Summary: The Wall Street Journal brings a rare bit of good news about our foreign wars, a story acknowledging our foe’s military skill. We should applaud recognition of reality, however belated, as a step forward. With luck next might come awareness that their skill results in part from our tactics. {2nd of 2 posts today.}
“People, ideas and hardware, in that order!”
— the late John R. Boyd (Colonel, USAF), quoted in Chet Richard’s Certain to Win.
This week the Wall Street Journal published a rare perspective on our jihadist enemies: “How Islamic State’s Win in Ramadi Reveals New Weapons, Tactical Sophistication and Prowess” — “Examination of Ramadi’s downfall reflects complex plans and new weapons.”
U.S. defense chief Ash Carter has blamed Ramadi’s fall mainly on Iraqi forces’ lack of will to fight. But Islamic State’s battlefield performance suggests the terrorist group’s tactical sophistication is growing — a development the Iraqis and the U.S.-led coalition have so far failed to counter, said Iraqi officials, former U.S. officials and military analysts studying the organization.
An examination of how Ramadi fell indicates that Islamic State commanders executed a complex battle plan that outwitted a greater force of Iraqi troops as well as the much-lauded, U.S.-trained special-operations force known as the Golden Division, which had been fighting for months to defend the city. Islamic State commanders evaded surveillance and airstrikes to bring reinforcements to its front lines in western Iraq. The group displayed a high degree of operational security by silencing its social media and propaganda teams during the Ramadi surge.
The group also churned out dozens of formidable new weapons by converting captured U.S. military armored vehicles designed to be impervious to small-arms fire into megabombs with payloads equal to the force of the Oklahoma City bombing. Over the three-day surge in Ramadi, Islamic State fighters launched at least 27 such vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, or Vbieds, that destroyed Iraq security forces’ defensive perimeters and crumbled multistory buildings.
Military analysts said the new formidable weapon was the latest development showing how the group appears to be learning from battlefield defeats like the one in Kobani, Syria, last summer in pursuit of its goal to control the Sunni-majority areas of Syria and Iraq.
“It’s very frustrating,” said Bill Roggio, senior fellow at the Defense of Democracies think tank and managing editor of the Long War Journal, which chronicles the U.S. war on terror. “These guys are showing a good degree of tactical awareness.”
Our military and civilian experts attributed our foes’ victories to their evil tactics (terrorism), to their religion, to our allies’ weakness, and to our virtue (e.g., reluctance to kill civilians). They seldom gave much credit to our foes’ competence, adaptability, and ability to innovate — all supposed to be American’s advantages vs. foreigners.
This denigration of our foes has been a consistent aspect of our post-9/11 wars. They “are hard dead-enders” (SecDef Rumsfeld, March 2002). They are “criminals … who are willing to be guns for hire” and “foreigners who have come in small numbers”” (Major General David Petraeus of the 101st Airborne, November 2003).
Only slowly have we recognized the competence of their leaders and dedication of their troops. Even then we attribute these to the remnant of Saddham’s officer corps — disbanded 12 years ago. To people like our officers. It’s too disturbing to credit the militia leaders who, lacking the formal education we prize above all things, learned their lessons on the battlefield — and win without our technology and equipment.
Why they learn faster than us
Charlie Winter, a researcher who studies extremist groups at Quilliam, a London think tank {said} “They displayed admirable operational security … They understand the element of surprise. And they understand how [the coalition] can track them.”
My very first post 12 years ago explained how an insurgency brings into play a “Darwinian ratchet,” in which our efforts in effect empower the insurgency. Not just spurring recruitment (as many saw), but forcing improvement in their leadership and methods. The US military machine relentlessly prunes our foes of the slow and stupid. Only the best survive. It’s one of the fundamental dynamics of our post-9/11 wars. As I wrote in March (also citing others’ work on this)…
We’re all familiar with how this works with bacteria. Administer antibiotics in non-lethal doses and soon you have a colony of drug-resistant bacteria. It works with people, too. The security services cull the pack of insurgents, eliminating the slow and stupid. This clears space for the “best” to rise in authority, those most able to survive, recruit, and train new ranks of more effective insurgents. An insurgency with shallow roots can be destroyed. If not destroyed, then evolution can occur. The more severe the efforts at exterminating the insurrection, the more capable the survivors.
Hence the familiar activity pattern of a rising sine wave: successes by the security forces, a pause in activity, followed by another wave of activity – but bigger and more effective.
This locks us into a Red Queen’s race, so we must run ever faster just to stay abreast of our enemies in the Long War. Insurgents prove more resilient than we expect, so we kill more locals and destroy more of their infrastructure. Our actions recruit more — and more effective — jihadists and further alienate the local population.
The “Darwinian ratchet” was a new idea in military theory when I wrote about it in 2003-2005. How is it possible that we still don’t understand it in 2015? As the following excerpts show, it’s been often mentioned by military and civilian experts. Can you explain our refusal to learn except by willful blindness?
The last point shows the dark thread connecting our failures since 9/11: our FAILure to learn from experience. Some of this results from our hubris, unwarranted confidence that our military is the best in the world (see here). Some from the fact that our foes are in many ways the opposite of our military, and therefore must be less competent.
Hubris is among the most expensive of luxuries.
More good news (file under recognition of the obvious)
“My first company commander told me that there’s two ways to learn: blunt trauma and mindless repetition.” — Mike Few (Major, US Army, Retired).
A gentle debunking of the fear mongerers: “How Much Does ISIS Really Threaten America?” by Alex Ward in today’s The National Interest. How sad that we need such articles 14 years after 9/11. The long war might teach us that the two sins God always punishes are slow and stupid.
For More Information
If you liked this post, like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter. See all posts about our officer corps, and these about the long war…
- America and the Islamic State both hope to change the world with rivers of blood.
- Using 4GW might give the Islamic State a big future — by GI Wilson (Colonel, USMC, retired).
- Our tactics are an obstacle to victory in the Long War, as the Darwinian Ratchet works against us.
- A senior US general explains that we’re learning to fight 4GWs, but slowly.
- Business 101 tells us what to expect next from jihadists: good news for them, bad for us.
- Why a decade of assassinations hasn’t helped America.
