This 2300 word essay by George Friedman of Stratfor shows the essence of America’s geopolitical engine, the heart of the War on Terror. I strongly recommend reading it. The end is especially worth pondering. More than just reading it, I recommend mailing copies to your elected representatives along with letters of outrage.
“Al Qaeda, Afghanistan and the Good War“, George Friedman, Stratfor (26 February 2008) — This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR. Excerpts:
…It {the US government} was not after the Taliban but al Qaeda. It appears — and much of this remains murky — that the command cell of al Qaeda escaped from Afghan forces and U.S. Special Operations personnel at Tora Bora and slipped across the border into Pakistan. …Al Qaeda clearly was disrupted and relocated — and was denied its sanctuary. A number of its operatives were captured, further degrading its operational capability.
…The U.S. commitment of troops was enough to hold the major cities and conduct offensive operations that kept the Taliban off balance, but the United States could not possibly defeat them. The Soviets had deployed 300,000 troops in Afghanistan and could not defeat the mujahideen. NATO, with 50,000 troops and facing the same shifting alliance of factions and tribes that the Soviets couldn’t pull together, could not pacify Afghanistan. But vanquishing the Taliban simply was not the goal. The goal was to maintain a presence that could conduct covert operations in Pakistan looking for al Qaeda and keep al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan.
…The real issue is the hardest to determine. Is al Qaeda prime — not al Qaeda enthusiasts or sympathizers who are able to carry out local suicide bombings, but the capable covert operatives we saw on 9/11 — still operational? And even if it is degraded, given enough time, will al Qaeda be able to regroup and ramp up its operational capability? If so, then the United States must maintain its posture in Afghanistan, as limited and unbalanced as it is. The United States might even need to consider extending the war to Pakistan in an attempt to seal the border if the Taliban continue to strengthen. But if al Qaeda is not operational, then the rationale for guarding Kabul and Karzai becomes questionable.
We have no way of determining whether al Qaeda remains operational; we are not sure anyone can assess that with certainty. Certainly, we have not seen significant operations for a long time, and U.S. covert capabilities should have been able to weaken al Qaeda over the past seven years. But if al Qaeda remains active, capable and in northwestern Pakistan, then the U.S. presence in Afghanistan will continue.
…It is a holding action waiting for certain knowledge of the status of al Qaeda, knowledge that likely will not come. Afghanistan is a war without exit and a war without victory. The politics are impenetrable, and it is even difficult to figure out whether allies like Pakistan are intending to help or are capable of helping.
Thus, while it may be a better war than Iraq in some sense, it is not a war that can be won or even ended. It just goes on.
It says much about our elites that a leading geopolitical expert could write this. Perhaps tear stains do not show on the Internet, nor can we hear his groans of frustration and anguish — as we cannot hear the suffering of our soldiers as they attempt to execute these delusional, nonsensical plans. Or perhaps Mr. Friedman just illustrates the broken OODA loop of America’s elites (Orientation-Observation-Decision-Action loop; see a pdf explanation of the loop here).
In Afghanistan we are in the eighth year of fighting al Qaeda, a foe that might not be there. That might not even exist in substantial form. The tribes we actually fight have no grievance against us — and we have none against them, nor any national interests at stake (other than the fight against a possible foe that might be there). The effort further strains our overstressed forces. We borrow the money for the war from foreign governments, as our economy slides into a recession.
No intelligence, no rational strategy, no realizable goals. War without end, without meaning. This is the tangible expression of an America in decline.
This is an election year. America need not be run in such a manner. We have only ourselves to blame if things remain unchanged in 2009.
