Summary: Here we discuss one of the more powerful urban legends of American history, undermining America’s social cohesion — that the CIA has been one of the largest drug smugglers into America. This was reformatted in June 2013.
Today we examine another urban legend that will not die. Here is a pure version, lifted from the comments:
Have you considered the possibility that all these drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in South America, plus the ones in Afghanistan operate under the blessings and guidance of all-powerful, supreme, cartel above them – The Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA’s main business is to profit from tremendous rents they extract from the drug cartels, in exchange for not doing much anti-drugs enforcement activity.
Contents
- Origin of the story
- Evidence: Prof Alfred W McCoy
- Evidence: Report of the DoJ Inspector General
- Evidence:
- Other sources
- For More Information
(1) Origin of the story
The origin of this urban legend — in its widespread and exaggerated form — is perhaps the most irresponsible story ever done my a major American newspaper, the San Jose Mercury News series about the Contra drug trafficking in August 1996. It was not what they proved, or even said — but what they implied. Their vague claims have mutated into a vaster set of accusations — culminating in dystopian delusions like those of Indian Investor.
The US government has a long history of working with drug dealers — along with gangsters, tyrants, and the other low-lifes and scum that wield so much power in our broken world. In a perfect world the government could work with just saints. A finer government might work with just good people (which in this world would mean a high proportion of them would be martyrs). But that’s neither our world nor our government.
The debate about this concerns the extent of US government involvement with drug dealers, and the degree of US complicity in their activities.
- Often allies of dealers?
- Sometimes partners?
- Or is our government a prime mover in the drug trade?
In my non-expert opinion, the first is certain. The second probable; its frequency is the key (the more often, the more disturbing). The third very unlikely, IMO.
Note that large-scale drug traffic requires government corruption. That is, bribery of government officials — police, prosecutors, judges, legislators, and other officials. The massive profits of drug trafficking make this inevitable and unstoppable. Magnitudes matter here, as everywhere. A moderate degree of corruption is sustainable; at the other extreme, too much can bring a regime crashing down.
(2) Evidence: Prof Alfred W McCoy
Much of the research about the CIA’s role in the global drug trade comes from Alfred W. McCoy (History Prof at U of Wisconsin-Madison). Here are excerpts from his 1972 book, “The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia“. {This is an update to the original post}
The CIA became the vanguard of America’s anti-Communist crusade, and it dispatched small numbers of well-financed agents to every corner of the globe to mold local political situations in a fashion compatible with American interests. Practicing a ruthless form of clandestine realpolitik, its agents made alliances with any local group willing and able to stem the flow of “Communist aggression.” Although these alliances represent only a small fraction of CIA postwar operations, they have nevertheless had a profound impact on the international heroin trade. {page 6}
After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over twenty years, the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime ministers, topple governments, and crush revolutions. But US officials in Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium traffic a quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to official involvement. A Laotian or Vietnamese general who so much as whispers the word “neutralism” is likely to find himself on the next plane out of the country, but one who tells the international press about his role in the opium trade does not even merit a raised eyebrow.
However, American involvement has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have carried opium, and individual CIA agents have winked at the opium traffic. {page 282}
(3) Evidence: Report of the DoJ Inspector General
For an exhaustive analysis of the San Jose Mercury News’ claims see this report: US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General’s report dated December 1997. The conclusions appear below.
Conclusions of Inspector General Michael R. Bromwich
It is rare that an investigation of this magnitude is prompted by a series of newspaper articles. We spent over 15 months and significant resources investigating the allegations suggested by San Jose Mercury News articles in August 1996. We did so because the allegations resonated with a substantial number of people and fueled suspicion that our system of criminal justice was corrupted by foreign policy considerations in a manner that would be extremely shocking if true.
The allegations contained an extremely volatile mixture, linking the activities of the intelligence community, support of the Contras in Nicaragua (easily the most controversial foreign policy initiative of the 1980s), the crack cocaine explosion, and the devastation of many of our inner cities by the crack epidemic.
These allegations fed an already profound suspicion of the government that exists within our inner cities and sparked widespread belief that the Contras were permitted to create massive drug enterprises in pursuit of a foreign policy initiative. More relevant to our inquiry, the allegations suggested that the pursuit of the policy of aiding the Nicaraguan Contras resulted in the manipulation of the criminal justice system, the protection of certain individuals by the CIA, and the failure of the Department of Justice to pursue investigations and prosecutions of these persons even though they were engaged in substantial drug trafficking activities.
We found that the allegations contained in the original Mercury News articles were exaggerations of the actual facts. Our investigation involved detailed reviews of the investigations and prosecutions of the various individuals who were at the center of the allegations contained in the original articles — Danilo Blandon, Norwin Meneses, Ricky Ross, Ronald Lister, and others.
We found that although the investigations suffered from various problems of communication and coordination, their successes and failures were determined by the normal dynamics that affect the success of scores of investigations of high-level drug traffickers: the availability of credible informants, the ability to penetrate sophisticated narcotics distribution organizations with undercover agents, the ability to make seizures of narcotics and other physical evidence, the availability of resources necessary to pursue complex cases against the key figures in narcotics distribution enterprises, and the aggressiveness and judgments of law enforcement agents.
These factors, rather than anything as spectacular as a systematic effort by the CIA or any other intelligence agency to protect the drug trafficking activities of Contra supporters, determined what occurred in the cases we examined.
We also found that the claims that Blandon and Meneses were responsible for introducing crack cocaine into South Central Los Angeles and spreading the crack epidemic throughout the country were unsupported. Undoubtedly, Blandon and Meneses were significant drug dealers guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of countless drug users, as well as the communities in which those drug users lived, just as is the case with all drug dealers of any magnitude. They also contributed some money to the Contra cause.
But we did not find that their activities were responsible for the crack cocaine epidemic in South Central Los Angeles, much less the rise of crack throughout the nation, or that they were a significant source of support for the Contras. This is not to say that we did not find problems or ambiguities in the matters we examined.
- We found that Blandon received the benefit of a green card in a wholly improper manner.
- We found that during a period of time in the 1980s, the Justice Department was not certain whether it wanted to prosecute Meneses or use him as a cooperating witness to make cases against others.
- We found that part of the government was not anxious to have DEA agent Castillo openly probe the activities at Ilopango Airport because of sensitive covert operations there.
- We found that the CIA did in fact intervene in the Zavala case and may have played a role in having a sum of money returned to him.
Although these findings are troubling, they are a far cry from the type of broad manipulation and corruption of the federal criminal justice system suggested by the original allegations.
We are well aware of the furor that these allegations created in communities throughout the country. We also recognize that it is impossible to draw conclusions about these questions with absolute certainty because of the age of the cases involved, faded memories, the dispersion of witnesses and evidence, and the special interests of many of the people we interviewed. We are also realistic enough to recognize that the suspicion of federal law enforcement will not be extinguished by our report on these allegations, especially because there remain some unanswered questions, which are multiplied when the investigation takes place so long after the events being investigated.
Nevertheless, we believe that a full consideration of the results of our investigation will show that we have conducted an exhaustive review of these allegations and that our findings are supported by the evidence.
(4) Evidence: Report of the CIA Inspector General
The CIA IG also conducted an investigation:
- Overview of the investigation & conclusions
- The full report
- Statement of CIA IG to Congress on 16 March 1998
Excerpts from the conclusions:
No information has been found to indicate that CIA as an organization or its employees conspired with, or assisted, Contra-related organizations or individuals in drug trafficking to raise funds for the Contras or for any other purpose.
… No information has been found to indicate that other Contra organizations engaged in drug trafficking for fundraising or any other purpose, although individual members were alleged from time to time to be involved in drug trafficking.
… In 1984, CIA received allegations that five individuals associated with the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)/Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS) were engaged in a drug trafficking conspiracy with a known narcotics trafficker, Jorge Morales. CIA broke off contact with ARDE in October 1984, but continued to have contact through 1986-87 with four of the individuals involved with Morales.
And so forth, in a similar vein at great length.
(5) Other evidence
Here are some other sources of valuable data, although of widely varying reliability:
- An archive of the San Jose Mercury News articles, posted at Dark Alliance
- The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations, The National Security Archive of George Washington University — Much damning material
- “The CIA, Contras, Gangs, and Crack“, William Blum, Foreign Policy in Focus (published by the Institute for Policy Studies), November 1996
- An archive of links posted at the Serendipity website.
(6) For more information
See the FM reference page National Intelligence Estimates – an archive.
Posts about the CIA:
- The Plame Affair and the Decline of the State, 25 October 2005
- When will global oil production peak? Here is the answer!, 1 November 2007
- The new NIE, another small step in the Decline of the State, 10 December 2007
- A must-read book for any American interested in geopolitics, 5 March 2008 — “Legacy of Ashes”
- When will global oil production peak? Ask the CIA!, 1 May 2008
- Something every American should read, 25 May 2009 — About the CIA’s use of torture
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