do not recognize developments until the votes are counted. Algeria provided a past example, as did Iran. Hamas' success in Palestine was the most recent example of unintended consequences of elections, and this trend will appear in Iraq when theocratic forces begin to dominate political party activities. As per the Nazi German model, once in control of parliamentary processes the leadership manipulates emergency powers (or issues religious edicts) contained or permitted within the rule of law to transform government into a totalitarian regime. This is precisely the technique that Islamic fundamentalists will employ to overturn elected democracies. In his book "The Crisis of Islam" (2003), author Bernard Lewis referred to this special case of Islamic democracy as: "One man, one vote, once." Russia knows our natural enemy well, and we would do well to learn from her rather than offer unrealistic prescriptions.

U.S. leaders consistently respond optimistically that democracy will inevitably absorb such a non-optimal development as a byproduct of democratic processes due to the inherent goodness of the ideals. The insistence on democracy as a prerequisite to American favors implied and stated in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies of the U.S. are evidence. This almost pseudo religious goodness of democratic ideals will somehow transform its participants into civilized, tolerant peoples who share our American values and will never go to war with us as a fellow democracy, as an article of faith. However, when that optimism is compared to the German experience there may be cause for reconsideration. Russia does not lose sight of history or her own experiences with overshot expectations under Yeltsin and the early, idealistic years of the USSR. Given the choices of continuing the benevolent authoritarian rule of a popular President Putin, or returning to the orderliness and predictability of the USSR, polls would indicate that the current path is worthy of pursuing. However, given the choice of either of those two alternatives and riding the economic and political roller coaster of Yeltsin's Russia any other foreign democracy system, Russians would probably prefer the either of the two stable Russian paths. We must first stand in the shoes of Russians before we pass judgment on their chosen path. She would also certainly redouble her efforts as an ally in the present war if our expectations of her were moderated, so that her internal affairs were respected by us as her sovereign sanctity.

c. Embark on long-term grand challenges with China and Russia for global benefit

In spite of the Sino-Russian "International World Order of the 21st Century" (2004), both Presidents proclaimed that: "The main trend of the world today is not towards a 'clash of civilizations'; rather, it underscores the imperative of engaging in global cooperation." This statement reveals the true intent of their new realpolitik, namely that all peoples should put aside ideological, cultural, and religious differences in favor of enabling globalization to occur with less tension, and a view to common objectives. For example, China's ability to non-judgmentally embrace polities as diverse and distant as Latin America, Iran, and Africa based merely on her economic interests is a strength of her modern world view. Russia is doing the same with Iran and others. Unfortunately, the US continues to turn away from such cooperation due to her idealistic domestic sensitivities. This attitude of moral superiority, prescription, and political preconditions leads to impossible expectations, and these then become lost opportunities in the area of realpolitik engagement that harm U.S. national security interests.

Conversely, one can imagine how different the situation in Iran might be today if the U.S. had developed deep economic ties with Iran over the past few years, as China and Russia continue to do. Independent of economic benefits, the simple engagement with that, in many ways western-oriented Islamic country might have prevented her insistence on going forth with a nuclear weapons program as a point of stubborn pride. Similarly, how much has our deep engagement with the similarly fundamentalist polity of Saudi Arabia prevented her from developing her own nuclear weapons, at least until now? It is this author's opinion that our self-righteous behavior towards Iran and others only reinforces the perception that America fulfills all expectations, and epitomizes in the 21st Century those superpower characteristics that were always loathed by the Third World in the 20th Century. But technological access and wealth accumulation have been released for global exploitation. All that remains of America's superpower status in the 20th Century is the self-righteous imperial attitude. With Russia and China standing up for her sovereign rights, Iran is unleashed and within the vortex of an imperial Islamic euphoria. The same can be said for the democratically elected Hamas leadership in Palestine as well.

The lesson in these examples is do not turn away from our remaining powerful secular Islamic partners when their domestic handling of difficult challenges does not suit our domestic values. This is especially true in the case of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Our reliability as non-judgmental partners with those governments will be closely studied by all, especially the Chinese for whom reliability and loyalty are central qualities in all relations.

However, our irreversible missteps in much of Islam to date should not hinder our direct cooperation with the Chinese and Russians. Being realists, both nations recognize that nationalistic passions, animosities, ambition and greed lie in the dark recesses of the hearts of all civilizations, including their own. Kant's coercive balances largely addresses this universal plague via *realpolitik*. But today there is more to global coexistence than geographically demarcated spheres of influence. The collective energy and creativity of humankind, led by the oligarchy of powerful civilized nations, must become engaged in setting the conditions for humankind's survival in coming centuries, not just their own civilizations. Once Kant's mechanisms are in place, China, Russia, and the U.S. can together move up "Maslov's Hierarchy of Needs" to the level of a cooperative "Self-Actualization," as per its description in *Encyclopedia Britannica Micropedia* (1990). In his book "The World Is Flat: A Brief History Of The Twenty-First Century" (2005), Thomas L. Friedman proposes: "I would love to see a grand China-United States Manhattan Project, a crash program to jointly develop clean alternative energies, bringing together China's best scientists and its ability to implement pilot projects, with America's best brains, technologies and money." (413) In the spirit of this 'Manhattan Project,' Russia should be added, and the three powers could pool their intellectual and surplus resources to achieve great breakthroughs, not just in renewable energy, but advanced agriculture, environmental clean-up, water redistribution, and a range of other critical topics for the survival of the species. Furthermore, instead of three separate manned space exploration programs, the Big Three could again pool their talents and resources to achieve one spectacular program whose scope and reach exceeds what any nation could afford individually. Given mutual and trilateral trust based on demonstrated reliability, the possibilities for human stewardship by China, Russia, and the United States are limitless.

Returning to the nagging competition between great civilizations, such Grand Challenge cooperation will serve another purpose, namely the ‘sublimation’ or diversion of the energy associated with our respective Chinese, Russian and American paths to war into the noble and socially acceptable challenges noted above. History provides compelling examples. America recognized that the restless cultural characteristics that had spawned Germany’s genius for war could be redirected into a genius for industry. Today, the modern German Field Marshals lead competitive multi-national corporations, precluding the need for renewed armament and aggression, and to great public satisfaction. The same can be said for Japan. Another example is participation in professional sports worldwide, and particularly in the US. Youth that had once suffered from race and class discrimination, and harbored explosive revolutionary potential, today sublimate that martial spirit by redirecting it towards exemplary athleticism, thereby eliminating the frustrating social barriers altogether. In summary, if the three great powers spoken of here devote their cooperative and creative spirits to the survival of humankind, there will be a lower likelihood that they will go to war.

For example, in a research paper titled Nuclear Powered Hydroponics-Based Vertical Farming: Targeting China’s Hinterlands With Advanced Agriculture (2006), this author proposed a large-scale agricultural cooperation between the United States and China with the objective of increasing the efficiency and self-sufficiency of China’s hinterland agricultural sector. The proposal focuses “...on the regions that have been left behind in national wealth accumulation, namely the western hinterlands and the northeastern rust belt. The paper will continue with a general introduction to a proposed collaboration between China and the U.S. to modernize China’s hinterland agricultural capabilities with space age technologies and concepts...Primarily, it would permit the integration of safe and environmentally friendly nuclear power generation with space-age farming techniques for an exponential increase in food production per acre in the less agriculturally productive areas of China. Hydroponics, vertical farming, indoor fisheries, robotics, voluminous, inflatable, light-weight greenhouse structures, capital-intensive automation, and many other stand-alone advancements would be integrated and exploited for this purpose.” This is one concrete example of how a materially blessed U.S. can muster her resources to assist China respectful of her priorities, and recognizing that stability in China is ultimately tied to U.S. national security interests.

d. United Nations revitalization

In their joint statement (2004), the leaders of Russia and China stated that “The United Nations [U.N.] is the world's most universal, representative, and authoritative international organization, and its role and functions are irreplaceable. The United Nations should play a leading role in international affairs and serve as the core for establishing and executing the basic norms of international law.” They also acknowledge that reform U.N. reforms are prerequisite to the U.N. attaining the effectiveness in the challenges of the 21st Century: “Reforms of the United Nations should be aimed at strengthening its leading role in international affairs, improving its efficiency, and enhancing its potential for dealing with new challenges and threats. Reforms should be based on the principle of achieving consensus through consultation and should fully embody the common interests of the vast numbers of member-countries.” During the reform process many have suggested interim measures to bridge the U.N.’s temporary lack of effectiveness.

In a recent presentation at ICAF (2005), Dr. Thomas Barnett, author of “The Pentagon’s New Roadmap” (2003) recently proposed that the most influential global powers form an oligarchic consensus body that serves to lead the U.N. constructively during its on-going reform process. This will insure transparency in communications, and insure that the most influential voices are heard on issues that require immediate action. It will also allow the global power brokers to agree to take such action when U.N. Security Council and universal body consensus building processes grind to a halt or indecision, and/or whose actions become hopelessly watered down. This oligarchy should be composed of the most potent and resource-laden states. This arrangement would recognize that speed of action in crisis is the precise equivalent of security in the 21st Century. Tangentially reinforcing the issue of communication, during a recent National Security Strategy Exercise conducted at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (2006), Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William Costantini went even further with a suggestion for real-time great power crisis coordination. He suggested that that the U.S. and China activate a command and control (C2) hotline of the same sort that the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and now Russia have in place to avert misunderstanding during times of crisis. This would provide China the face recognition as a super power and top-level crisis vote on daily international and transnational issues that will increasingly have instantaneous global security implications.

Proponents for the status quo expeditionary American freedom of action strongly reject any notion that the U.S. should first seek consensus with, much less permission from, any foreign states to act on issues perceived to be in the U.S. national security interest. Acknowledging this need, in a recent Washington Post OpEd titled “The Rules On Preventive Force” (2006), Dr. Henry A. Kissinger observed that: “...the United States, like any other sovereign nation, will in the end defend its vital national interests -- if necessary, alone.” However, Dr. Kissinger continued: “...[the U.S.] also has a national interest in making the definition of national interest of other nations as much parallel to its own as possible. Any course that relies for international order primarily on unilateral superior force defines a trajectory toward doomed overextension.” Taking into account the other issues discussed in this paper, America would be wise to take the national interests of at least two rising great powers into account. Combining America’s decline with the ascension of China and Russia, it is clear that we cannot fight the longer war to a decisive victory without their vote and tacit concurrence. Similarly, given our absolute respect for their perspectives by the business-like trust imbedded in realpolitik, they will be obliged to reciprocate, as reciprocation will fulfill longer term shared interests. In this respect, we would do well by joining China and Russia in respecting the sovereignty of other states even at added risk to ourselves and the preclusion of an option for unilateral military preemption. This will gain us their sincere sympathy and even alliance if we are compelled to react punitively to the imperial vanguards of Radical Islam and the communities that nurture and protect them in the future.

Many will say that such an alliance and cooperation is out of the question, purely on ideological grounds. It would be seen as completely inconsistent with US ideals to moderate our policies towards China in the Pacific, much less to forge an alliance with a Communist country and/or authoritarian Russia outside of the NATO context. This would probably be the status quo American position, but as stated earlier, this superior American self-image is an enemy that must be defeated in itself. Our global power is limited, and it is steadily declining from a relative perspective, and perhaps absolutely in the future. Yet, our conventional expeditionary forces

bring a special capability to the table that can support the stability of globalization in partnership with other civilizations. In the spirit of Tai Chi, we should move with the inevitabilities of globalization rather than fight against them, so that we can combat anti-modernists together rather than allow those rejectionists of modernity to divide and conquer our modern civilizations in detail.

Similarly, America has refined the art and technology for global strike and expeditionary warfare, as well as the capacity for projecting humanitarian assistance around the world on very short notice. Foreign peoples have always been thankful for the generous American sacrifice and assistance in the face of natural disasters. The Great Tsunami, the Pakistani earthquake, and the recent Philippine mudslides are just a few of the most recent examples. Our unique capacity to alleviate suffering on a grand scale has served to mitigate suffering and discontent following disasters that could otherwise be ideologically exploited for violent political purposes. The technology-enabled productivity, surpluses, and global reach of wealthier nations, led by the American example, have permitted this form of humane and non-judgmental intervention in poor, failing, and failed states. This gem of peaceful US power projection could be adopted as the front for all three great powers, with a physical contribution from each in resources and manpower.

e. Preferential immigration, adoption, and student exchange policies

The “melting pot” approach to identity assimilation has been a cornerstone of America’s vitality, and continues to serve as a source of strength. Racial and ethnic intermarriage blurs past distinctions over time, and has served to moderate competing identities. Conversely, in those multi-ethnic polities where such root-level assimilation does not occur nations are plagued with disunity. For example, in this respect Russia has a much more difficult task, as her sizable and exclusive ethnicities are not as prone to intermarriage. For China, her 92 percent ethnic Han homogeneity combined with significant geographical separation limits assimilation to a non-issue when compared to her other national challenges. But intermarriage and other root-level measures of civilizational synthesis are key to making today’s piecemeal partnership of great, though differing civilizations a permanent and positive development for humankind tomorrow. In globalization we must consciously encourage this synthesis with policy, a deliberate engineering of humankind that will further assist in achieving Kant’s perpetual peace for extended epochs. Selective immigration policies are the key to engineering-in peoples tolerance of modernity and secularism, and engineering-out the anti-modernist and fundamentalist tendencies of Radical Islam and other anti-modernists.

Therefore, the immigration of ethnic Chinese, ethnic Russians, and Christian peoples of Latin America should be liberalized and incentivized as an outcome of the current immigration debate. This includes students, professionals and liberal adoption policies. At the same time, immigration by others including Europeans should be discouraged, or slowed. The kludging of our great, yet disparate civilizations in a permanent fashion requires hard decisions, and discriminatory immigration policies are a constructive start. Devising schemes that provide incentives for intermarriage, selectively pulling on and retaining students with technical and scientific aspirations, easing adoption timelines, shortening residency requirements for citizenship, and permitting dual citizenship should be considered.

Such U.S. policies would help China with a depressurization of her rural migration by providing an outlet for emigration, and assist Russia with rural poverty by greatly increasing the number of youth and children allowed to come to the US under the same pretences. America has much accumulated domestic wealth to share, and a responsibility to share it for general betterment during globalization. But in this we have the right to be selective, as per realpolitik. By fundamentally altering our immigration policies we can change the face and character of America over time in a positive way, and in the process largely defeat the imperial American attitudes that hold us back as a nation.

4. America must employ a heavier hand against anti-modernism and its causes

In his distinction between savage and civilized combatants, Clausewitz was non-judgmental. Both were accorded respect in being considered equally formidable in the context of warfare. Rather, the difference he drew was in their respective psychological motivations for warfighting, with the former driven by “passion” and the later by rational consideration. , an excellent description of the emotional drive behind Radical Islamic fascist ambitions. Over a longer war Clausewitz observed that the civilized opponent would inevitably be ruled by passion as well, and the two could become indistinguishable, an unpleasant prospect for humanity generally. Shortening the length of the war would appear to be the key consideration in avoiding this moral drift and eventual abyss. It is the author’s opinion that a shorter war, however ruthlessly prosecuted, is the key to preserving the core values of American civilization over the long term. Quick liquidation of the soldiers of Radical Islam is required to destroy the vanguard and intimidate would-be recruits from secular Islam and other anti-modernists from joining in.

The past failure of a civilized empire to destroy a passionate and savage enemy serves as a lesson to encourage timely, reality-grounded decisions in the 21st Century. Wikipedia (2006) chronicles such a case from antiquity. In the year AD 9, the Germanic tribesman Arminius and his savage followers, through deceit, lured the Roman Governor P. Quinctilius Varus and his three heavily-equipped Roman Legions into the closed wooded terrain of Teutoburg Forest. There the Romans forfeited their technological advantages, and in driving rainstorms they and their camp followers of women and children were ambushed, and over 20,000 were butchered. Varus committed suicide rather than face the defeat, and it is said his head was cut off by the Teutonic tribesmen and sent to Caesar Augustus in Rome to squelch the Emperor’s further territorial ambitions. Arminius and his savages were victorious in their aims. Shortly thereafter the Romans ceased entering Germania in force. Arminius, or Hermann as he became affectionately known to later Germans, thereafter was celebrated as the first German nationalist. One unintended consequence of Caesar’s short-sighted intimidation was the ability of the National Socialists to play on and resurrect that savage Germanic Volksgeist in the early 20th Century for genocidal purposes.

Today, Radical Islamic savages draw soldiers and innocents alike into urban terrain of their choosing where many of our military’s technological advantages are lost. Beheading and similarly horrific acts are again used as tools of terror against the civilized mind, betting, often correctly on the west’s lack of stomach for such a sustained assault on the senses. The fratricide suffered by the Radical Islamist’s own blood kin is celebrated as reinforcing their aims. The 9/11

attacks, Madrid train bombings, Beslan schoolhouse slaughter, and London metro bombings were similar ambushes on our civilized sensibilities. But savages are in the end soldiers. It is only their passion that distinguishes them from our civilized military, as per Clausewitz.

Not coincidentally, the roots of Islamic savagery are similarly ancient. It can be argued that they, like Germanic archetypes before them, are a reactionary response to the inevitable assimilation of a spiritually uncompromising tribal people within a modern, global, and technologically “flattened” community. The objections of Neo-Nazis, Christian Identity, and even Mormon fundamentalists overwhelmingly coincide with those of the imperial Islamist vanguards of anti-modernism. All of these traditionalist reactionaries would rather secede from, destroy, or enslave the societies that would pollute them. Coexistence and compromise are not options.

Given current global conditions, executing Clausewitz’s primary disarmament aim of warfare may not be feasible with 21st Century Islamists and the other anti-modernist Neo-Nazi, Fascist, and Ecoterrorist wills for which they are the armed pathfinders. When dealing with defeated civilized states we can at least take heart that the disarmament can be believed, even in the modern material conditions described earlier. Modern Germany, Japan, and Italy are 1st World examples; the total war they swore actually succumbed to residual civilized sensibilities through surrender. However, neither Radical Islamists nor committed Neo-Nazis can be bargained with. For Islamists compromise is a tool of unbelievers and apostates. Like Earl Turner’s closed-loop ideological simplicity, today’s growing ranks of martyrdom-motivated suicide attackers is seemingly impervious to the sophisticated information age psychological tools we can muster.

Again Clausewitz: “Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead...to extremes.” (pp.76) Relevant analogies abound. A lethal cancer demands earliest liquidation, and a gangrenous limb demands immediate amputation. Similarly, a mad dog that mauls a child is put down. Other animals having raised a mere suspicion of being rabid are put down even before an attack can occur. In all analogies, rehabilitation is determined futile from a biological or realistic perspective, and the greater societal good takes priority. We cannot afford to simply live and let live, as with Caesar Augustus’ capitulation to Germanic savages two millennia ago.

A jointly agreed-upon U.S., Chinese and Russian approach to confronting the Radical Islamic threat while it is being cultivated within the communities, mosques and prisons that spawn it may have to be explored to regain the initiative in the longer war. The same applies to the committed Neo-Nazis that may soon rise as effective armed allies of Islamic anti-modernists in the long war. As a civilized people, our preventative tools should always avoid unnecessary cruelty, and technology may again yield relatively humane solutions. Nevertheless, the means should be based on enlightened assumptions regarding the true nature and danger of the savage threat, and when executed be certain of their lasting deterrence or effectiveness in this special case. In his book “The Crisis of Islam,” (2003) Bernard Lewis states that: “Sooner or later, Al-Qa’ida and related groups will clash with other neighbors of Islam -Russia, China, India - who may prove less squeamish than the Americans in using their power against Muslims and their sanctities.” China and Russia understand the savage Islamist mind better than we ever could. As

realists we should accept their choice of means as necessary and justified, just as they will accept ours, and we should learn from them in applying our own degree of force. Again, WMD have great modern utility, not just for extremist adversaries, but also for our civilization's preservation.

However, the successful combating of anti-modernist savagery, even the liquidation of identified savages themselves is not enough. The author of this paper contends that concurrently America, and indeed all modern civilized powers, must study with introspection and humility the core objections that are common to all anti-modernists. When stripped of their respective racial, religious, and other objectionable political cloaks, the legitimate commonalities relate to the sacrifice of spiritual man at the altar of materialism. The reemergence of rejectionism and savagery must contain seeds of legitimacy at their core, as the decadence of materialism is obvious and rampant. Savagery and extremism cannot be attributed to criminality or insanity alone. It isn't a mere coincidence that the seductive property that the Ayatollah Khomeini attributed to the "Great Satan" is virtually identical to the Capitalist decadence discussed by Adolf Hitler in both "Mein Kampf." By eliminating the anti-modernists we have only treated the symptom. America can become a respected leader in the globalized world again if we exhibit the will to attack the internal cause, and thereby set a new example for a modern world.

5. Dangers posed by status quo foreign policy to U.S. survival in the 21st Century

Assuming that the American attitude of global moral and physical superiority continues in word and deed into the 21st Century, unintended consequences can reasonably be predicted. As per earlier discussions in this paper, the sensitivities and motivations of other great powers, rogues, and transnational threats, including home-grown western Neo-Nazi nihilists, can be determined. The coinciding interests of all are noteworthy here. Notable hot spots where U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrence remain effective for the time being are well known. They include an increasing number of radical Islamic state designs on Israel, the U.S. Central Command footprint in Islam, China's position on the Province of Taiwan, North Korea's designs on South Korea and Japan, and Russia's dormant superpower self-image and her historical western aspirations. Interestingly, in the case motivations, minor delays in U.S. intervention might enable one or more belligerents to execute their individual designs and present America with a *fait accompli*, with minimal risk of escalation. This is especially true wherever a lack of definitive attribution to violent delaying actions can be achieved.

a. Sovereignty, unpaid American blood debts, and imperial ambitions

If the realism-based pragmatic paths of China and Russia continue to deviate ever-further from America's imperial, school teacher-like list of domestic prescriptions for them, tension rather than opportunity will come to dominate our bilateral relations. Employing the Chinese as an example, the disrespectful treatment of President Hu by senior American Government hosts during his recent visit to Washington, DC exemplifies the status quo. In a San Francisco Chronicle article titled *Bush, Hu Agree to Disagree* (2006) the multiple incidents described would appear to reinforce the contention of Chinese nationalists for a showdown with the U.S. If the history of modern Chinese nationalism described by Peter Hays Gries in *China's New Nationalism* (2005) is a measure, the U.S. has incurred an additional blood debt by causing

President Hu to lose face on a very public world stage. Even before the visit, significant distrust was already evident, as the Pentagon and Congress perceive her efforts to assume a position of geopolitical prominence through military and economic excellence as the aggressive moves of an enemy to be feared, rather than an earned right. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review affirms this. For example, growing tension over Taiwan is a case in point, even though it is Taiwan's renegade political behavior that holds U.S. plans hostage. In a San Francisco Chronicle article titled "Feinstein rips Taiwan while urging China to cooperate" (2006), author David Armstrong stated that in a recent speech Senator Dianne Feinstein: "...blasted Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian...Chen, she said, has taken...a provocative and belligerent stance toward mainland China, all for his personal political gain, in hopes that he can be hailed as the savior who stands up to Communist China. She praised mainland China -- which regards Taiwan as a renegade province -- for declining to take Chen's bait..." The author of this research paper suggests that the U.S. has and continues to swallow Chen's bait - hook, line, and sinker. Again, this is evidenced in the fact that both the U.S. and China are held hostage to such DPP opportunism on the issue of Taiwan. Lone Congressional voices, such as Senator Feinstein's who recognize the dangerous ability of Taiwanese independence advocates to manipulate the strategic stakeholders may be too few in number to turn the tide against Sino-U.S. confrontation.

The U.S. recoil at China's rise combined with China's long memory of past Sino-U.S. confrontations could sow the seeds of open conflict. The US-perpetuated tensions over Taiwan, humiliations of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and American support for an unapologetic Japan, who now openly courts Taiwan as a state ally are all catalysts for trouble. The Chinese sense of martial superiority born in Korea and reinforced in the later defeat of the U.S. in Viet Nam embolden Chinese nationalists and the PLA to gird themselves for such conflict. In each source of tension, Chinese honor, and or blood was shed, and an American blood debt was incurred, whether directly or by association.

Events in Iran or North Korea could conceivably serve as the spark, however, it is the author's opinion that the most likely candidate for instigating trouble for aforementioned reasons is a renegade Taiwan. America would be wise to reflect on China's history of reliability when it comes to her consistency of policy and action. In "The U.S. Marine Corps Story" J. Robert Moskin recalled that on 3 October 1950: "China's Prime Minister Chou En-lai warned...that if American troops crossed the 38th Parallel, China would enter the war. In Washington some read his statement not as a realistic 'announcement of intended entry' but as political blackmail." However, China did exactly what she warned of doing with the effect of preventing the unification of Korea by force and gaining great prestige in Asia, while humiliating the U.S. Moskin continued: "Secretary of State Acheson called what happened after the United States crossed the [38th] Parallel, 'the greatest defeat suffered by American arms since the Battle of Manassas and an international disaster of the first [order]'." This remains a vivid memory in China today, and a source of national pride.

During the U.S. retreat from the north the full weight of American air power and naval gunfire support was brought to bear against masses of exposed Chinese infantry. The ratio of Chinese to American losses is said to have been 20:1, but in spite of their primitive equipment, the hardened and spirited Chinese prevailed. Any American support for Taiwan given a

declaration of independence will stoke the nationalistic spirit of the PLA in the same way, and this time a more capably equipped PLA in comparison to the U.S. Since foreign interference in the sovereign issue of the Province of Taiwan is considered one of China's "Five Nos," escalation to a theater or intercontinental nuclear weapons exchange with the U.S. cannot be ruled out. In the end, if we insist on idealistically pursuing a separate security-related policy towards Taiwan in basic violation of One China's recognition, the unintended consequence could be the military defeat of U.S. forces in the Pacific Theater and possibly the undoing of American societal stability at home. While incomprehensibly stupid at a glance, it has been demonstrated historically that foreign policies assume a momentum of their own, even when ill advised.

Still, neither China nor any other great modern civilization has a nuclear death wish. Affirming this fact, in a recent Washington Post OpEd titled *The Rules On Preventive Force* (2006), Dr. Henry A. Kissinger observed that: "... 'great powers' have nothing to gain by military conflict with each other. They are all more or less dependent on the global economic system. They are all threatened if ideology and weapons run out of control." So, while China might avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S., clever non-attributable alternatives are available to her, Russia, and others. Asymmetric warfare may now be China's doctrine of choice for her anticipated conflict with the U.S. The book "Unrestricted Warfare" coauthored by PLA officers Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui was written in 1999, but not translated and published in the west until after the events of 9/11. In the Translator's introduction it is commented that: "Perhaps another reason Jiang [Zemin] and China's official media are touting the success of the September 11 attacks is their own pride that China's new military doctrine, so well expressed in *Unrestricted Warfare* and so specifically advocating bin Laden bombing the World Trade center, seems to have worked." (pp.ix)

Russia should not be underestimated in this regard, as her patience with American idealism may not be endless. In the book *Putin's Russia* (2003) author Lilia Shevtsova emphasizes that while Russia's President Putin most strongly sympathized with, and came to the immediate aid of the U.S. following 9/11, the U.S. has done little to reciprocate. From our abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, to our continuous accusations of Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, to our domestically-motivated criticism for Russia's selected sovereign path to reforms, America continues to alienate a potential ally. It is this author's opinion that Russia probably sees the U.S. as unreliable at best and consciously insincere at worst. Given the aggravation of fundamental U.S. differences with Russia are worsening, the same symmetric nuclear and asymmetric unconventional options of the Chinese are available to a pragmatic Russia as well. Plausibly deniable asymmetric means might be preferred by both to avoid the certain kinetic destruction of open nuclear conflict. As noted earlier, neither Russia nor China have any particular desire to return to the nuclear brinkmanship of the Cold War than does the U.S., and the unconventional employment of conventional weapons and means will be preferred. Yet, the most ominous asymmetric nuclear threat to the U.S. is still worthy of discussion.

b. Opportunistic alliances between EMP-capable states and anti-modernists

In spite of all the improvements to U.S. homeland security since 9/11, America still has a few Achilles heels that make us vulnerable to irreversible societal disruption. America's softest

underbelly in today's asymmetric world is our growing vulnerability to High Altitude Electromagnetic Magnetic Pulse (HEMP), the most efficient means for opportunistic alliances of our adversaries to bring the U.S. to its knees. Generated by the high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon, HEMP would disable or destroy most if not all electronic systems within unshielded line of sight of the event. In fact The Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (2004) states that: "EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. It has the capability to produce significant damage to the ability of the United States to project influence and military power." In fact, China and Russia have for many decades recognized the attractive features of such a non-kinetic attack. A tailored HEMP attack could irreversibly paralyze the highly developed, urbanized, and uniquely vulnerable U.S. Given its widely published effectiveness as a weapon, this commonly understood phenomenon probably has not escaped the notice of our asymmetric adversaries, including rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.

If America continues to alienate friend and foe alike, the conditions could be particularly favorable for covert state and non-state cooperation in such a deniable application of one or a few nuclear weapons. One plausible scenario involves a nuclear state sympathizing or finding common ground with anti-modernist enemies, whether they be vanguard imperial Islamists or non-state Neo Nazis in the U.S. and Europe. As the nihilistic intent of an unrequited Radical Islam will drags in the sympathies of Islam at large, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and other future nuclear-capable states could be used to funnel miniaturized weapons to non-state operators, including other anti-modernists. In a Washington Times OpEd titled "*National Paralysis: Electromagnetic attack a grave threat.*" (2005) and a later Naval Proceedings article titled "Electronic Chaos" (2005), this author highlighted the relative ease that extremists could execute such an attack. Given the availability of the state-supplied warhead, platform and launch vehicle technologies readily available in world weapon markets could be employed to great effect and with plausible deniability.

Our increasing national vulnerability to EMP attack serves as the starkest revelation that the protection of our society against devastation and ruin can no longer be assured by nuclear deterrence and expeditionary military battlefield preparations on their own. Such an attack could be executed today. Given that a primitive fission device is lofted by means of a shipboard launch, or the sudden deorbiting of a supposedly non-military object in low earth orbit, neither U.S. missile defenses nor forensic attribution mechanisms would be effective. The EMP Commissioners did their duty by identifying the dire potential consequences of allowing U.S. vulnerability to continue. Yet, much time is being lost in initiating infrastructure protection, and tactical systems and consumer electronic shielding against this insidious possibility. It has been over two years since the Report of the EMP Commission was published.

America's perpetual EMP vulnerability serves as a particularly disturbing example of the inertia of the democratic American apparatus. It is seemingly incapable of mustering or directing the will of the nation to recognize the dangers of its own global posture and to prepare for the consequences. America's reactive, short-term, market and election-oriented behavior is incapable of attaining the preparation tempo that is required now in order to out-pace the emergence of superempowered threats to our very existence. Given this chronic modern U.S. vulnerability an old saying comes to mind, namely "don't throw stones if you live in a glass

house. So, we should aim to prevent anti-U.S. axis' or sympathies to form in the first place. It is the author's opinion that significant national course changes such as a modification of our domestic democratic processes, moderation of our arrogant tone are required, the national security benefits ultimately far outweigh the costs.

America should not be concerned about a future in which her global status becomes less relevant than today. England, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and countless other civilizations have endured such declines in influence successfully. But if we refuse to acknowledge our real vulnerabilities and continue with status quo behavior, the EMP threat and a few other technology-enabled phenomena can easily turn America's decline into our demise.

6. The research project in retrospect

At the conclusion of his famous work "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (1996), Samuel P. Huntington concluded that: "In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war." (pp.321) By synthesizing the observations of Huntington and Kant we may indeed achieve "a perpetual peace" along the modern lines of civilizational demarcation that matter, namely modernity and anti-modernity. Huntington probably was not surprised by the decade that followed the publication of his book, and he might not disagree that an imperial American stance has not helped the formation of such a world order. While America alone is not responsible for the ills of globalization, for the time being we do carry the overwhelming share of the responsibility for its imbalances. Imperial America as an attitude is therefore a real enemy, a demon within us that must be conquered to insure our survival through the 21st century. America's leadership could accomplish this in short order, given the will. We also still have the physical capacity to help alter the course of those ills in a direction that acknowledges the realities of the global community, and its organism-like qualities. Unfortunately, we are still alienating others with an out-dated idealistic, school teacher approach to national security and foreign policy. Our dismissive attitude towards President Putin's authoritarian leadership and our recent public humiliation of China's President Hu show that we are not prepared to face the future.

The most dangerous polity that has been awakened due to this alienation is the political force of Radical Islam, as the armed vanguard of anti-modernism. When this enemy is combined with the accelerating rate of change underlying globalization, realism, realpolitik, and strong allies become critical for our national survival, as now the clash will come. We need to arm ourselves physically and psychologically for what may very well turn out to be at worst total war of at least two civilizations. We have largely brought upon ourselves the coming difficulties by means of our unqualified air of superiority and our transparent hypocrisy in our global actions. Correcting the course, diffusing the passions of greater Islam to sympathize with that radical political component can still be accomplished by expressing sincere contrition for those causes of the general discontent that are ours. As it pertains to the great civilizations it is indeed dangerous for the U.S. to project our ideals into international affairs with hypocritical inconsistency, and at a time when real global power is cycling away from American dominance. The special characteristics of the rising Chinese and Russian powers in geopolitical equations makes our U.S. insistence on passing judgment on their internal affairs inconsistent with our self-

interests. A humble departure from evangelical American idealism in favor of a consistent realpolitik firmly rooted in the coinciding national economic and security interests of America and the world's most powerful states will be necessary. All of these changes in attitude and action should not await the initiative of others.

In the concluding chapter of his book "Diplomacy" (1994), author Henry Kissinger observed: "...America's survival and progress will depend as well on its ability to make choices which reflect contemporary reality. Otherwise foreign policy will turn into self-righteous posturing...What no leader must ever do is to suggest that choice has no price, or that no balance needs to be struck." (pp.834) It is this author's opinion that the reason America today finds herself increasingly alienated from, and threatened by an opportunistic combination of modern great powers and anti-modernist fundamentalists is that such sound advice has not been heeded. If we were owed debts of gratitude for American leadership from other peoples in the 20th Century, those debts are largely being cancelled through our perpetual imperial attitude and behavior. Therefore, we must take unprompted initiative to adjust to 21st Century realities by setting new conditions that acknowledge our relative civilizational decline, while averting our outright demise.

VI. Recommendations

Based on this paper it is recommended that selected studies be undertaken to follow up on the research conclusions contained herein. Suggested topics for further research include:

1. Revising the National Security Strategy based on global realism instead of domestic idealism.
2. Consider an apology to Secular Islam for any American complicity in past offenses.
3. Study the implications of planning for Israel's evacuation and resettlement in the U.S.
4. Reexamine all idealistically-inspired U.S. policies towards China, and adopt realpolitik.
5. Reexamine all idealistically-inspired U.S. policies towards Russia, and adopt realpolitik.
6. Consider renaming the "GWOT" as the "War on Radical Islam."
7. Consider new weapons and strategies for employment against Radical Islam.

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