Analogies are fudge, as TE Lawrence says. Esp historical analogies, since every era is unique. We use them anyway, mining the past for comparisons to help us better understand the present. While analogies cannot be accurate (different times are incomparable), they can illustrate aspects of the present that we might otherwise overlook.
This sketch looks at one element of America’s grand strategy. Like the great powers before WWI, we love the offense. Pre-emptive warfare and fighting on foreign soil are the bread and milk of our military thinking. Future generations might consider this daft, just as we consider daft the WWI “cult of the offense.”
America, today
Brilliant, charismatic figures like John Nagl take us back to the future. As I explain in Nagl gives a profoundly wrong vision for the US military (22 June 2008), he gives us a clear and appealing vision, but one that is deadly wrong IMO. Only a first rate mind could have conceived it something so attractive and yet destructive — like this (FM note: this section was slightly expanded on 13 Feb):
In the twenty-first century, wars are not won when the enemy army is defeated on the battlefield; in fact, there may not be a uniformed enemy to fight at all. Instead, a war is only won when the conditions that spawned armed conflict have been changed.
… The soldiers who will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies — and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms, or work for the Department of Army. The most important warriors of the current century may fight for the US Information Agency rather than the Department of Defense.
Decisive results’ in the twenty-first century will come not when we wipe a piece of land clean of enemy forces, but when we protect its people and allow them to control their territory in a manner consistent with the norms of the civilised world. Thus victory in Iraq and Afghanistan will come when those nations enjoy governments that meet the basic needs and garner the support of all of their peoples.
John Nagl (Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, retired), in his review of Brian McAllister Linn’s book, The Echo of Battle – The Army’s Way of War, RUSI Journal (April 2008). Note: the link to his review is at the Small Wars Journal, posted courtesy of the RUSI Journal.
This is the core theme of counter-insurgency theory, COIN. FM 3-24 is its handbook, showing how to use social science terminology and analytical frameworks to manipulate foreign societies. This will likely fail on several levels, as the goal of ending the “conditions that spawned armed conflicts” is beyond our means (we can “change” conditions, just not consistently for the better).
(1) It will not work, as the social sciences are as yet immature. Its practitioners cannot wield their theories as can chemists and physicists. Twentieth century history is largely a series of failed attempts at social engineering. Consider how Watts and Harlem have deteriorated since 1960, despite forty years of expensive intervention.
(2) If US social scientists were able to do so at home, that does not mean that they could do so in foreign lands. Traveling thousands of miles to foreign lands may make the task seem easier, as one loses sight of its complexities. In many cases the locals will reject our neo-colonial presumptions. That’s just good sense, as the great successes of the past century were, in general, nations who ignored both our advice (e.g., most of Southeast Asia).
(3) If social engineering was possible to do in foreign lands, the US military might not have the necessary organization or talent to do so. This probably requires something like Thomas Barnett’s “System Administrators“, a 21st century organization of colonial civil servants (the sorcerer’s apprentices of the 21 century).
(4) Note that this passage implies very different concepts of “soldiers” and “warriors” than used today. And perhaps a different set of “laws” for war to accommodate them.
Someday the social sciences might provide the abity to successfully manipulate our society, and even later still do so to foreigners. Today they are in an early stage of development. Ahead lie years, probably generations, of lab work, gathering data, and constructing simple theories. If there was a government agency regulating social engineering — as the FDA regulates pharmaceuticals — they would declare these tools unready for human trials.
But it is being used now, as America borrows vast sums in the attempt to mold foreign societies to meet our needs and frustrate our enemies. It is the cult of the offense, polished up for the 21st century. It is an error with deep roots in western history.
Looking back to France, a century ago
From Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August (not the most scholarly work on the era, but one of the best written), Chapter 3 – The Shadow of Sedan:
{Folch’sideas} were taken up with particular enthusiasm by {French} Colonel Grandmaison, “an ardent and brilliant officer” … who in 1911 delivered two lectures at the War College which a crystallizing effect.
Colonel Grandmaison grasped only the head and not the feet of Foch’s principles. Expounding their elan (will) without their surete (protection), he expressed a military philosophy that electrified his audience. he waved before their dazzled eyes an “idea with a sword” which showed them how France could win.
Its essence was the offensive a outrance, offensive to the limit. Only this could could achieve Clausewitz’s decisive battle which “exploited to the finish is the essential act of war” and which “once engaged, must be pushed to the end, with no second thoughts, up to the extremes of human endurance.” Seizure of initiative is the sine qua non. … Liberty of action is achieved only by imposing one’swill upon the enemy. “All command decisions must be inspired by the will to seize and retain the initiative.” The defensive is forgotten, abandoned, discarded; its only possible justification is an occasional “economizing of forces at certain points with a view to adding them to the attack.”
… Within a few months of Granmaison’s lectures, the President of the Republic, M. Fallieres, announced “The offensive alone is suited to the temperament of French soldiers. … We are determined to march straight against the enemy without hesitation.”
The new Field Regulations, enacted by the government in October 1913, as the fundamental document for the training and conduct of the French Army, opened with a flourish of trumpets: The French Army, returning to its traditions, henceforth admits no law but the offensive.” … The offensive alone leads to positive results.”
Few or none of the generals on either side in WWI were stupid. Nonetheless, overconfidence about the efficacy of their plans contributed to the bonfire of civilization called WWI. It is an inevitable risk of modern military theory, which cannot be tested in any meaningful way.
Comparing then and now
Mistakes of the past so often seem obvious — poorly reasoned bouts of emotional myopia — while our misfortunes result from “black swans” — unpredictable blows of fate. Yet it need not be so.
Our “cult of the offensive”, tinkering with foreign societies, might be seen by future generations as folly — attempting things obviously beyond the current state of the social sciences or American wisdom. And as an esp bizarre strategy for a over-indebted hegemonfrantically attempting to stay afloat with money borrowed from creditors of dubious loyalty.
An alternative: playing defense
There is an alternative strategy: focusing on defense, not offense. For more on this see Thoughts on FMFM 1-A, an important tool for survival in the 21st century and esp William Lind’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
Of course “offense” and “defense” are just shorthand labels for concepts of extreme subtlety — beyond the scope of this already too-long essay, to be discussed in a later post. A few quite notes to illustrate this:
- In 4GW the “home court advantage” might be a more useful concept than “defense”.
- Rretaining the initiative at all timesis vital (as it is in 3GW, maneuver warfare).
- As the late John Boyd (Colonel, USAF) said, offensive/defensive are attributes of the destructive forms of war; there are more effective ways for nations to win conflicts.
About John Nagl (updated 14 February)
He is President of the Center for a New American Security, a Visiting Professor in the War Studies Department at Kings College of London, an Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Dr. Nagl was a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Military Academy Class of 1988 and served as an armor officer in the U.S. Army for 20 years, retiring with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His last military assignment was as commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas, training Transition Teams that embed with Iraqi and Afghan units. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He earned his doctorate from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, taught national security studies at West Point, and served as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Nagl also earned a Master of the Military Arts and Sciences Degree from the Command and General Staff College, where he received the George C. Marshall Award. He was awarded the Combat Action Badge by General James Mattis, USMC.
Dr. Nagl is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the writing team that produced the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Source: Center for a New American Security
Afterword
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For information about this site see the About page, at the top of the right-side menu bar.
For more information from the FM site
To read other articles about these things, see the FM reference page on the right side menu bar. Of esp relevance are:
Some posts about COIN on the FM site:
- Why We Lose at 4GW, 4 January 2007
- Kilcullen explains all you need to know about the Iraq War, 6 October 2007
- ABCDs for today: About Blitzkrieg, COIN, and Diplomacy , 21 February 2008
- The 2 most devastating 4GW attacks on America, and the roots of FM 3-24, 19 March 2008
- A key to the power of FM 3-24, the new COIN manual (20 March 2008)
- How often do insurgents win? How much time does successful COIN require?, 29 May 2008
- How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century – part I, 7 June 2008 — Thoughts about eating soup with a knife.
- Nagl gives a profoundly wrong vision for the US military, 22 June 2008
- Is COIN the graduate level of military hubris?, 30 July 2008
Some posts about America’s grand strategy:
- The Myth of Grand Strategy , 31 January 2006
- America’s Most Dangerous Enemy , 1 March 2006
- America takes another step towards the “Long War” , 24 July 2007
- One step beyond Lind: What is America’s geopolitical strategy? , 28 October 2007
- How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century – part I , 19 March 2007; revised 7 June 2008
- How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century – part II , 14 June 2008
- America’s grand strategy: lessons from our past , 30 June 2008 – chapter 1 in a series of notes
- President Grant warns us about the dangers of national hubris , 1 July 2008 – chapter 2
- America’s grand strategy, now in shambles , 2 July 2008 — chapter 3
- America’s grand strategy, insanity at work , 7 July 2008 — chapter 4
- The King of Brobdingnag comments on America’s grand strategy, 18 November 2008