Site icon Fabius Maximus website

James Bond is not just our hero, but the model for our geopolitical strategy

Larry Kummer, Editor

I enjoyed Ian Fleming’s books about James Bond, and some of the movies too (esp. Casino Royale).  But should we base our geopolitical strategyon fielding teams of “00” agents (and special operators) to kill our enemies?  Will this make us safer, or make more likely what we most wish to avoid?

Consider this:

  1. Many (most?) nations have used assassination in exceptional circumstances.
  2. Some nations have made occasional use of assassination (e.g., our Phoenix Program in Vietnam).
  3. Some nations have made extensive — even routine — use of assassination (e.g., the USSR, Israel).

Since our entry into WWII, and esp during the Cold War, America moved from group 1 to group 2.  Now we are moving from group 2 to group 3.  This post discusses the history of assassination as a geopolitical tool (i.e., by government against foreign enemies), how we are making more use of it, and what this might mean for America.  At the end are links to the other chapters in this series.

Contents

  1. History of assassination
  2. Today’s news
  3. Implications of routine assassination
  4. Legalities
  5. Recommended sources  for an introduction to this subject
  6. Afterword and where to go for more information

(1)  History of assassination

Assassination as a tool of statecraft or war is nothing new.  In Chapter 13 of The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote:

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command.

For a look at our time, here is an excerpt from the Wikipedia entry about the history of assassination (click through to Wikipedia to see the many links). 

However, the 20th century likely marks the first time nation-states began training assassins to be specifically used against so-called enemies of the state. During World War II, for example, MI6 trained a group of Czechoslovakian operatives to kill the Nazi general Reinhard Heydrich (who did later perish by their efforts – see Operation Anthropoid), and repeated attempts were made by both the British MI6, the American Office of Strategic Services (later the Central Intelligence Agency) and the Soviet SMERSH to kill Adolf Hitler …

The Cold War saw a dramatic increase in the number of political assassinations … During the Kennedy era Fidel Castro narrowly escaped death on several occasions at the hands of the CIA (a function of the agency’s “executive action” program) … The assassination of the FBI agent Dan Mitrione, a well known torture teacher, in hands of the Uruguayan guerrilla movement Tupamaros is a perfect proof of United States intervention in Latin American governments during the Cold War.

At the same time, the KGB made creative use of assassination to deal with high-profile defectors such as Georgi Markov, and Israel’s Mossad made use of such tactics to eliminate Palestinian guerrillas, politicians and revolutionaries …

Most major powers were not long in repudiating such tactics, for example during the presidency of Gerald Ford in the United States in 1976 (Executive Order 12333, which proscription was relaxed however by the George W. Bush administration). Many allege, however, that this is merely a smoke screen for political and moral benefit and that the covert and illegal training of assassins by major intelligence agencies continue, such as at the School of the Americas run by the United States.

… {M}any accuse Russia of continuing to practice it in Chechnya and against Chechens abroad, as well as Israel in Palestine and against Palestinians abroad (as well as those Mossad deems a threat to Israeli national security, as in the aftermath of the Munich Massacre during “Operation Wrath of God”). Besides Palestine Liberation Organization members assassinated abroad, {Israel’s military} has also often targeted Hamas activists in the Gaza strip.

Are attacks on military leaders during wartime called “assassinations”?  See the answer here.

(2)  Today — routine use of assassination

(a)  “Filling the skies with Assassins” by Tom Engelhardt, 17 April 2009 — Excerpt:

Our drone wars also represent a new chapter in the history of assassination. Once upon a time, to be an assassin for a government was a furtive, shameful thing. In those days, of course, an assassin, if successful, took down a single person, not the targeted individual and anyone in the vicinity (or simply, if targeting intelligence proves wrong, anyone in the vicinity). No more poison-dart-tipped umbrellas, as in past KGB operations, or toxic cigars as in CIA ones — not now that assassination has taken to the skies as an every day, all-year-round activity.

Today, we increasingly display our assassination wares with pride. To us, at least, it seems perfectly normal for assassination aerial operations to be a part of an open discussion in Washington and in the media. Consider this a new definition of “progress” in our world.

(b)  “US choice hardly McChrystal clear“, Gareth Porter, Asia Times, 14 May 2009 — This has much interesting detail about General McChrystal; I recommend reading it in full.  Excerpt:

The choice of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal to become the new United States commander in Afghanistan has been hailed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and national news media as ushering in a new unconventional approach to counter-insurgency.  But McChrystal’s background sends a very different message from the one claimed by Gates and the news media. His long specialization in counter-terrorism operations suggests an officer who is likely to have more interest in targeted killings than in the kind of politically sensitive counter-insurgency program that the Barack Obama administration has said it intends to carry out.

In announcing the extraordinary firing of General David McKiernan and the nomination of McChrystal to replace him, Gates said that the mission in Afghanistan “requires new thinking and new approaches by our military leaders” and praised McChrystal for his “unique skill set in counter-insurgency”.  Media reporting on the choice of McChrystal simply echoed the Pentagon’s line.

  • The Washington Post said his selection “marks the continued ascendancy of officers who have pressed for the use of counter-insurgency tactics, in Iraq and Afghanistan, that are markedly different from the Army’s traditional doctrine”.  {link}
  • The New York Times cited unnamed “Defense Department officials” in reporting, “His success in using intelligence and firepower to track and kill insurgents, and his training in unconventional warfare that emphasizes the need to protect the population, made him the best choice for the command in Afghanistan.” {link}
  • The Wall Street Journal suggested that McChrystal was the kind of commander who would “fight the kind of complex counter-insurgency warfare” that Gates wants to see in Afghanistan, because his command of special operations forces in Iraq had involved “units that specialize in guerilla warfare, including the training of indigenous armies”. {link}

But these explanations for the choice of McChrystal equate his command of the special operations forces with expertise on counter-insurgency, despite the fact that McChrystal spent his past five years as a commander of special operations forces focusing overwhelmingly on counter-terrorism operations, not on counter-insurgency.  Whereas counter-insurgency operations are aimed primarily at influencing the population and are primarily non-military, counter-terrorism operations are exclusively military and focus on targeting the “enemy”.

  • As commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) from April 2003 to August 2008, he was pre-occupied with pursuing high-value al-Qaeda targets and local and national insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – mostly through targeted raids and airstrikes.
  • It was under McChrystal’s command, in fact, that JSOC shifted away from the very mission of training indigenous military units in counter-insurgency operations that had been a core mission of special operations forces. …
  • Special operations forces under McChrystal’s command also engaged in raiding homes in search of Taliban suspects, angering villagers in Herat province to the point where they took up arms against the US forces, according to a May 2007 story by Carlotta Gall and David E Sanger of the New York Times.

(c)  This is greeted with applause by some experts.  Such as Pat Lang (Colonel, US Army, retired), from a post at Sic Semper Tyrannis, 12 May 2009:

What is the message in this change? McChrystal’s background, his “issues” over supposed abuse of prisoners by his commandos in Iraq and a reputation for operational aggressiveness do not “telegraph” the coming of a policy aimed at a political settlement in Afghanistan.

This sounds like a paradigm shift in which Obama’s policy of destroying the leadership of Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan takes priority over everything else.

I might like this.

(d)  “Afghan Graveyard“, Ralph Peters, 14 May 2009 — Very much worth reading in full!  Excerpt:

The conflict in Afghanistan was a special-operations war in 2001, and it’s a special-operations war in 2009. Everything in between was deadly make-believe.

… Dave McKiernan didn’t fail the Army. The Army failed him. Sent to Afghanistan to herd NATO cats, he operated by the book. But the book the Army gave him was wrong.  That book — our Counterinsurgency Manual — was midwifed by Gen. David Petraeus, who did a dazzling job of turning around the mess Rumsfeld-era policies made in Iraq.

But Petraeus was nimble. When he hit the ground in Baghdad, he promptly surged beyond the prescriptions in his politically correct manual. Petraeus did what needed to be done. That included staying out of Stan McChrystal’s secret fight against al Qaeda and other bad actors in Iraq. We turned the blood tide during the hours of darkness, while journalists snored in their bunks.

Of all the factors that enabled the turnaround in Iraq, the first was the speed with which al Qaedaalienated the locals. The second was the incisive, relentless elimination of terrorists by our special-ops forces: Killing works.

… Will McChrystal, our special operator without peer, be allowed to do what’s necessary — and to jettison huggy-bear programs that sound good but don’t work? Can he focus on the destruction of our enemies? Can he throw away the book?

McChrystal’s boss, Petraeus, remains the key. If this supremely talented man can overcome his preconceptions about the fight we’re in, he and McChrystal may be the team that rescues another failing effort. But Petraeus has to think like a Pashtun tribesman, not a Princeton man.

As this column has pointed out repeatedly, Afghanistan’s worthless in and of itself. Securing hundreds of premedievalvillages means local progress at the cost of strategic paralysis. To fight a mobile enemy, we need to be hypermobile. The dirt doesn’t matter.  That’s where special-ops come in. Our efforts should concentrate on supporting our black-program professionals. It’s their fight. We need fewer troops, but a clear vision and more guts.

… Getting it right in Afghanistan — and across the frontier in Pakistan — means digging fewer wells and forcing our enemies to dig more graves. I’ll bet on McChrystal to get it right. If he’s allowed to.

(3)  Implications of a world where assassination is a routine tool

(a)  Does it work strategically as well as tactically?

“Killing works” as a tactic.  Wars are won by good strategy, not just good tactics (or else everyone in Europe would be singing Deutschland Uber Alles before their soccer games).  Basing our operations on “killing works” not just violates most COIN theory, but might fatally compromise key strategic interests.

David Kilcullen (Lt. Colonel, Australian Army, retired) gently but clearly discusses on aspect of this in “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below, co-author with Andrew McDonald Exum (US Army, retired), op-ed in the New York Times, 16 May 2009 — Excerpt:

The use of drones in military operations has steadily grown — we know from public documents that from last September to this March alone, C.I.A. operatives launched more than three dozen strikes.

The appeal of drone attacks for policy makers is clear. For one thing, their effects are measurable. Military commanders and intelligence officials point out that drone attacks have disrupted terrorist networks in Pakistan, killing key leaders and hampering operations. Drone attacks create a sense of insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions with suspected informers. And, because they kill remotely, drone strikes avoid American casualties.

But on balance, the costs outweigh these benefits for three reasons.

  • First, the drone war has created a siege mentality among Pakistani civilians. …
  • Second {such strikes} offend people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability.
  • Third, the use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic — or, more accurately, a piece of technology — substituting for a strategy.

About the author:  For Kilcullen’s bio and links to his many articles about counter-insurgency, see The Essential 4GW reading list: David Kilcullen.

(b)  Does it encourage attacks on the US?

There is another possible result.  Our enemies can retaliate, and perhaps even reciprocate.  It’s not clear — except in the nightmares that substitute for strategic thought in the US — that any Afghanistan tribes have an objective interest in attacking America.  What would be the military objective, the potential benefit?  But each killing adds to the number of individuals with a reason to do so, among the friends and relatives of the dead.

Chet Richards (Editor of DNI; Colonel, USAF, retired) says “The pointlessness of attacking the US might not stop them from trying.  History shows that all sides in every war are vulnerable to the temptation of putting tactics ahead of strategy.”

Routine use of assassination might make inevitable what we most wish to avoid.  If so, it will be — unlike 9-11 — a legitimate operation of war.  America has made it so.

(c)  What does it do to us?

We are shaped by our actions as well as our aspirations and beliefs.  Assassination is a form of war, but it differs from war as we usually think of it in the West.  The effects of routine use of assassination on our hearts, minds, and souls might prove to be the most important long-term result.

With the routine use of assassination we join a dirty roster of nations.  Perhaps the most important factor to ponder:   few of the nations on this list are successful nations, by any standard.

(5)  Legalities

After the revelations of our government’s legal justification for torture, there is no point in discussing the legalities of targeted killing vs. assassination, and the fine distinctions involved.  Plus we are in the long war, in which our enemies are both ill-defined and changing over time.  As has been shown in elaborate detail, both on this site and many others, essentially the US government now reserves the right to kill whoever it wants to, US citizens included (incidents such as Waco and esp Ruby Ridge demonstrated that to all but the exceptionally slow learners among us).  That is, self-restraint and fear of consequences are the major factors constraining government action.

Perhaps the key aspect of these laws and regulations is that the term “assassination” is not defined.  However, for you legal beagles:

Assassination section of the Lieber Code, U.S. Army General Order No. 100, 1863

Executive Order 11905 — United States foreign intelligence activities, 18 February 1976

Executive Order 12333 — United States intelligence activities, 4 December 1981

DoD Directive 5240.1 – DoD Intelligence Activities, 25 April 1988 

Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: a Brief Summary, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 2002

(5)  Recommended sources for more information about assassinations

The two best reports I have found of these issues are the CRS report (above) and  Operations against Enemy Leaders, Stephen T. Hosmer, RAND, 2001 (151 pages).   This report was sponsored by US Air Force. I recommend reading it if you are interested in learning about these complex issues. From the summary:

An analysis of some 24 cases of leadership attacks from World War II to the present provides insights about the comparative efficacy of different forms of leadership attacks, the potential coercive and deterrent value of such operations for shaping future enemy policy and behavior, and the possible unintended consequences that may result from the ill-considered use of such attacks.

… With the single exception of the shoot-down of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s aircraft in World War II, all U.S. operations to neutralize senior enemy leaders by direct attack have failed.

(6)  Afterword

If you are new to this site, please glance at the archives below.  You may find answers to your questions in these.

Please share your comments by posting below.  Per the FM site’s Comment Policy, please make them brief (250 words max), civil, and relevant to this post.  Or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

For more information from the FM site

To read other articles about these things, see the FM reference page on the right side menu bar.  Of esp interest these days:

Other articles about our government’s assassination programs

  1. James Bond is not just our hero, but the model for our geopolitical strategy, 18 May 2009
  2. Another nail put in the Constitution’s coffin, but we don’t care, 9 February 2010
  3. Stratfor looks at “The Utility of Assassination”, 26 February 2010
  4. Another step towards fascism: “Silencing the Lawyers”, 31 May 2010
  5. Code red! The Constitution is burning, 5 August 2010
  6. An Appalling Threat to Civil Liberties and Democracy, 8 August 2010
  7. Every day the Constitution dies a little more, 1 September 2010
  8. What do our Constitution-loving conservatives say about our government’s assassination programs?, 2 September 2010
Exit mobile version