Prof Roubini prescribes first aid for America’s economy

As the prospects for the American economy darkens, the discussion turns from “where’s my recession?” to “what should we do?”  Prof Nouriel Roubini has similar ideas to those in my post of yesterday, “The last opportunity for effective action before disaster strikes“, developed in greater detail.  He has generously allowed this to be reposted here.

“Financial and Corporate System is in Cardiac Arrest: The Risk of the Mother of All Bank Runs“, RGE Monitor, 3 October 2008 — Roubini is a professor of economics at NYU, noted expert in international finance, and founder of RGE Monitor (a aggregator of economics and finance articles, invaluable for anyone in those fields).  Posted in full; I have added subheadings. 

It is now clear that the US financial system – and now even the system of financing of the corporate sector – is now in cardiac arrest and at a risk of a systemic financial meltdown. I don’t use these words lightly but at this point we have reached the final 12th step of my February paper on “The Risk of a Systemic Financial Meltdown: 12 Steps to a Financial Disaster” (Step 9 or the collapse of the major broker dealers has already widely occurred).

Thursday a senior market practitioner in a major financial institution wrote to me the following:

So far as I can tell by working the telephones this morning:

• LIBOR bid only, no offer.
• Commercial paper market shut down, little trading and no issuance.
• Corporations have no access to long or short term credit markets — hence they face massive rollover problems.
• Brokers are increasingly not dealing with each other.
• Even the inter-bank market is ceasing up.

This cannot continue for more than a few days. This is the economic equivalent to cardiac arrest. Then we debated what is necessary to restart the system.

I believe that the government will do another Hail Mary pass, with massive guarantees to the short-term commercial credit system and wide open short-term lending by the Fed (2 or 3 times expansion of the Fed balance sheet). If done on a sufficient scale this action will probably work for a while. But none of these financial measures affects the accelerating recession — which will in turn place more pressure on the financial sector.

Another senior professional in a major global financial institution wrote to me:

Today, in our trading room, I could see the manifestations of a lending freeze, and the funding hiatus for banks and companies, with libor bid only, the commercial paper market closed in effect, and a scramble for cash – really really scary.

Do you think this is treatable without a) a massive coordinated liquidity boost and easing of monetary policy and b) widespread nationalisation of some banks, gtessto others AND a good bank/bad bank policy where some get wiped along with their investors? The Treasury Tarp plan is an irrelevance if we are at a major funding crisis.

And to confirm the near systemic collapse of the system of financing of both financial firms and corporate firms Warren Buffet declared yesterday, as reported by Bloomberg:

… the U.S. economy is “flat on the floor” after a cardiac arrest as companies struggle to secure funding and unemployment increases.

“In my adult lifetime I don’t think I’ve ever seen people as fearful, economically, as they are now,” Buffettsaid today in an interview with Charlie Rose to be broadcast tonight on PBS. “The economy is going to be getting worse for a while.’ …The credit freeze is “sucking blood” from the U.S. economy, Buffett said.

We are indeed at the cardiac arrest stage and at risk of the mother of all bank and non-ban runs as:

(1)  The run on the shadow banking system

The run on the shadow banking system is accelerating as: even the surviving major broker dealers (Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs) are under severe pressure (Morgan losing over a third of its hedge funds clients); the run on hedge funds is accelerating via massive redemptions and a roll-off of their overnight repo lines; the money market funds are experiencing further withdrawals in spite of government blanket guarantee.

(2)  A silent run on the commercial banks

A silent run on the commercial banksis underway. In Q2 of 2008 the FDIC reported $4462bn insured domestic deposits out of $7036 bn total domestic deposits; thus, only 63% of domestic deposits are insured. Thus $ 2574bn of deposits were not insured. Given the risk that many banks – small, regional and national – may go bust (as even large ones such as WaMu and Wachovia went recently bust) there is now a silent run on parts of the banking system.

Deposit insurance formally covers only deposits up to $100000. Thus any individual, small or large business and/or foreign investor or financial institution with more than $100000 in a FDIC insured bank is now legitimately concerned about the safety of its deposits. Even if as likely the deposit insurance limit will be temporarily raised to $250000 by Congress there will still be a whopping $1.9 trillion of uninsured deposits (or 73% of total deposits); thus, a huge mass of uninsured deposits will remain at risk as even small businesses have usually more than $250K of cash while medium sized and large firms as well as any domestic and foreign financial institution or investor with exposure to US banks has average exposure in the millions of dollars. Particularly at risk are the cross border mostly short term interbank lines of US banks with their foreign counterparties that are estimated to be close to $800 billion.

(3)  A run on the short term liabilities of the corporate sector

A run on the short term liabilities of the corporate sector is also underway as the commercial paper market has effectively shut down with little trading and no issuance or rollover of such debt while corporations have no access to long or short term credit markets and they are therefore facing massive rollover problems (over $500 billion of rollover of maturing debts in the next 12 months). Indeed, the market for commercial paper plummeted $94.9 billion to $1.6 trillion for the week ended Oct. 1 (and down over $200 billion in the last three weeks). Especially banks and insurers were unable to find buyers for the short-term debt: financial paper accounted for most of the decline, plunging $64.9 billion, or 8.7% in the last week; but now even non-financial corporations are also experiencing severe roll-off in the CP market.

Discount rates for investment-grade non-financial commercial paper spike to 599bp z(basis points) for 60 day maturities. More companies are borrowing against or tapping their revolving credit lines. This is largely due to the dislocation caused in the money markets by the failure of Lehman and the subsequent withdrawals from money market funds, which are some of the biggest providers of liquidity in the short term funding/commercial paper.

Even the largest corporations are at severe stress: AT&T last week was forced to rely on overnight funding for its treasury operations, as lenders were unwilling to provide more long term financing due to fears in money market funds over investor redemption. The CEO said

“It’s loosened up a bit, but it’s day-to-day right now. I mean literally it’s day-to-day in terms of what our access to the capital markets looks like”

Things are much worse for non-investment grade corporations and for small and medium sized businesses. As reported today by Bloomberg:

Rohm & Haas, based in Philadelphia and rated BBB by Standard & Poor’s, is paying 8 basis points for a $750 million revolving line of credit provided by 13 banks, the treasurer said. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

As the U.S. House of Representatives prepares to vote on a $700 billion bailout bill passed by the Senate, global credit markets are being squeezed by banks afraid to lend to each other and to even some investment-grade corporate clients. Treasurers are struggling to keep credit lines open so they can pay employees, fund pension benefits and purchase raw materials.

“The banks are really starting to play hardball,” said Jeff Wallace, managing partner at Greenwich Treasury Advisors, a financial consultant in Boulder, Colorado. “They don’t want to give out any more money to people because they don’t have enough capital”. Banks are demanding renegotiation of interest charges or lending terms when “routine” amendments are requested on lines of credit, said Thomas C. Deas Jr., treasurer of Philadelphia- based FMC Corp. and an association board member.

(4)  The money markets and interbank markets have shut down

The money markets and interbank markets have shut down as yesterday  — despite the Senate passing the bail-out bill — markets were

• USD Overnight Libor was still at 268bp after reaching an all-time high of 6.88%;
• the USD 3m Libor-OIS spread widened to record 270 basis points;
• EUR 3m LIBOR-OIS spread is at record 130bp;
• the TED spread is at record 360bps (TED was 11bps one month ago);
• money and credit markets are dysfunctional also in emerging markets; and
• agency bond spreads are also at highs again.

Summary

So we are now facing:

(a)  a silent run on the huge mass of uninsured deposits of the banking system and even a run on some insured deposits are small depositors are scared;

(b)  a run on most of the shadow banking system: over 300 non bank mortgage lenders are now bust; the SIVs and conduits are now all bust; the five major brokers dealers are now bust (Bear and Lehman) or still under severe stress even after they have been converted into banks (Merrill, Morgan, Goldman); a run on money market funds; a serious run on hedge funds; a looming refinancing crisis for private equity firms and LBOs);

(c)  a run on the short term liabilities of the corporate sector as the commercial paper market has totally frozen (and experiencing a roll-off) while access to medium terms and long term financings for corporations is frozen at a time when hundreds of billions of dollars of maturing debts need to be rolled over;

(d)   total seizure of the interbank and money markets.

This is indeed a cardiac arrest for the shadow and non-shadow banking system and for the system of financing of the corporate sector. The shutdown of financing for the corporate system is particularly scary: solvent but illiquid corporations that cannot roll over their maturing debt may now face massive defaults due to this illiquidity. And if the financing of the corporate sectors shuts down and remains shut down the risk of an economic collapse similar to the Great Depression becomes highly likely.

So what needs to be done?

Even several hundreds of billion dollars in emergency liquidity support to the financial system by the Fed and other central banks in the last week alone have not been enough to stop the seizure of liquidity in interbank markets and the shut down of financing for the corporate sector as counterparty risk is now extreme (no one trusts any more in this crisis of confidence even the most reputable and trustworthy financial and corporate counterparties).

Thus, emergency times where we are at risk of a systemic meltdown require emergency measures. These include the following…

(a)  Expanded deposit guarantees

A temporary six-month blanket guarantee on all US deposits (not just those below $250k) combined with a rapid triage between insolvent banks that should be quickly closed and distressed but solvent – conditional on liquidity and capital injections – banks that should be rescued. To stop the silent run on the banking system you do need now such blanket guarantee on all (insured and uninsured) deposit regardless of their size.

To minimize lender moral hazard from such action the blanket guarantee needs to be followed by a very rapid triage and shut-down of insolvent institutions to prevent such institutions from gambling for redemption, i.e. acquiring more deposits and making even more risky loans. To limit such moral hazard distortions one can also limit the extended guarantee only to current deposits: i.e. any new deposit above a $100k limit will not be insured.

Of course all the currently uninsured deposits of such insolvent institutions will need to be made whole once such banks are shut down (otherwise the run on uninsured deposits would continue and accelerate). Once the rotten apples (insolvent banks) that are infecting the good apples (the solvent banks) are eliminated the blanket guarantee will be lifted as the uninsured depositors of surviving banks can be assured that the remaining banks (the good apples) will not go bust.

Currently the silent run is triggered by investors and depositors not knowing which banks will go bust and which will survive as the bad apples are mixed in the same dark basket together withthe good apples. The extra fiscal cost of bailing out the uninsured depositors of failed banks can be addressed with FDIC recapitalization or an increase in deposit insurance premia or by whacking further unsecured creditors of failed banks (as the government should have first claim on the remaining assets of failed banks if uninsured depositors are made whole in such banks).

Anything short of this blanket guarantee cum triage will not be enough as the silent run on the banks will soon become a roaring tsunami of an open run. Solution a la Korea 1997 – where the cross border interbank run was solved via a bail-in rather than a bailout of the foreign cross border interbank creditors of Korean banks via an effectively forced conversion of short term interbank lines into one to three years claims guaranteed by the Korean government – would be too risky as such effective capital controls and coercive stretching of maturities of cross border interbank lines would dramatically scare foreign investors placing funds in US banks.

(b) Expanded emergency liquidity

Extension of the emergency liquidity support of the Fed (both TSLF and PDCF) to a broader range of institutions in the shadow banking system, especially those directly providing credit to the corporate sector. The TSLF and PDCF are already available to some non banks (the broker dealers that are primary dealers of the Fed). But two of such broker dealers are gone (Bear and Lehman) and the other three are under stress.

Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, the other primary dealers and the banks that have access to the TSLF and PDCF (and discount window) have massively used these facilities in the last few weeks; but they are hoarding such liquidity and not relending it to other banks, to the thousands of the other members of the shadow banking system and to the corporate sector as they need such liquidity and don’t trust any counterparty. Thus the transmission mechanism of credit policy (the non-traditional Fed liquidity lines) is completely shut down now. Thus, on an emergency basis the TSLF and PDCF need to be extended to other non-bank financial institutions, especially those directly providing credit to the corporate sector such as non-bank finance companies and leasing companies.

To ensure that this liquidity support is effective the Fed may require the borrowing institutions to maintain their level of exposure to the corporate sector (avoid the roll off of commercial paper, of short term credits to corporate and alike). A similar requirement may need to be imposed on all other financial institutions (banks and non bank primary dealers) that are now shutting down or rolling off their exposure to the corporate sector. Of course a crucial triage of the corporate sector is also necessary: those firms that would have ended up into Chapter 11 or 7 even under less extreme financial conditions should not be rescued and thus allowed to go into bankruptcy court.

(c) Triage

Some members of the shadow banking system will not receive such liquidity support of the Fed (hedge funds and private equity funds) as – fairly or unfairly – there is no political sympathy for such institutions. This means that the demise of hundreds – and possibly thousands – of hedge funds will occur as redemptions and roll off of overnight repo financing for leveraged investments will cause a massive liquidity – and thus solvency – crisis for such institutions.

If hundreds of smaller hedge funds collapse the systemic consequences would be limited (even if in the aggregate hedge funds provide significant financing to the corporate sector). If larger and systemically important hedge funds were at risk of failing the Fed will have to engineer a massive private sector bail-in of such hedge funds (a larger scale rescue a la LTCM) where the prime brokers of such funds are forced to maintain repo exposure to such funds rather than be allowed to shut off such exposure.

This is a radical suggestion but the alternative of a Fed liquidity bailout of systemically important hedge fund is not politically feasible given the little sympathy that such funds enjoy in Congress. The refinancing crisis of private equity firms and their LBOs is a longer fuse run as covenant-lite clause and PIK toggles will postpone such financing crisis but make the harder the fall as zombie corporations that postpone restructuring will have a bigger collapse once the financing crisis eventually occurs. But since many of these LBOsshould have never occurred in the first place any financing crisis for such buy-outs should be dealt with in bankruptcy court; no public funds should be used to rescue such LBOs and the reckless private equity firms that designed such schemes.

(d)  Direct lending to businesses

Direct lending to the business sector from the Fed via extension of the PDCF and TSLF to the non financial corporate sector. This could include Fed purchases of commercial paper from corporations and other forms of financing of the short term liabilities of the Administration to small businesses secured in appropriate ways. Given the collapse of the corporate CPmarket and the banking system reluctance to provide loans to the corporate sector (credits lines are being shut down) the only alternative to the Fed becoming directly the biggest emergency bank for the corporate sector would be to force the banking system to maintain its exposure to the corporate sector, possibly in exchange for further Fed provision of liquidity to the banking system. The former option may be better than the latter to deal with the looming illiquidity of the corporate sector.

(e)  Coodinated central bank action

Have a coordinated 100bps reduction in policy rates by all major advanced economies central bank and, possibly, even some emerging market economies central banks. While this policy rates may not directly resolve the insolvency issues in financial markets and in the corporate sector it may ease liquidity pressures and it would signal that global policy makers are serious about addressing together this most extreme liquidity and financial crisis. Also, some of the radical policy actions that have been suggested here for the US will most likely need to be undertaken also by European policy makers as the liquidity and credit crisis is now becoming global.

(f)  Redesign the TARP

Radically redesign the Treasury TARP rescue plan – possibly after its necessary approval today – to make it effective, efficient and fair. This implies that in addition to a more limited government purchase of toxic assets, you need:

1. an emergency triage between insolvent and illiquid and undercapitalized but solvent banks should be made;
2. a sharp reduction of the mortgage debt burden of the insolvent household sector;
3. and a recapitalization of solvent banks to be done via public injection of preferred shares and matching contributions by current shareholders of the banks.

Financial markets have already voted no to this plan (that is flawed in its current form) yesterday when after its passage in the Senate US and global equity markets plunged another 4% while money markets and credit markets seized up even further.

Conslusion

The suggested policy actions are extreme and radical but the times and conditions in financial markets and the corporate sector are also extreme. Thus, to avoid another Great Depression radical and unorthodox policy action needs to be taken now both in the US and in other advanced economies as the credit crisis and liquidity crisis is now becoming virulent even in Europe and other advanced economies.

This credit crisis is both a crisis of confidence and illiquidity and a crisis of credit and solvency. But while the insolvent institutions should go bust we have now reached a point where many financial institutions and now non financial firms may become insolvent because of pure illiquidity; and this would lead to an extremely severe economic contraction similar to an economic depression rather than a mild recession.

At this point the US, the advanced economies (and now likely even some emerging market economies) will experience an ugly recession and an ugly financial and banking crisis regardless of what we do from now on. What radical policy action can only do is preventing what will now be an ugly and nasty two-year recession and financial crisis from turning into a systemic meltdown and a decade long economic depression. The financial and economic conditions are extreme; thus extreme policy action is needed now to save the global economy from an ugly depression.

{end Prof Roubini’s article}

Afterword

If you are new to this site, please glance at the archives below.  You may find answers to your questions in these, such as the causes of the present crisis.  I have been writing about these events for several years; since November 2007 on this site.  As you will see explained in these posts, the magnitude of the events now happening is beyond what most Americans have — or can — imagine.

Please share your comments by posting below.  Please make them brief (250 words max), civil, and relevant to this post.  Or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling). 

Some FM posts about the current crisis

1. Treasury Secretary Paulson leads us across the Rubicon, 9 September 2008
2. High priority report: a geopolitical sitrep on the financial crisis, 15 September 2008
3. Say good-bye to the old America. Welcome to our new socialist paradise!, 17 September 2008
4. Another voice warning about the nationalization of AIG, 18 September 2008
5. A vital but widely misunderstood aspect of our financial crisis, 18 September 2008
6. A new sitrep, as we move into phase 3 of the financial crisis, 19 September 2008
7. Another step away from our Constitutional system, with applause, 19 September 2008
8. What do we know about the financial crisis? What are the key questions?, 20 September 2008
9. Slowly a few voices are raised about the pending theft of taxpayer money, 21 September 2008
10. America appoints a Magister Populito deal with the financial crisis, 21 September 2008
11. Legal experts discuss if the Paulson Plan is legal, 21 September 2008
12. Essential steps to surviving the current crisis, 23 September 2008
13. How should we respond to the crisis?, 24 September 2008
14. A solution to our financial crisis, 25 September 2008
15. Is the US economy in good shape, or in terrible shape?, 27 September 2008
16. A quick guide to the “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008″, 29 September 2008
17. America has changed. Why do so many foreigners see this, but so few Americans?, 1 October 2008
18. The last opportunity for effective action before disaster strikes, 3 October 2008

For a full listing see the FM reference page about the Financial crisis – what’s happening? how will this end?.

A few of the most important posts warning about this crisis

This crisis has long been forecast by many, including in articles on this site.  Even now that we are in the whirlwind, these provide valuable background material on its causes — and speculation about the results.  To see the all posts on this subject, go to the FM reference page about The End of the Post-WWII Geopolitical Regime.  Here are some of those posts.

1. A brief note on the US Dollar. Is this like August 1914?, 8 November 2007 — How the current situation is as unstable financially as was Europe geopolitically in early 1914.
2. The post-WWII geopolitical regime is dying. Chapter One, 21 November 2007 — Why the current geopolitical order is unstable, describing the policy choices that brought us here.
3. We have been warned. Death of the post-WWII geopolitical regime, 28 November 2007 — A long list of the warnings we have ignored, from individual experts and major financial institutions (links included).
4. Death of the post-WWII geopolitical regime, III – death by debt, 8 January 2008 – Origins of the long economic expansion from 1982 to 2006; why the down cycle will be so severe.
5. Geopolitical implications of the current economic downturn, 24 January 2008, – How will this recession end?  With re-balancing of the global economy, so that the US goods and services are again competitive.  No more trade deficit, and we can pay out debts.
6. A happy ending to the current economic recession, 12 February 2008 – The political actions which might end this downturn, and their long-term implications.
7. What will America look like after this recession?, 18 March 208  — The recession might change so many things, from the distribution of wealth within the US to the ranking of global powers.
8. The most important story in this week’s newspapers , 22 May 2008 — How solvent is the US government? They report the facts to us every year.
9. Prof Nouriel Roubini describes “The Decline of the American Empire” ,18 August 2008
10. The World’s biggest mess, 22 August 2008 — A brillant ex pat looks at America from across the ocean.
11. “The changing balance of global financial power”, by Brad Setser, 22 August 2008
12. “The Coming US Consumption Bust”, by Nouriel Roubini, 6 September 2008