How bad is our bloat of generals? How does it compare with other armies?

Summary:  As a followup to yesterday’s powerful rant by Richard A Pawloski (Captain, USMC, retired) about our bloated corps of senior generals, today we look at the actual numbers.  They show that Pawloski understated the situation, and that only many more rants can reform our military. It’s not just expensive, and detrimental to their effectiveness, but also might become a risk to the Republic.

“In place of that optimax of 5% {officers} that the MI never can reach, many armies in the past commissioned 10% of their number, or even 15%! This sounds like a fairy tale but it was a fact, especially during the 20th century. What kind of an army has more officers than corporals? And more noncoms than privates! An army organized to lose wars — if history means anything. An army that is mostly red tape and overhead, most of whose soldiers never fight.”

— From Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers (1959). Heinlein was Annapolis class of 1929, discharged in 1934 due to TB.

Contents

1. About our bloated roster of generals
2. Our economy has not grown, but our officers corps has
3. Comparing our Army to successful & unsuccessful past armies
4. Research about our officer corps
5. For More Information

(1)  About our massive, bloated roster of senior officers

What will all those generals and admirals do with our vast military and intelligence forces? No other nations appear interested in playing war. In fact, the primary military goal of our opponents is defending power-projection off their borders — or against US attacks.

What our generals cannot do is win modern wars, as our defeats in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan prove beyond doubt.  Despite great efforts, 4GW (brought to maturity at the close of WWII by Mao) remains an unsolved mystery to our generals.

But there are many things they can do at home in America. See the military’s increased role in disaster relief and patrolling the borders.  And there are vistas beyond those small projects.  History shows that generals often feel well-suited to lead their nations in many ways beyond defending the State against external foes. We may be ready for their leadership, especially if tough times arrive.  Polls show that the military are the only agency of government in which modern America has confidence (followed by their cousins in the security services).

It’s the prussian-ization of America.  It’s a pre-fascist trait, one of many appearing in America today. For more about our fading confidence in Republican institutions, and rising faith in generals:

1. A look at the future of the Republic: we will choose leaders that we trust, 14 May 2012
2. Gallup’s polls show who we trust, pointing to a dark future for our Republic, 15 August 2012

(2)  Our economy hasn;t grown. Our officers corps has prospered.

“General and Flag Officer Requirements”

Excerpt from testimony of Ben Freeman (Project on Government Oversight).
Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel, 14 September 2011.

Since World War II ended, the number of general or flag officers per uniformed personnel has been increasing — reaching an all-time high in 2010 of nearly 7 general and flag officers per every 10,000 uniformed personnel. This is an increase of more than 0.5 a general or flag officer per 10,000 uniformed personnel than when the war in Afghanistan began; 1.5 more than when the Cold War ended; and 5 more than when World War II ended, as Figure 1 shows.

There has been a fairly constant increase in the ratio of general and flag officers compared to all other uniformed personnel since the end of the Cold War, even though the military underwent a contraction during the 1990s and an expansion following the onset of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As of April 2011, there were 964 general and flag officers. By comparison, at the end of the Cold War the U.S. had 1,017 general and flag officers. Thus, there has only been a nominal decrease in general and flag officers even though the number of active duty uniformed personnel has decreased by roughly 28%, the Air Force flies 35% fewer planes, and the Navy has 46% fewer ships in its fleet. In sum, the number of general and flag officers has barely fallen despite double-digit percentage drops in the size of the forces they command.

This trend towards a top-heavy force structure continued during the post-Cold War drawdown from 1991 to 2001. During this time period, the DoD cut just over 600,000 uniformed personnel — a decline of approximately 30% — but only 146 general and flag officer positions were eliminated — a decline of less than 15%. Thus, the remaining general and flag officers were responsible for commanding far fewer personnel when the war in Afghanistan.

GROWING NUMBER OF 3- AND 4-STAR GENERAL & FLAG OFFICERS

The increase in the very top brass — 3- and 4-star officers — further illustrates star creep within the DoD. The number of 3- and 4-star general and flag officers has increased since the Cold War ended, as depicted in Figure 3. In 1991, there were 157 3- and 4-stars. By April 2011 they had swollen to 194—an increase of 24%. We have more 3- and 4-stars now that at any point since the Cold War ended. Since 1991, no DoD personnel group has grown at a faster rate. From 1991 through April 2011, officer ranks shrank by more than 56,000 (19%) and enlisted personnel decreased by nearly half a million (30%).

… The rise of the top brass during the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to other DoD personnel is noteworthy. From 2001 to 2011 the number of officers per 3- and 4-star general or flag officers dropped by 172 and the number of enlisted personnel per 3- and 4-star officer dropped by 1,253.

…The rise of the top brass during the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan compared to other DoD personnel is noteworthy. From 2001 to 2011 the number of officers per 3- and 4-star general or flag officers dropped by 172 and the number of enlisted personnel per 3- and 4-star officer dropped by 1,253.

Figure 5 compares the growth of 3- and 4-star officers to other categories of military personnel. The 3- and 4-star ranks have increased twice as fast as 1- and 2-star general and flag officers, 3X as fast as the increase in all officers, and almost 10x as fast as the increase in enlisted personnel. If you imagine it visually, the shape of U.S. military personnel has shifted from looking like a pyramid to beginning to look more like a skyscraper (i.e. higher ranks having fewer lower ranking personnel under them rather than more).

STAR CREEP ACROSS THE SERVICES SINCE 9/11

While star creep is the general trend across the military, there have been considerable and counterintuitive variances across the services since September 2001. Figure 6 tracks the number of general and flag officers per 10,000 uniformed personnel in each branch of the military from September 2001 to April 2011.  The Marines have the fewest generals and are also the leanest force (but still top heavy compared to historical Marine force compositions), averaging just over 4 generals for every 10,000 uniformed personnel. At the other end of the spectrum, the Air Force is the most top-heavy branch with almost 10

generals for every 10,000 airmen. In other words, the Air Force is 2.5X as top-heavy as the Marines, and in absolute terms they have more than 3X as many generals as the Marines. With 312 general officers, the Air Force is tied with the Army for most general and flag officers of any service, even though the Air Force has approximately 237,000 fewer uniformed personnel than the Army.

… THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF STAR CREEP

For taxpayers concerned with an ever-expanding DoD budget, star creep adds to DoD costs. This is due in large degree to the costs that that surround general and flag officers, such as staff, contractors, and travel, which tends to increase significantly with higher ranks.

… The direct compensation cost of officers also increases with their rank. In just basic pay, when a colonel (Navy captain) with over 20 years experience becomes a brigadier general (rear admiral – lower half), their pay jumps from $110,674 to $138,488, an increase of more than $27,000 per year.30 Costs increase further when other parts of an officer’s compensation package are included, such as allowances for subsistence, housing, and tax benefits. A major general (rear admiral) with 30 years of service and a family of four receives a compensation package worth more than $206,000 annually, and if they are promoted to a three-star lieutenant general (vice admiral) their compensation package increases to over $225,000.

——————— End excerpt ———————

(3)  Compare our Army to successful & unsuccessful armies of the past

Officer Manning: Armies of the past.
Slides from a presentation by Donald E. Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired.

He makes a powerful case that larger ratios of officers to enlisted ranks makes an army more effective.  That’s unfortunate, for our military has gone the other way.

(4) More research about our officer corps

(a)  About inflation in our officers corps

1. “Officer Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer and to Military Effectiveness“, Project on Military Procurement, October 1987.
2. “More Brass, More Bucks: Officer Inflation in Today’s Military“, Project On Government Oversight, 1 March 1998.
3. “General and Flag Officer Authorizations for the Active and Reserve Components: a Comparative and Historical Analysis“, Library of Congress, December 2007.

(b)  Articles about this problem with our senior officers

1. “Generals Wary of Move to Cut Their Ranks“, New York Times, 26 August 2010.
2. “The Pentagon’s Biggest Overrun: Way Too Many Generals“, Dina Rasor, Truth-Out, 5 January 2012.

(c)  Government Reports

1. General and Flag Officer Requirements Are Unclear Based on DOD’s 2003 Report to Congress, Government Accounting Office, April 2004.
2. DOD Could Make Greater Use of Existing Legislative Authority to Manage General and Flag Officer Careers, Government Accounting Office, 23 September 2004.
3. Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency, 21 May 2008.

(5)  For more information

If you liked this post, like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.  See the posts listed at America’s military, and our national defense strategy. See these posts about the skill and integrity of our senior military leaders:

1. The Core Competence of America’s Military Leaders.
2. The moral courage of our senior generals, or their lack of it.
3. About military leaders in the 21st century: “Theirs Is to Reason Why”.
4. Preface to Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s Centurions.
5. Training of officers, a key step for the forging of an effective military force.
6. Dragging American Military Culture into the 21st Century.
7. Leadership in action: when resource constraints meet conspicuous consumption, we just ignore the problem.
8. Careerism and Psychopathy in the US Military leadership. By GI Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired).
9. Do we need so many and such well-paid generals and admirals? Richard A Pawloski (Captain, USMC, retired).
10. How bad is our bloat of generals? How does it compare with other armies?
11. A step to getting an effective military. We might need it soon.
12. How officers adapt to life in the Pentagon: they choose the blue pill.
13. Why does the military continue to grow? Because the tail wags the dog. By Danny Hundley (Colonel, USMC, retired).
14. Overhauling The Officer Corps. By David Evans.