One of the top sources of insight about modern maritime strategy is Galrahn at Information Dissemination. He has advice for those watching US forces in the Middle East:
Amateurs watch the carriers; professionals watch the Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs). Amphibious Ships are the Dreadnoughts of the modern maritime era.
How can this be true, when our carrier strike groups are the kings of the sea? Why should we instead watch the movements of ships half the size of a super-carrier?
Contents
- The new world of maritime strategy
- Descriptions of Expeditionary Ships
- Navies are putting these insights into action
- For more information about the US Navy
1. The new world of maritime strategy
What is an ESG? (from Global Security.org, slightly edited)
An expeditionary strike group is made up of amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. An expeditionary strike group could include amphibious ships, a destroyer, cruiser, frigate, attack submarine and a P-3C Orion land-based aircraft. This allows Navy and Marine Corps forces to launch Marines and landing craft as warships and submarines strike inland targets with missiles and shells. Currently, each amphibious ready group is built around an amphibious assault ship, a dock landing ship and an amphibious transport dock.
In several lengthy posts Galrahn explains how the world has changed from the post-WWII era. Here are two excerpts from “Sell The Strategy to Expand the Fleet“, 25 July 2008:
The Navy, indeed Congress and the American people in general, are under the misguided perception that the AEGIS battleship is the dreadnought of our era. This is absolutely false, and would only be true if the Navy was facing a peer competitor. The Dreadnought of the modern maritime era is the Amphibious Ship, and what we call the mothership; essentially the weapon system and logistical enabler capable of saturating the maritime domain with manned and unmanned systems to USE command of the sea, and influence that domain throughout the littorals and into land.
From “In No Case Can We Exercise Control by Battleships Alone…, 29 July 2008:
Since the end of the cold war, the United States Navy has achieved Command of the Sea in the spirit of Mahan, or controlled communications in the spirit of Corbett. This achievement was made possible by decisive victory, but not a decisive victory of war, rather the decisive victory of the cold war. The great question that has plagued the US Navy since the achievement of this decisive victory has not been how to achieve control of maritime communications against competitors, rather how to USE the control the US Navy has achieved.
… Today, the average age of the 86 battleships — 22 CGs {cruisers}, 62 DDG-51s {destroyers}, and 2 DDG-1000s {next-gen destroyers} — the US Navy has or is building is a combined average age younger than the aircraft in the US Navy aviation inventory, younger than the submarine force, younger than the amphibious fleet, younger than the logistics force, and younger the aircraft carrier fleet. It seems strange then that this week the big debate in Congress is not how the United States will leverage the US Navy to forward the foreign policy of the United States by managing peacetime, rather which new battleships the US Navy will build to further increase the command of the sea the Navy already enjoys today.
… Command of the Sea exists only where the US Navy is present, and let us not confuse scouting with unmanned technology as the same as presence. Presence requires manpower to exercise control in peacetime, which is why the ability to influence, and more specifically USE Command of the Sea requires forward deployed manpower in sufficient numbers to execute such influence. When Command of the Sea is not challenged, which in today’s maritime environment describes almost all points of the maritime domain, the entire maritime domain is available to be leveraged as a base of operations by which to execute strategy. To us this means there must be a commitment to building flexible forces for leveraging the sea as base to connect with the non-integrated gaps, and in this way US Navy can position itself to better manage the maritime challenges of peacetime.
In every maritime era there is always one type of ship that determines the capability of naval forces to execute maritime strategy. In the sixteenth century galeasses and heavy galleys represented the dominate ship of the era. As the age of sail emerged, the Royal Navy became the dominate force by putting sails on all of its battleships, which ultimately became the dominate vessel at sea until the mid nineteenth century, when the armored ship replaced the age of sail battleship as the dominate weapon. Eventually the combination of armor and larger guns evolved the battleship again, until all ships were completely rendered irrelevant all at once by HMS Dreadnought, a technological evolution that combined armor, firepower, mobility, speed, and the flexibility to maneuver heavy gunfire and fight on multiple axis. In the mid 20th century, the aircraft carrier became the dominate platform, and combined with the nuclear powered submarine held the position of the most influential vessel at sea until the end of the cold war.
However, with the end of the cold war, it is time to ask what is the dominate ship to execute maritime strategy in this era. Taking a broad view around the world, we note that almost every nation except the United States appears to have answered this question.
… The US Navy finds itself at a major crossroads of history. At this point in time, and for only the next 12-15 years, the US Navy has superior battle-fleet capabilities to maintain complete control of the sea, and none of the 86 battleships widely recognized as the most powerful warships in the world need replacement during the entirety of that time. At the same time, the amphibious force continues to shrink, and the small combatant force (what Corbett calls a cruiser, known as the modern frigate) is completely ignored. While Lockheed Martin and the US Navy, to the disgrace of maritime terminology, insist the Littoral Combat Ship is a surface combatant, it is not. By every strategic and maritime definition used for the last several centuries the LCS is an unrated ship of the flotilla, any insistence otherwise is a demonstration in ones own ignorance. Under such misrepresentation we should be counting MCMs as surface combatants.
2. Descriptions of Expeditionary Ships
These are quotes from Global Security; click on the links for more information.
Amphibious Transport, Dock: LPD-17 San Antonio class (LPD: Landing Platform Dock):
Amphibious Transport Docks include several classes of ships: LDP’s (Landing Dock Platform), LSD’s (Landing Ship Dock), and the new LPD’s. They transport and land Marines, their equipment and supplies by embarked landing craft or amphibious vehicles augmented by helicopters in amphibious assault. These versatile ships perform the mission of amphibious transports, amphibious cargo ships and the older LSDs by incorporating both a flight deck and a well deck that can be ballasted and deballasted to support landing craft.
Helicopter amphibious assault ship: LHA-1 Tarawa class (LHA: Landing Helicopter Assault)
The primary war-fighting mission of the LHA-1 Tarawa class is to land and sustain United States Marines on any shore during hostilities. The ships serve as the centerpiece of a multi-ship Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). Some 3,000 Sailors and Marines contribute to a forward-deployed ARG composed of approximately 5,000 personnel. Nearly three football fields in length and 20 stories high, the ship’s two-acre flight deck, 18,519 square-foot hangar deck, and 250-foot well deck enable an embarked landing force to accomplish its mission around the globe.
The ships are designed to maintain what the Marine Corps calls “tactical integrity” – getting a balanced force to the same place at the same time. One LHA can carry a complete Marine battalion, along with the supplies and equipment needed in an assault, and land them ashore by either helicopter or amphibious craft. …They incorporate the best design features and capabilities of several amphibious assault ships currently in service: the Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA), and Dock Landing Ship (LSD).
- These ships have the general profile of an aircraft carrier. ..
- They can support a 35-aircraft complement …
- The LHA’s full length flight deck can handle 10 helicopters simultaneously, as well as HARRIER jump-jet aircraft …
- There is a well deck in the stem of the ship for a number of amphibious assault craft, both displacement hull and air cushion.
- Very complete hospital and mortuary facilities include 17 ICU beds, 4 operating rooms, 300 beds …
Helicopter amphibious assault ship: LHD-1 Wasp class (LHD: Landing Helicopter Dock)
The Wasp-class are the largest amphibious ships in the world. WASP class ships are the first to be specifically designed to accommodate the AV-8B Harrier jump jet and the LCAC hovercraft, along with the full range of Navy and Marine helicopters, conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles to support a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of 2,000 Marines. The ships also carry some of the most sophisticated communications, command and control capabilities afloat, along with state of the art electronic systems and defensive weaponry.
The LHD is an improved follow-on to the five ship Tarawa-class LHAs, sharing the basic hull and engineering plant. The LHD l has an enhanced well deck, enabling it to carry three LCACs (vice one LCAC in the LHAs). The flight deck and elevator scheme is also improved, which allows the ship to carry two more helicopters than its predecessor, the LHA.
3. Navies are putting these insights into action
Navys around the world are realizing this, and re-configuring their fleets for the new century.
“Warfare ‘Renaissance’ – Expeditionary Capabilities Drive Procurement“, Christopher P. Cavas, Defense News, 3 April 2006 — Excerpt:
One word captures current events in navies around the world: expeditionary.
“There is unquestionably a renaissance in expeditionary naval warfare worldwide,” said Bob Work, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel who keeps tabs on naval developments for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. “Most navies are giving up surface combatants and submarines to improve their capability in naval expeditionary warfare,” he said. “There is a resurgence, an unbelievable upkick in the number of amphibious warfare ships being pursued by nations.”
The trend is taking place in navies big and small, east and west. Various types of amphibious ships are being contemplated, on order or under construction for many navies, whether or not they have operated similar warships. Even more traditional warship types such as frigates are being designed with large command centers able to host joint coalition commanders, and one Danish design adds a large roll-on/roll-off deck to the standard frigate configuration.
“The good thing about expeditionary ships is they can be used for a lot of different kinds of missions,” said Eric Wertheim, editor of the bi-annual “Combat Fleets of the World” international compendium. … “It’s also a lot less militaristic to call it a ‘multipurpose support ship,'” he added. “Warships in a lot of ways are becoming less warship and more an instrument of multinational use. They become an instrument of diplomacy in unified task forces and coalition operations.”
… LPDs, along with larger LHD amphibious assault ships, feature floodable well decks able to operate small boats or landing craft. Both types can embark fully equipped combat troops and their equipment. Big-deck LHDs can operate and support helicopters, tiltrotor aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and vertical-takeoff-or-landing jets. LPDs in general are only able to refuel aviation assets and carry fewer troops.
“LPD: The New Dreadnought?“, Robert Farley (assistant professor, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, U Kentucky), posted at Lawyers, Guns, and Money, 14 April 2006 — Excerpt:
Another interesting article in the April 3 Defense News concerns the increasing focus of the world’s navies on “expeditionary” ships, like LPDs, LHDs, LCCs, LHAS, command ships, and so forth. Broadly, this group includes just about any ship that is designed to manage, project, and protect ground expeditions as a primary mission. These ships are large, expensive, tend to carry helicopters, and usually have the capability to deliver and keep supplied a contingent of ground forces.
- The USN … currently has 12 amphibious assault ships (Tarawa and Wasp classes- LHA), and a dozen amphibious transport docks (LPDs).
- The Royal Navy has one LHA and two LPDs,
- the French Navy has recently commissioned the first of the Mistral class, a large amphibious command ship. …
- The Dutch commissioned Rotterdam, a 17000 ton LPD, in 1998.
- Spain has built two large LPDs and is building a big LHA, and
- Italians are building three LPDs, and
- Portugal is building one.
- Canada has expressed an interest in purchasing one of the US San Antonio class LPDs, roughly at 25000 ton ship. …
- India in attempting to buy a US LPD, and
- Japan operates three small LPDs.
- South Korea, believe it or not, is building a 19000 ton LHA.
- Malaysia is considering building two new 18000 ton LHAs.
As major warfare operations have increasingly become coalition expeditionary efforts, states with small militaries want a way to contribute. An amphibious assault ship gives a country like Spain, the Netherlands, or Canada a way to involve itself in an expeditionary operation without being excessively dependent on one of the major naval powers. Like their armies, the navies of these countries are becoming less focused on the traditional forms of territorial defense and more on the need for policing, peacekeeping, and other forms of expeditionary warfare.
4. For more information about the US Navy
Articles from other sources:
- For in-depth coverage of these issues, see Galrahn’s work at Information Dissemination. His blogroll has many other sites of interest discussing these matters.
- “Providing for the Common Defense: Four Percent for Freedom,” Jim Talent and Mackenzie Eaglen, Heritage Foundation, 13 December 2007 – An example of those calling for Defense spending at 4% of GDP.
- Upcoming FY2009 Debate For the Navy, Informatino Dissemination, 8 July 2008
Articles on the FM website:
- DoD Death Spiral – the US Navy version, 31 January 2008
- Update to the “Navy Death Spiral”, 22 April 2008
- A lesson in war-mongering: “Maritime Strategy in an Age of Blood and Belief”, 8 July 2008
- A step towards building a Navy we can afford, 16 July 2008
To see all articles on the FM sites on this topic: Naval warfare and strategy.
