{Military reform} is not attacking the people in the Army, many of which sacrifice so much so many times. It is not the people, the vast majority which really adhere to the values of the services; it is the systems that manage them that are so bad and out of date. A lot of people succeed with selfless service despite the personnel system.
— From “Leading the Human Dimension Out of a Legacy of Failure” by G.I. Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired) and Donald Vandergriff, chapter 3 of America’s Defense Meltdown (2008).
Summary: Yesterday’s post explained how the US Army’s leadership problem grow so bad. Today Don Vandergriff gives the good news, discussing reforms under way today — and more powerful reforms for the future. He concludes by asking why not take these steps now, rather than waiting until after a serious defeat.
What’s being done today?
We see what we call “beer can personnel management”: The operant idea is to reach into the stack (i.e. human resources) of cold beer sitting in the refrigerator, grab one, slam it down, crumple up the beer can (i.e. the individual), toss it out, and reach for another. The cycle is repeated over and over taking an irreparable toll on individuals, the personnel systems and operations. {op. cit.}
The army has several experiments with reforms under way. But it’s only slow progress.
Even as late as 2011, Scott Halter (Lt. Colonel, Army), a successful Aviation Battalion Commander who practices Mission Command and Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBTE; details here), wrote “What is an Army but Soldiers: A Critical Assessment of the Army’s Human Capital Management System” (Military Review, Jan-Feb 2012) describing recommendations of the Secretary of the Army’s Human Dimension Task Force to reform the Army’s personnel system. Results of their work? Nothing!”
One promising tool is 360 degree assessments (aka multi source feedback). Used by the Wehrmacht in WWII, they’re based on work going back to the T-groups devised in 1914. Today the Army experiments with this on a small scale. Too many senior officers fear that the fastest “water walkers” would get exposed by it. I know guys that I commanded companies beside who were hated by their senior NCOs and Lieutenants, but did well — some making it through brigade command to general. Great politicians, but their soldiers knew the truth.
Another vital reform is changing from individual replacements of soldiers (IRS) to rotating entire units off the front line for rest and rebuilding. It’s a vital step to maintain the cohesion of fighting units. Marshall devised the IRS in early WWII; it quickly broke down, and has produced ill results in every war since. The Army has often attempted this reform, so far always unsuccessfully. For an introduction see this 2004 article in Military Review. The key conclusions, discussing the Army’s most ambitious attempt at unit rotation (aka UMS):
The Army considered it essential that the command climate in the unit and above the unit support the COHORT model. COHORT worked best when an entire division, its home base, and its supporting and higher headquarters supported the idea of stabilized units.
… COHORT failed because the entire Army did not support it. A small but influential group of advocates in senior positions initiated UMS but it became so complicated and contentious that when its advocates left the Army, it died.
The demise of COHORT, however, does not mean that unit stabilization is impossible. If the Army heeds lessons learned from COHORT and current proposals to modify the personnel management and training systems, it might be possible finally to do this right.
The Army is trying again, but so far this is reform in name only. The officer and senior NCO corps are not aligned with it. Mandatory career schools are not aligned with it.
What the Army needs.
Reform is complex not just because it’s difficult, but due to the many second and third order effects that must be understood for success. There is much we can do now, such as reforming the 1980 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA, mandating the “up or out” system), gradually reducing the number of officers (especially at the top), and improving the Army’s education and training programs.
In Path to Victory I proposed that leaders would command in annual war games, free play “force on force” exercises short of combat, which would count toward promotions or reliefs. Also a smaller officer corps could spend more time on officer development. Our captains command to early and too briefly to be effective. Most will tell they were great, but then turn around and said they did not “get it” until they were almost done. Also, they only know what they know.
But piecemeal reforms might not work. Reforms must go across the board, or what is called Parallel Evolution, changing several institutions side by side at the same time. As described in my March 2005 PowerPoint presentation:
The Army will fail if it tries to change its parts (institutions) in isolation without changing the culture, particularly in regards to providing the climate to nurture adaptive leaders and innovators.
Solution: “Parallel evolution”, organizational evolution as a holistic problem …
Reform will require broad support not just within the military but also in the civilian DoD staff and Congress. Especially Congress, by changing DOPMA 1980 and reducing the number of positions mandated by law (e.g., joint services, acquisition programs).
What’s the alternative to reform?
If we continue our current aggressive global strategy of occupations while executing the façade called COIN, eventually, we will be unable to retreat to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), while our generals oversee platoon and company fights against an enemy who possesses very little tangibles, but still has heart. We currently have strategic defeats concealed by meaningless tactical victories.
Eventually, we will suffer not just hollow victories (e.g., Desert Storm, the brilliant initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan Oct-Dec 01-brilliant counter offensive turned into a costly occupation)) but a major setback. Why must we wait for a Task Force Smith (Battle of Osan, 1950) or Kasserine Pass (1943) to reform? Prussian reformed only after Jena-Auerstadt (Oct 1806) , but we can learn from their experience instead of repeating it.
The Army can reform. We should start today.
About the author
See the bio of Donald Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired) on the FM authors’ page.
For More Information
Posts about the US officer corps:
- About military leaders in the 21st century: “Theirs Is to Reason Why”.
- Preface to Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s Centurions.
- Training of officers, a key step for the forging of an effective military force.
- Dragging American Military Culture into the 21st Century.
- Leadership in action: when resource constraints meet conspicuous consumption, we just ignore the problem.
- Do we need so many and such well-paid generals and admirals? By Richard A Pawloski (Captain, USMC, retired).
- How officers adapt to life in the Pentagon: they choose the blue pill.
- Overhauling The Officer Corps. By David Evans (Lt. Colonel, USMC, retired).
