First in another series of Iraq situation reports.
As with the fable about the blind men and the elephant (look here for several versions), we can look at Iraq from different perspectives. Each gives different insights.
One day, a rajah’s son asked, “Father, what is reality?”
“An excellent question, my son. Come, we will go to the marketplace.”
So the rajah and his son went outside and mounted their royal elephant. When they got to the marketplace, the rajah commanded, “Bring me 3 blind men.” When the blind men arrived, the rajah commanded, “Place one blind man at the elephant’s tusk, one at the elephant’s leg and one at the elephant’s tail.” When that was done, the rajah said, “Describe the elephant to me, blind men.”
The man at the tusk said, “It’s like a spear.” The man at the leg said, “It’s like a tree.” The man at the tail said, “It’s like a rope.”
As the men started to argue, the rajah said to his son, “Reality, my son, is the elephant. And we are all blind men.”
Many optimists about the gain confidence from reports by those who have served with US forces in Iraq, including the “war bloggers”. But the reports of strangers in a strange land – especially people with guns occupying foreign land, knowing neither the language nor the culture – must be handled with care. As told in another version of this story…
One day six wise, blind elephants were discussing what humans were like. Failing to agree, they decided to determine what humans were like by direct experience. The first wise, blind elephant felt the human, and declared, “Humans are flat.” The other wise, blind elephants similarly felt the human and agreed that humans are flat. (Both these stories are from here.)
For another perspective we can ask a wise man what we are doing in Iraq. Such as Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired), who says…
General Petraeus has abandoned the counterinsurgency manual in favor of the tactics which served us so well in Vietnam: massive firepower on civilian areas, search-and-destroy sweeps, and funding Popular Force militias. {note additional detail on this in the comments}
Search and destroy sweeps
Although characterized in many different ways, these have been a component of each American plan to pacify Iraq. Offensives based on some form of local intelligence, launched at something we define as an enemy in Iraq. Baathist dead-enders, Sunni Arab insurgents, Shiite Arab insurgents, Al Qaeda in Iraq (supported by local Sunni Arabs or Iran or external Al Qaeda affiliates)… it is a long and ever-changing list. Always different, always similar.
Militia
Another of the Iraq – Vietnam parallels, alike but somewhat different.
The use by the US of popular force militias (esp. Kurdish and Sunni Arab militia) has been a wild card in Iraq, of uncertain long-term impact. It has reduced US causalities, had some effect on overall violence levels (ethnic cleansing and urban balkanization may have had more impact), but at the cost of eroding both power and legitimacy of the Iraq central government. A selection of new stories shows confusion about their benefits, costs, and risks.
American-backed killer militias strut across Iraq, The Times, 25 November 2007 — Excerpt:
Members of the Baghdad Brigade receive $300 a man each month from the Americans, who also provide vehicles, uniforms and flak jackets. In return the brigade keeps out Al-Qaeda, dismantles roadside bombs and patrols the area, a task performed with considerable swagger by many of its 4,000 recruits. The US military is delighted with the results achieved by the brigade in Abu Ghraib and by similar groups in other former “hot spots” of sectarian conflict that have seen a sharp decline in violence.
For Shi’ites such as Kahiriya Musa, however, a Sunni militia represents another potential source of terror in a country where millions have been traumatised by ethnic cleansing. A 50% cut in car and roadside bombs, shootings and rocket and mortar attacks since June has brought hope that some of the 5m Iraqis driven from home may soon be able to go back. Yet many – Kahiriya Musa among them – are too frightened of the new militias and the ethnic cleansers in their ranks to risk moving.
Officials in the Shi’ite-led government also fear the burgeoning of fresh forces beyond its control. The question being asked in government circles is: have the Americans achieved a short-term gain in security at a cost of long-term pain that may be inflicted by the Sunni militias, which are already threatening to go to war against their Shi’ite counterparts?
‘It Boils Down to Trust’, Spencer Ackerman, The Washington Independent, 23 January 2008 — Excerpt:
One of the signature achievements of the surge … has been the creation of so-called “Concerned Local Citizens” groups – that is, bands of tribal fighters, mostly Sunni and including many former insurgents, who have agreed to take U.S. cash (and in some cases weaponry) if they pledge to fight al-Qaeda. The groups, also known as Awakening Councils, currently stand at 80,000 fighters, 80 percent of which are Sunni. They’re outside the chain of command of the regular Iraqi security forces. And the U.S. military, for months, has relied on the councils for information, including targeting information, about who the U.S. should go after in the name of fighting al-Qaeda.
But many of these groups consist of former insurgents. Many have an agenda that isn’t the U.S.’s. How does the U.S. really know that these groups are truly targeting al-Qaeda, instead of manipulating the U.S. military?
According to Rear Admiral Greg Smith, a spokesman for the U.S. military command in Iraq, it’s simple. Trust. “The sense is, as we partner with tribal chiefs, the chief knows who’s working for him,” Smith said when I asked him about the reliability of these bands on a blogger conference call this morning. “You’ve got to put some trust and confidence in these people.” That trust, he said, isn’t built overnight, and the U.S. will have a “relationship” with a tribal leader before committing resources to him or including him in a program.
But is that all it amounts to? Trust?
“It boils down to trust,” Smith confirmed. “And over time, you can earn it or lose it.”
‘If there is no change in three months, there will be war again’, The Independent, 28 January 2008 — Excerpt:
A crucial Iraqi ally of the United States in its recent successes in the country is threatening to withdraw his support and allow al-Qa’ida to return if his fighters are not incorporated into the Iraqi army and police.
“If there is no change in three months there will be war again,” said Abu Marouf, the commander of 13,000 fighters who formerly fought the Americans. He and his men switched sides last year to battle al-Qa’ida and defeated it in its main stronghold in and around Fallujah. “If the Americans think they can use us to crush al-Qa’ida and then push us to one side, they are mistaken,” Abu Marouf told The Independent
… The Iraqi government fears ceding power to the Awakening movement which it sees as an American-funded Sunni militia, whose leaders are often former military or security officers from Saddam Hussein’s regime and are unlikely to show long-term loyalty to the Shia and Kurdish-dominated administration.
Part of Abu Marouf’s force is paid for by the Americans. Ordinary fighters are believed to receive $350 (£175) a month and officers $1,200, but some receive no salary. He makes clear that he wants long-term jobs for himself and his followers and that “they must be long-term jobs”. There is more than just money involved here. The Sunni tribal leaders want a share of power in Baghdad which they lost when Saddam Hussein was deposed.
The US calls the Awakening movement groups “Concerned Citizens”, as if they were pacific householders heroically restoring law and order. In fact, the US has handed over Sunni areas to the guerrilla groups such as the 1920 Brigades and the Islamic Army who have been blowing up American solders since 2003.
…But, far from America having won a victory in Iraq, violence has fallen largely because the United States has handed power to the guerrillas who fought it for so long.
Massive firepower on civilian targets
(A) Airpower
The great undercovered story of the Iraq War. Tom Engelhardt has been one of the few covering this key aspect of the war. A journalist — no military expert — he has told a story ignored by most warbloggers and military experts. For example, look at the low volume of coverage of the air war at StrategyPage, the Small Wars Council, and by Stratfor. Here are his major articles on the air war, essential reading for anyone seeking to understand our activities in Iraq.
- Incident on Haifa Street, 19 September 2004
- Dahr Jamail on Life under the Bombs in Iraq, 2 February 2005
- Icarus (Armed with Vipers) Over Iraq, 5 December 2005
- Michael Schwartz on Iraq as a Killing Ground, 10 January 2006
- Air War, Barbarity, and the Middle East, 28 July 2006
- Nick Turse on America’s Secret Air War in Iraq, 7 February 2007
- Nick Turse: The Air War in Iraq Uncovered, 24 May 2007
- Bombs Away Over Iraq, 29 January 2008
Tom Engelhardt is the author of The End of Victory Culture — Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation. Here are excerpts and reviews.
(B) Artillery
Even less often discussed than airpower (and used less often), artillery played a role. As seen in these posts.
- Winning hearts and mind with artillery fire, 26 May 2008
- Another example of winning hearts & minds with artillery, 29 May 2008
For more information from the FM site
To read other articles about these things, see the FM reference page on the right side menu bar. Of esp interest these days:
- About Iraq & Sub-continent Wars – my articles
- About Iraq & Sub-continent Wars – studies & reports
- About the Iraq War – Goals and Benchmarks
Posts about the war in Iraq:
- The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace, 13 March 2007
- Beyond Insurgency: An End to Our War in Iraq, 27 September 2007
- Iraq, after the war, 20 May 2008
- Slowly the new Iraq becomes visible, 18 July 2008