America’s combination of hubris and paranoia produces many strange things — which we baffle our descendents — but the repeating debates in the form of “who lost China” must take the booby-prize.
“The Coming Failure On Iran“, Jackson Diehl (a deputy editor), Washington Post, 4 October 2009 — The title says it all. If Iran gets nukes, it’s our failure. Perhaps Obama’s failure (given the WaPo’s hawkishness, we can expect to read this soon).
Contents
- History
- Examples from today: Afghanistan is ours
- Imperial temptations (update)
- FM’s forecast and recommendations
- For More Information, and Afterword
(1) History
We’ve been down this path before. Such reasoning did terrible damage to us then, and might again today.
The first assault on the {State} Department came early in 1950, and it came in the Republican Saturday Evening Post in a series of articles which provided that material for the ensuing Republican attacks upon the Department and the Democrats. Rather than trying to hold the line for sane and thoughtful assessments, an important organ like the Post was looking for conspiratorial answers, and it had exactly the right author, former Captain Joseph Alsop, now back in America, bitter over our failure to support Chiang and the full Chiang line, anxious to get even.
The title of the three-part series was “Why We Lost China,” and it was not a serious bit of journalism, a view of a decaying feudal society, but rather a re-creation of the Chennault-Chiang line. It set the tone, though slightly loftier than some successors, for the conspiracy view of the fall of China: the blame was placed on the State Department.
The title is worth remembering: “Why We Lost China.” China was ours, and it was something to lose; it was an assumption which was to haunt foreign policy makers for years to come. Countries were ours, we could lose them; a President was faced with the blackmail of losing a country.
— From David Halberstan’s The Best and the Brightest
This sparked off the witch hunts for communists in the government, arts, and elsewhere. While there were Soviet agents and sympathizers, the mania quickly spread beyond rational limits. The State Department was the major victim, with its experienced China experts purged — and the lasting lesson taught to our FSO’s that accurate reporting risked destruction of one’s career. Parroting the party line of whoever occupied the White House meant security and success. That scars from that era remain today (as we saw in the lies leading to the Iraq War), as no Secretary of State has taken the time and energy to rebuild the Department.
It is hubris (pride on a scale risking destruction) to think that the United States can determine the path taken by major nations. That’s the insanity implicit in Diehl’s op-ed. India, Pakistan, and Israel got the bomb — but it’s our fault if Iran gets one too.
America will be a far stronger nation when we laugh at such writing. Such thinking is flawed both morally and geopolitically.
(2) Examples from today: Afghanistan is ours
These authors must have a tin ear not to hear the historical echos, saying that nations are “ours.”
- “Still Ours to Lose: Afghanistan on the Brink “, Council on Foreign Relations”, Barnett R. Rubin (New York U),21 September 2006
- “Lose Afghanistan, Lose Pakistan, Lose Iran, Lose It All“, James Lewis, The American Thinker, 6 September 2009 — “That is why Afghanistan and its neighbor Pakistan, AfPak, is a historic watershed moment. If we lose in Afghanistan and the Taliban win, and they can combine with their brethren in Pakistan to get control over a nuclear weapon, and we will see an Al Qaeda look-alike with nukes.
- “If We Lose Afghanistan“, Washington Post editorial, 6 October 2009 — “Yes, al-Qaeda would return. But that’s just the beginning.”
(3) Imperial temptations
Jack Snyder explained this well in “Imperial temptations“, The National Interest, Spring 2003. I strongly recommend reading it. Here is a brief excerpt:
Every major historical instance of imperial overstretch has been propelled by arguments that security could best be achieved through further expansion — “myths of empire” I have called them. …
Falling Dominoes
Another common myth of empire is the famous domino theory. According to this conception, small setbacks at the periphery of the empire will tend to snowball into an unstoppable chain of defeats that will ultimately threaten the imperial core. Consequently, empires must fight hard to prevent even the most trivial setbacks. Various causal mechanisms are imagined that might trigger such cascades.
- The opponent will seize ever more strategic resources from these victories, tipping the balance of forces and making further conquests easier.
- Vulnerable defenders will lose heart.
- Allies and enemies alike will come to doubt the empire’s resolve to fight for its commitments.
- An empire’s domestic political support will be undermined.
- Above all, lost credibility is the ultimate domino.
Such reasoning has been nearly universal among overstretched empires. For example…
(4) FM’s forecast and recommendations
(a) About Afghanistan
From a long-term perspective, it makes little difference what we do in Afghanistan (as our efforts after the invasion made little difference in Iraq). It will remain a weak state for the foreseeable future, but not substantially destabilize its neighbors.
(b) About Pakistan
The Taliban will not nuke anyone. They will neither concquor Pakistan nor get any nukes. They might obtain formal local control in some regions, and perhaps become formal players in the national government. No India-Pakistan atomic war, or even serious conventional war.
(c) About Iran
A prediction (aka guess): Neither the US nor Israel will attack Iran. We may levy sanctions, but they will be even less effective than those against South Africa. Esp if still in place when the global economy recovers and oil prices scream higher.
FM’s recommendations:
- Make a maximus effort to get better intelligence about Iran.
- Attempt to develop links to factions inside Iran.
- Keep the public dialog cool; constant waving of the big stick makes us look weak.
- Use diplomatic tools to encourage and discourage Iran (to join the nonproliferation club and end its nuke program, respectively)
What if Iran builds nukes? Probably nothing. There is no evidence that its generals and senior leaders are crazy (or religious fanatics on the necessary scale). And only crazy people would use nukes, as the result is certain destruction of their nation. Note that no one person can employ a nation’s nukes. They’re not kept in the President’s desk drawer, either in the US or Iran.
(5a) For more information from the FM site
To read other articles about these things, see the following:
Reference pages about other topics appear on the right side menu bar, including About the FM website page.
Some of the posts on the FM website about our hubris, and its effects:
- America’s Most Dangerous Enemy, 1 March 2006
- America’s grand strategy: lessons from our past, 30 June 2008
- America’s grand strategy, now in shambles, 2 July 2008
- President Grant warns us about the dangers of national hubris, 7 July 2008
- The world has changed, but many Americans retain their dreams of hegemony, 28 August 2008
- The King of Brobdingnag comments on America’s grand strategy, 18 November 2008
(5b) Afterword
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