The battle continues, and heats up. Prominent people are chaning sides. Others double down, advocating that we expand the war. The stakes are high. Is the public paying attention?
Contents
- Three prominent conservatives turn against the war.
- General McChrystal expected to seek more troops
- A debate in the Washington Post
- A clearer look at our alternatives
- The next chapter in Foust’s series about the case for Afghanistan
- Afterword and for more information
(1) Three prominent conservatives turn against the war.
I strongly recommend reading Peters article.
- “Time to Get Out of Afghanistan“, George Will, op-ed in the Washington Post, 1 September 2009
- “Trapping Ourselves in Afghanistan and Losing Focus on the Essential Mission“, Ralph Peters, Joint Force Quarterly, July 2009
- Mark Steyn, at National Review Online (muted objections, not explicit opposition)
(2) Will DoD request more troops for Afghanistan?
“U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Calls Situation ‘Serious’“, Washington Post, 1 September 2009 — “McChrystal Expected To Seek More Resources, But White House Is Wary.” Excerpt:
The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy.
Bernard Finel (American Security Project) on his blog calls this “Classic Doubletalk“:
See, it is no longer our goal to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland — it is just that our strategy requires that we do so in order to defeat AQ. And the rest of us are supposed to take this kind of argument seriously?
(3) A debate in the Washington Post
“Is the War in Afghanistan Worth Fighting?“, debate in the opion section of the Washington Post, 31 August 2009 — “The Post asked experts whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. Below are contributions from John Nagl, Andrew J. Bacevich, Erin M. Simpson, Clint Douglas, Thomas H. Johnson and Danielle Pletka.” Here are two excerpts.
(a) Nagl starts off with his high card, which is a joker.
America has vital national security interests in Afghanistanthat make fighting there necessary. The key objectives of the campaign are preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with global reach and ensuring that it does not become the catalyst for a broader regional security meltdown. Afghanistan also serves as a base from which the United States attacks al-Qaeda forces inside Pakistan and thus assists in the broader campaign against that terrorist organization — one that we clearly must win.
Most of this has been demolished elsewhere (go here for details). To read his other online works, seee The Essential 4GW reading list: John Nagl.
But note the “Afghanistan as a base” from which to attack Pakistan.
- If our strikes support the Pakistan government, why must we operate from Afghanistan (with its difficult logistics)?
- If Pakistan’s government does not support these strikes, are we waging war on Pakistan?
For more on this see the article by Metz in section #4.
(b) Quote of the day from Danielle Pletka (American Enterprise Institute):
Worse still, for those who believe victory is worth achieving in Afghanistan, it’s not easy to pinpoint what victory looks like. It never has been. Nonetheless, Afghanistan has both strategic and moral value to the United States. And it is wise to remember that the price of failure is horribly high. We have failed before in Afghanistan and betrayed the trust of Afghans who believed America cared about them. After two decades and the rise of an al Qaeda homeland, we paid the price.
Really weak, IMO. Here are some comments from Matthew Yglesias’ post about this:
Francisco The Man: “Jesus, it’s like these people aren’t even trying anymore. I wouldn’t accept this kind of thinking from my high school students.”
kafka: “Victory is easy to define: the last U.S. soldier leaving Afghanistan, never to return.”
theAmericanist: “The ARMY ROTC manual used to begin by stating that the first military principle is the principle of the objective: what, precisely, do you intend to achieve? Then you determine what you will require.”
(c) Comment on this debate by Michael Cohen, Democracy Arsenal
By the way, you got to love the Washington Post. They have a debate on whether the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting and they get 5 people who think it is and 1 who doesn’t. Way to keep it even-handed guys.
(4) A clearer look at our alternatives
{Update: the original version of this post did not accurately represent Metz’s article; this section has been rewritten}.
For a clearer analysis of our choices see “Destroy the Taliban’s Sanctuary“, Steven Metz (Prof, Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College), Joint Force Quarterly, July 2009 — Excerpt (slightly reformated for clarity):
This leaves three options.
- If eradicating the sanctuaries would, in fact, lead to the downfall of the Pakistani regime and if its survival is more important than stabilizing Afghanistan, Washington could continue the current policy…
- If stabilizing Afghanistan and lowering the American burden there is the priority, then the US must give the Pakistani government a choice. It can either eradicate the Taliban sanctuaries within its territory or the Afghan government can have the UN declare the sanctuary a threat to regional peace and security, then ask the US to deal with it.
There is no doubt that such actions would challenge, and perhaps even threaten, the Pakistani government. But Islamabad cannot be both America’s friend and enemy at the same time. Our Afghan ally is at great risk because of Pakistan’s inaction. American military forces are killed by insurgents operating from their sanctuary in Pakistan.
- Perhaps the best solution is disengagement from this embattled part of the world.
But if the United States elects to sustain its commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan, the insurgent sanctuary must be destroyed.
(5) The next chapter in Foust’s series about the case for Afghanistan
“The Case for Afghanistan: (Recent) Historical Considerations“, Joshua Foust, Registan, 1 September 2009 — He never gets around to explaining why we should wage war in Afghanistan. Other than, of course, the by now ritualistic references to 9-11 :
A policy of American disengagement, limited to occasional air strikes at terrorist compounds and funding proxy militias, not only did not deter the Taliban from supporting terrorist activity, it prevented the U.S. from stopping the 9/11 attacks.
This makes no sense, IMO. Where is the evidence that the Afghanistan Bases provided substantial support to the 9-11 terrorists (the 9-11 commission report says otherwise)? How likely is it that the US government will again disengage and allow al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan? These things were discussed in You can end our war in Afghanistan.
(6a) Afterword
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(6b) For more information about this topic
To see all posts about our new wars:
Some posts about the war in Afghanistan:
- Why are we are fighting in Afghanistan?, 9 April 2008 — A debate with Joshua Foust.
- Stratfor: “The Strategic Debate Over Afghanistan”, 13 May 2009
- Real experts review a presentation about the War (look here, if you’re looking for well-written analysis!), 21 June 2009
- The Big Lie at work in Afghanistan – an open discussion, 23 June 2009
- “War without end”, a great article by George Wilson, 27 June 2009
- “Strategic Calculus and the Afghan War” by George Friedman of Stratfor, 17 July 2009
- Powerful insights about our war in Afghanistan, part 1, 18 July 2009
- We are warned about Afghanistan, but choose not to listen (part 2), 19 July 2009
- Powerful insights about our war in Afghanistan, part 3, 20 July 2009
