Recommended reading: “Is Counterinsurgency the Graduate Level of War?“, David S. Maxwell (Colonel, US Army), Small Wars Journal, 20 July 2008 — “Some Random Thoughts on COIN Today.” This has a wealth of insights. It deserves a review, which time precludes doing now. This is a brief post, taking this idea in a different direction (with some overlap of Colonel Maxwell’s thinking).
The outcome of the debate about the effectiveness of the surge, and more generally COIN, may shape history of the US and the world for the next decade or two. Should we decide that the surge and COIN worked, we will probably continue to reconfigure our forces to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. And we probably do so, even more frequently than we did in the 20th century.
Concluding that we know how to fight insurgencies might mean a Long War for America, an unnecessary war (read “America takes another step towards the “Long War”” to see this process at work). And, since I doubt we know how to wage COIN, an expensive and probably unsuccessful war (for more on this see Why We Lose at 4GW and How often do insurgents win? How much time does successful COIN require?).
Here are some random throughts on COIN today (more random than Colonel Maxwell’s well-reasoned article). This post intermixes discussion of COIN and the surge, as they are often conflated in US military and political discussions.
A. There was no “surge”, just a redeployment
First, the “surge” should be called the “redeployment.” There has been no meaningful increase in the number of Coalition troops in Iraq, which had been more-or-less stable since the end of 2004. This graph shows that Coalition strength is only slightly above the average for the past 4+ years, since troop levels stabilized in Spring 2004. The increased number of US troops has been largely offset by departure of allied forces.
Wars have been won by skillful redeployment of forces, so this is no trivial affair. Calling it a “surge” was inspired marketing.
B. Did we use any sophisticated COIN theory in Iraq, as described in FM 3-24?
How many of FM 3-24’s ideas have been put into practice? Despite its powerful backers, with General Petraeus as our commander in Iraq, the impact of FM 3-24 remains unclear. The new COIN doctrine emphasizes efforts to (1) increase the legitimacy of the government we support and (2) precise applications of force. Our Iraq operations during 2007 have diminished the national government (building bases without their approval, conducting operations they oppose, and arming their opponents) — plus a 4x increase in bombing. Not exactly following the FM 3-24 recipe.
From a broader perspective, our “surge” tactics in Iraq — doing sweeps, a massive increase in bombing, and funding popular front militia — were all done in Vietnam. Funding local militia is ancient (“better to have them inside pissing out of our tent than inside pissing in.”). Giving locals the choice of accepting our money or suffering our firepower is another, equally ancient tacic (see here and here for examples of this in Iraq). This combination — money plus firepower — may have been the secret formula for success in the Northern Alliances quick victory over the Taliban (and the CIA bag men might have been more effective than the more famous special ops teams and B-52’s.
C. Could the locals have accomplished the same results in 2007 without us?
“In effect FM 3-24 and Counterinsurgency as a term have become code, simply stated, for nation building.”
— Gian P Gentile, comment posted at the Small Wars Journal, 20 July 2008
What basis is there for our belief that we can successfully build nations — let alone allies? Germany and Japan had long histories as cultural units, and longer and more successful histories as States than Iraq. Their success after WWII is attributable to our generosity and support, but primarily to their people’s work and wisdom.
There are signs of nation-building in Iraq, mostly due to a few key factors.
- Ethnic cleansing.
- Development of local governments which suppress rival forces in their zones.
- The cease-fire declared by Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army.
- Iran brokering settlements among the Shiite Arab factions.
These were the factors that reduced violence (not nearly peace, yet) in the Iraq civil war. (As opposed to the Anbar Awakening, which reduced American deaths — it largely involved US paying locals not to shoot at us, or to fight others groups shooting at us)
What did we do to facilitate these things? Did the redeployment of Coalition troops, and the changes in their tactics, have effects so large as any of these factors? Did we negotiate any of these things? Or do we just claim credit for the results?
The COIN tradition, going back to Nagl’s seminal How to Eat Soup with a Knife, attributes key actions in insurgencies to westerners rather than their local allies. Quite flattering to western audiences, and matching our prejudices. Could the Malaysian government have successfully suppressed the 500 thousand ethnic Chinese people that formed the core of the rebellion. Could the Iraq leaders have reduced the horrific violence of late 2006? Without the leadership of western elites?
D. What has been accomplished by the surge and our new COIN tactics?
Since the invasion much blood has been shed, self-identities of Iraq’s people have shifted, and new regional governing machinery is being built. These trends gain strength both from our support and our casual neglect (even contempt) of Iraq’s central government. This moves Iraq toward a new future, but by a process in which we (rightly) have little influence — and whose result might not further any US goals.
There are few signs of political reconciliation, the primary goal of the surge. Most of what progress in this area trumpeted by pro-war analysts is imaginary. For example, the new de-Baathification law. As Juan Cole says,
“{it} was loudly denounced by the very ex-Baathists who would be affected by it. In any case, the measure has languished in oblivion and no effort has been made to implement it.”
The provincial elections look to be kicked into the future, along with the vital referendum on the status of Kirkuk. The Iraq parliament frequently operates in violation of its own rules and often the Constitution as well.
Meanwhile, much of what we ask the Iraq government to do — furthering our political goals — is absurd. No Iraq government, however weak or strong, can do these things without suffering a severe loss of legitimacy (a scarce thing in today’s Iraq, outside of Kurdistan).
- Give us their oil on terms more generous than Canada gives foreigners.
- Grant extra-territorial immunity to our troops and mercs.
- Grant us authority to conduct operations without their consent.
- Enlist tens of thousands of Sunni Arab militia, whose loyalty to the government by most accounts ranges from low to zero.
Conclusion
The problem with using propoganda to maintain support for a war among both the people and the army is that it works only at a high cost: divorcing our thinking from reality. A good spin on the news is seductive, esp. when it plays to deeply held beliefs about the rightness of our cause and the power of our forces. This may have happened with the selling of the surge and new COIN tactics. They maintained sufficient American support to continue the war, but only by contaminating our thinking with false beliefs.
Afterword
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To read other articles about these things, see the FM reference page on the right side menu bar. Of esp relevance are:
- About America’s national defence strategy and machinery
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Some posts about COIN on the FM site:
- ABCDs for today: About Blitzkrieg, COIN, and Diplomacy , 21 February 2008
- The 2 most devastating 4GW attacks on America, and the roots of FM 3-24, 19 March 2008
- A key to the power of FM 3-24, the new COIN manual (20 March 2008)
- How often do insurgents win? How much time does successful COIN require?, 29 May 2008
- How America can survive and even prosper in the 21st Century – part I, 7 June 2008 — Thoughts about eating soup with a knife.
- Nagl gives a profoundly wrong vision for the US military, 22 June 2008
- Is COIN the graduate level of military hubris?, 30 July 2008
Posts about the fragmentation of Iraq
- Lessons Learned from the American Expedition to Iraq (29 December 2005)
- The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace (13 March 2007)
- Beyond Insurgency: An End to Our War in Iraq (27 September 2007)
- Iraq, after the war (20 May 2008)