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4GW allows ISIS to fight and win against more powerful armies. Like ours.

Summary:  Today GI Wilson explains how one of our foes, calling itself the Islamic State, uses 4GW to match their strengths against the weaknesses of our far more powerful military. Earlier generations of jihadists using 4GW methods changed the course of America (9/11 was one of the most effective military operations ever). ISIS is better. There are interesting times ahead for us all.  This is the 3rd chapter of his 4 part series. {2nd of 2 posts today.}

Islamic Jihad Movement fighter.

Backward “and” Forward: 4GW Orientation On War – part 3

The strengths of our 4GW foes; above all they learn faster.

Our adversaries recognize that America’s predilection for high-tech conventional warfare where the assumption is that the technologically strongest wins. Our foes nevertheless prefer low-cost-low-tech (i.e. Improvised explosive devices) 4GW tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) — leveraging our addiction to high-tech hardware against ourselves.

Similarly, our adversaries leverage our own bureaucratic weight against ourselves (e.g. Congressional grid lock). The United States government (USG) is a burgeoning bureaucracy on steroids that thrives on political correctness, politically sanctioned incompetence, and high-technological-high-cost solutions for everything. For a horrifying description see “America’s Defense Meltdown“ (Center for Defense Information, 2008). All of which contribute to the money slathering in Washington, DC in the name of technological advantage.

Our enemy’s “technological advantage” as exemplified in the 9/11 attacks consisted of box cutters, ceramic knives, a steely determination to die for a cause, while creatively turning commercial airlines into field expedient cruise missiles to attack the U.S.. It worked, and our vast military-security-law enforcement bureaucracy was virtually helpless to stop it. Today little has changed as ISIS trees the USG where again incompetence is enshrined. The USG’s universal solution to everything remains one of money slathering inextricably linked to the politically correct notion that no one in power is ever to be held accounted or responsible.

We are literally underwriting our radicalized foes’ success by not recognizing that our own lumbering, incompetent and money slathering bureaucracies keep us from operationally and strategically adapting in order to defeat our foes. In fact our adversaries count on our fetish for obese wasteful bureaucracies, excessive regulations, high-tech-high-cost hardware, political correctness, and ballooning debt thus pave the way for our enemies’ operational successes. Clayton L. Niles (USMC) writes in his 2008 thesis “Al Qaeda and Fourth Generation Warfare as its Strategy“:

Whether one believes in the concept of generations of warfare or another explanation for a terrorist strategy is not necessarily important. What is important is that security professionals involved in combating terrorism understand the enemy, whomever it may be, and can adapt to counter the strategy that adversary uses.

4GW forces like hybrid “forces can effectively incorporate technologically advanced systems into their force structure and strategy, and use these systems in ways that are beyond the intended employment parameters.” (thesis of William. J. Nemeth, USMC: “Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare“, 2002).

Similar visage, better equipped

About the Islamic State (aka IS or ISIS)

ISIS is a 4GW- hybrid harbinger of things to come. As Gareth Stansfield (Professor Middle East Studies, U Exeter) notes regarding ISIS:

Not only is the Islamic State stronger than previous organisations, it has also learned lessons from them. For example, IS has few fixed operational centres and its chain of command remains mobile. British policy options at this stage are burdened with problems and complications and also bring with them a range of unintended consequences that could draw Western powers into further engagements in the region.

ISIS’s ability to learn and adapt is seen in how its fighters use not only captured tanks and artillery but suicide truck bombs as well. ISIS’s TTP creativity was observed in Iraq when the Islamic State used an M113 armored personnel carrier for suicide vehicle. The Iraqis apparently thought the M113 was one of their own. ISIS released a video of a M113 approaching an Iraqi Army checkpoint. The M113 suicide vehicle and Iraqi Army checkpoint disappear in a huge explosion. Using a captured Iraqi M113 as a suicide bomb vehicle demonstrates ISIS’s operational prowess (see “Counter-Terrorism: The Ultimate Vehicle Bomb“, StrategyPage, 25 November 2014).

ISIS’s TTPs are continuously being updated. The ISIS’s networking capability and use of the Internet, social media, and cellular technology for intelligence gathering, information operations, and even targeting is impressive. The FBI recently warned those who serve in uniform to scrub their social media accounts of anything that might bring unwanted attention from “violent extremists.”

ISIS indeed may want to target U.S. military personnel (i.e. active duty, reserve, retired, veterans) and even family members. Even if for only the psychological effect. ISIS’s operational agility is revealed in news reports pointing out that “Islamic State militants are changing tactics in the face of U.S.-led air strikes in Iraq by ditching conspicuous convoys in favor of motorcycles.” (Daily Mail, 26 September 2014.)

The ability of extremists like ISIS to radicalize and network globally is evident. In Australia it is reported that “organized crime has melded with religious extremists to produce a unique threat for security experts: Islamic radical biker gangs. Authorities in Australia are seeing a nexus between radicals who are desperate for cash and biker gangs with connections to organized crime that can help them achieve their goals.” (Reuters, 20 November 2014)

Also of particular note is how potential jihadists are using creative TTPs to circumvent and avoid tighter security at airports. “Would-be fighters eager to join jihadists in Syria and Iraq are traveling on swank cruise ships, say Interpol officials.” (UPI, 7 November 2014)

Tomorrow see the last chapter in GI Wilson’s article about our new wars.

Future Islamic State: propaganda that works for both ISIS and DoD!

Posts in this series about 4GW, reflecting on 25 years of 4GW defeats

  1. Chuck Spinney asks why we choose to lose at 4GW.
  2. William Lind: thoughts about 4GW, why we lose, and how we can win in the future.
  3. What is a fourth generation war, the wars of the 21st century? Who fights them, and why?
  4. Understanding 4GW, the first step to winning the Long War — #1 of GI’s series.
  5. DoD defends itself against dangerous new ideas about 4GW. — #2 of GI’s series.
  6. 4GW allows ISIS to fight and win against more powerful armies. Like ours. — #3 of GI’s series.
  7. Using 4GW might give the Islamic State a big future. — #4 of GI’s series.
  8. 4th Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare & Unconventional Warfare: Similar but not Interchangeable. By Gary Anderson (Colonel, USMS, retired).

For More Information

Posts about ISIS, the “Islamic State”:

  1. Before we start a new war with ISIS, let’s remember how we stumbled into the last two, 21 August 2014.
  2. The long-simmering conflict in the Middle East breaks out, surprising US experts, 26 August 2014.
  3. The solution to jihad: kill and contain our foes. Give war another chance!, 8 September 2014.
  4. America and the Islamic State both hope to change the world with rivers of blood, 19 September 2014.
  5. “SAS kill up to 8 jihadis each day, as allies prepare to wipe IS off the map.” Bold words we’ve heard before., 24 November 2014.
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