Summary: Now that we’re extricating ourselves from the first two nations we occupied in the War On Terror, with no gains to offset the cost in money and blood, let’s re-examine the advice that led us into those holes. Like the memos planning the Vietnam War, after the war they’ll read as madness. Historians will wonder why we took this foolishness seriously. But we can learn from this experience, as we failed to do from Vietnam.
We had a wide range of advisors for our futile wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some charlatans, such as Max Boot. Some brilliant, like Ralph Peters and David Kilcullen. The latter are more interesting. With good senior leaders, political and military, the work of Peters and Kilcullen would have earned themselves prominent places in the annals of military history. But instead their expertise was used to justify and support wars probably impossible to win — and destructive to those who try. Great men in the service of donkeys.
Today we’ll look at Kilcullen’s best-known work, highly influential mid-way through our wars — after the first rush of enthusiasm had passed and doubts appeared. This is an excerpt from an article I wrote in rebuttal. The Editor (rightly) dissuaded me from calling Kilcullen’s article pernicious nonsense, requiring instead a detailed analysis. Now we can see more clearly. Six years later all that remains is one important question, left for readers to answer in the comments (because I haven’t a clue): why did anyone consider as sensible Kilcullen’s pernicious nonsense masquerading as advice?
Why do we lose 4th generation wars?
Originally posted on at Defense and the National Interest, 4 January 2007.
An early symptom of impending defeat is loss of confidence in one’s tactical doctrines. In a strong military culture, though, this can spark a burst of creativity. In WWI, this resulted in the perfection by the German Army of infiltration tactics. Later, with new technology, this became blitzkrieg.
How has the prospect of defeat in Iraq affected the US military?
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The first effect has been to grasp at our strengths, the attributes that have proved insufficient in Iraq. Like a “drop of the hair of the dog that bit you” on the morning-after, it does not help. Enthusiasm for the work of David Kilcullen clearly shows this dynamic at work. He has a strong background in modern military theory: Lt. Col in the Australian Army, Ph.D. in anthropology, Chief Strategist in the Office of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, recently awarded the Medal for Exceptional Public Service …
Let us look at the most widely circulated of his works about counterinsurgency: “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency” Military Review, May – June 2006. Explicitly written for a Coalition company commander just warned for deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan … At the opening Kilcullen defines his subject:
{Counterinsurgency} “is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.”
As noted above, Kilcullen is not drawing distinctions between guerrilla warfare, to which this statement applies, and insurgency. With that in mind, we can then ask whether it is possible for us “to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population”?
The answer is “no,” and the rationale is critical to appreciating why Kilcullen’s lessons learned for tactical commanders may mislead politicians who try to generalize it to a war-winning strategy (just implement his tactics and we win) or even worse, to grand strategy. For an explanation we must look at the different types of 4GW. …
Kilcullen’s Article #1 – Know your turf.
“Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.”
It is easy to read this as important but banal. Centurions posted to remote Roman provinces were probably told to “know your turf.” This ignores the depth of Kilcullen’s insight. Kilcullen here describes the “home court advantage.” It is a powerful advantage in 4GW, perhaps one reason for the consistent victory of locals over foreigners. This is not a new aspect of war.
“As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. … I am convinced that the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.”
— Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1.
Unfortunately, in the Middle East everyone has this advantage, except us. The world expert on “your” district already lives there and probably was born there. US company commanders on six to twelve month rotations cannot develop anything comparable to the locals’ knowledge about their home, especially in so foreign a culture. It might be difficult for some of them to do so quickly in Watts or Harlem. …
Article #2 – Diagnose the problem.
“Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?”
Having “strategic corporals” was insufficient. Now we need “sociologist captains.” This is not a task for company commanders, already carrying a complex and heavy load of managerial and leadership duties. Nor does Kilcullen explain how to apply this advice. Once you have understood the insurgents and diagnosed the problem, how do you construct a solution? A handbook offering these answers could solve many of America’s own domestic problems.
Worst of all, this advice crashes on our lack of the home court advantage. How can someone newly arrived in a foreign culture – Iraq and especially Afghanistan are very foreign to most Americans – do this without speaking the local languages? …
Article #10 – Be there
“The first rule of deployment in counterinsurgency is to be there. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach – living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are.”
This is good advice for insurgents, well known since Mao said that the guerrilla is like a fish that swims in the sea of the people. In chapter 37 of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence wrote words that apply equally today (although in a different context) to the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan (bold emphasis added):
“Our largest resources, the Bedouin on whom our war must be built, were unused to formal operations, but had assets of mobility, toughness, self-assurance, knowledge of the country, intelligent courage. With them dispersal was strength. Consequently we must extend our front to its maximum, to impose on the Turks the longest possible passive defence, since that was, materially, their most costly form of war.”
Will this work for us? Perhaps Kilcullen is correct that “these seem more dangerous than they are”, but in insurgent-held areas patrolling has run up casualties with no evident benefit. Kilcullen might have in mind the Marine’s combined action platoons (CAP), Marines deployed to live in Vietnamese villages. They proved effective in Vietnam’s largely neutral (i.e., apolitical) rural areas. Iraq is highly urbanized, with a far more politically “mobilized” people than Vietnam’s 1960′s rural peasants. Dropping a unit of Marines into an Iraq town might be …
- a waste of effort, if in a (relatively) peaceful Kurdish or Shiite area (i.e., already run by the locals), or
- suicidal, if in an area controlled by the insurgents.
I doubt there are many intermediate situations, except for what are in effect urban war zones like Baghdad, where coalition forces are bunkered in the Green Zone. Anyone suggesting the “residential approach” in Baghdad should be invited to be to test it out, personally.
Kilcullen’s expectations for our company commanders.
We have fielded some of the best-educated and trained company commanders the world has ever seen. We can ask much of them, but not everything of them. Increasing their responsibilities should not substitute for the military’s lack of effective doctrine and operational intelligence. Simplifying their job might produce better results than making it more complex. Certainly, the insurgents’ operational doctrines do not require leaders with a college degree, let alone graduate studies. Perhaps we can learn something from them in this respect.
Furthermore, they are products of America – perhaps our finest “products.” As such, they carry with them both the strengths and weaknesses of our culture, and it is not realistic to expect them to quickly free themselves from what they are. In general, since early childhood they have been indoctrinated to value and believe in freedom and equality, and to consider opposing beliefs are unreasonable. However fine and just, this does not help them understand and empathize a culture with different values – such as Iraq and, even more so, Afghanistan, where religion and tribal/ethnic loyalties play a much larger role.
Good commanders can do much. Great commanders can do almost anything. However, nobody can do everything. Perhaps Kilcullen asks too much.
From another perspective, these 28 articles help us even if we cannot implement them as well as can local insurgents? That misses their significance. These are the competitive advantages of insurgents. To borrow Michael Porter’s phrase, these are insurgents’ “core competencies.” In conventional wars, such as WWII, armies could copy tactical innovations from their enemies. In 4GW’s what works for the insurgents often does not work well for foreigners – a basic tenet of asymmetric warfare.
We can learn from our enemies, but we will continue to lose these wars unless we find other, different, advantages vs. the insurgents. The search for these continues, but for us this is at present a “Handbook for Losers.” …
For more information
For more information about Kilcullen, including links to many of his articles:
Posts about COIN:
- More paths to failure in Iraq, 16 December 2006 — Myths about COIN in Iraq
- How often do insurgents win? How much time does successful COIN require?, 29 May 2008
- No coins, no COIN, 6 October 2008
- Is COIN the graduate level of military hubris?, 30 July 2008
- Max Boot: history suggests we will win in Afghanistan, with better than 50-50 odds. Here’s the real story., 21 June 2010 — Boot discusses 7 alleged victories by foreign armies fighting insurgencies.
- A major discovery! It could change the course of US geopolitical strategy, if we’d only see it, 28 June 2010 — Andrew Exum (aka Abu Muqawama) points us to the doctoral dissertation of Erin Marie Simpson in Political Science from Harvard. She examines the present and past analysis of counter-insurgency. This could change the course of American foreign policy, if we pay attention.
- A look at the history of victories over insurgents, 30 June 2010
- WPR: “Counterinsurgency in the Post-COIN Era”, 31 January 2012