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A descent into darkness by our special operations forces

Larry Kummer, Editor

Summary: Only slowly have Americans begun to see the dark thing done in our name during our post-9/11 wars. For years we tightly closed our eyes. We told ourselves that only terrorists were killed, or fighters “on the battlefield” — plus a few civilians as collateral damage. Slowly those lies get debunked and we see the institutionalized assassination machinery created in our military – dirtying our reputation, operationally ineffective, and strategically counterproductive. But it doesn’t matter what we think, for the war has slipped beyond civilian control (as wars often do). {2nd of 2 posts today.}

“Even the sharpest sword rusts when plunged into salt water.”
— Ancient wisdom.

Member of Special Operations Task Force Southeast at Base Tarin in Afghanistan, 7 Aug 2012. By James Ginther.

Contents

  1. SEAL Team 6: quiet killings.
  2. Elite soldiers become assassins.
  3. Assassination seldom works.
  4. Women can fight and kill.
  5. There are alternatives.
  6. For More Information.

(1)  SEAL Team 6: quiet killings

The New York Times gave a tangible example of our madness, a nice follow-up to Study body counts to learn about our wars: how we fight, why we lose:  “SEAL Team 6: A Secret History of Quiet Killings and Blurred Lines“, 6 June 2015 — “The unit best known for killing Osama bin Laden has been converted into a global manhunting machine with limited outside oversight.”

Once a small group reserved for specialized but rare missions, the unit best known for killing Osama bin Laden has been transformed by more than a decade of combat into a global manhunting machine. That role reflects America’s new way of war, in which conflict is distinguished not by battlefield wins and losses, but by the relentless killing of suspected militants.

… Afghan villagers and a British commander accused SEALs of indiscriminately killing men in one hamlet; in 2009, team members joined C.I.A. and Afghan paramilitary forces in a raid that left a group of youths dead and inflamed tensions between Afghan and NATO officials. Even an American hostage freed in a dramatic rescue has questioned why the SEALs killed all his captors.

Let’s hold the applause for a few minutes and consider what this means for our wars, for our military, and for America.

(2)  Turning our elite soldiers into assassins

“I’ll be the good guy.  You will be the American special ops assassin.”
— Children at play around the world.

Assassins are not heroes. Assassination is not heroic. We close our eyes to this in vain. For details see The men of US Special Operations Command are heroes. But are their deeds heroic? It tarnishes the reputations of those who use it, as described in The biggest re-branding exercise in the history of the world,

Worse, as I wrote in 2013 we are Expanding the size and scope of our Special Operations Forces, an alternative to learning from our failed wars. Opportunities for effective assassination are rare. Instead we’re employing — even expending — our elite troops to no great effect. From the NYT article…

Waves of money have sluiced through SEAL Team 6 since 2001, allowing it to significantly expand its ranks — reaching roughly 300 assault troops, called operators, and 1,500 support personnel — to meet new demands. But some team members question whether the relentless pace of operations has eroded the unit’s elite culture and worn down Team 6 on combat missions of little importance. The group was sent to Afghanistan to hunt Qaeda leaders, but instead spent years conducting close-in battle against mid- to low-level Taliban and other enemy fighters. Team 6 members, one former operator said, served as “utility infielders with guns.”

The cost was high: More members of the unit have died over the past 14 years than in all its previous history. Repeated assaults, parachute jumps, rugged climbs and blasts from explosives have left many battered, physically and mentally.

(3)  Assassination seldom works

Mass assassination programs have worked in the past. Palestine has been shaped into its current pitiful state by generations of assassination on its leaders, especially moderate mayors — by groups from the Gush Emunim (right-wing Jewish settlers) to radical Palestinian groups. But assassination seldom produces constructive results. Even the gullible journalists at the NYT, usually applauding even the most feckless wars of the US, have doubts…

Like the C.I.A.’s campaign of drone strikes, Special Operations missions offer policy makers an alternative to costly wars of occupation. But the bulwark of secrecy around Team 6 makes it impossible to fully assess its record and the consequences of its actions, including civilian casualties or the deep resentment inside the countries where its members operate. The missions have become embedded in American combat with little public discussion or debate.

Assassination arouses even more antipathy than other forms of war, whether done by spec ops or drones. We’re goading our enemies to attack America. Eventually we’ll succeed, and they will.

Worse, our serial executions of our foes’ leaders is the equivalent of long low doses of antibiotics — not only insufficient to destroy their cohesion, but also eliminating the slow and stupid so that only their best survive. It creates a Darwinian Ratchet forcing improving of our foes. For details see Our tactics are an obstacle to victory in the Long War, as the Darwinian Ratchet works against us and Why a decade of assassinations hasn’t helped America.

There’s a large literature about the risks and often meager rewards of assassination.

Lyudmila Pavlichenko: 309 kills.

(4)  Proving that women can fight and kill

The case for admitting women becomes stronger as assassination becomes a major role of our special operations troops. Women have a long and storied history of not just participating with insurgents and guerrilla, but also acting as assassins in many capacities — from covert to military. For example, consider the 2,000 women snipers of the Soviet Union during WWII — including such stars as Lyudmila Pavlichenko (309 confirmed kills) and Nina Lobkovskaya (commanded a company of snipers).

Image by Eric A. Hendrix.

(5)  There are alternatives

There are alternatives on all levels to the easy boldness of staging hits. See the strategic significance of bin Laden’s execution, and the road not taken. For a more tactical perspective, see this by Pat Lang (Colonel, Special Forces, retired) on our fight harder not smarter approach to 4GW — a conflict of approaches within the special operations forces. This explains why we’ve lightly used effective tactics and increasingly relied on less effective tactics. People are policy.

The US Army Special Forces (Green Berets – I am one such) of the pre-antiterrorist commando era were men specially selected and trained to work with culturally alien peoples on a non-judgmental basis.  They (we) were very good at that.

To some extent that skill set persists but it has been submerged under the “door kicker” mentality of men like; McChrystal, McRaven, Schoomaker, Boyden, Beckwith et al.  The original “model” Green Berets were purged (and this has been noticed by the young) or paid high career prices for their tolerant attitudes.

The US Army also tried hard in the 20th Century to develop a small cadre of officers who had a deep knowledge of particular groups of human aliens.  This program still exists in the “Foreign Area Officer” career field, but while it once produced culturally sensitive political-military officers, skilled in the languages needed who worked out in the field as trainers, attaches, intelligence collectors, etc., it now produces officers often relegated to high level staffs as advisers to generals who feel obliged to have them but who do not take their advice.

Available at Amazon.

(6)  For More Information

If you liked this post, like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter. See all posts about assassination and about special operations forces.

See these articles about our special operations assassins.

 

 

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