Author Archives: GI Wilson

In our wars the tactics of the weak confound the strong

Summary: Few things are sadder in our long war than reading prescient articles from the past which we disregarded. Like the one shown below from 2003 which not only accurately predicted our failures but explained why and how they would happen. Perhaps ten years from now you will read it again and marvel at how well it predicted our failure in the new wars beginning today. Until then read this to help you better understand events, new game of rock-paper-scissors behind the headlines.

4GW

Source: Syed Zaid Zaman Hamid

Introduction by GI Wilson

The debate about modern war continues, with the highest stakes — not just the almost trillion- dollars/year in US defense spending, but perhaps national survival as well. Have wars between nation states become obsolete, with 4th generation warfare (4GW) the real threat?

Most of DoD’s spending goes to preparing for conventional great power war, so 4GWs are fought largely with conventional tools (e.g., bombing). It must be so in order to preserve the many “rich rice bowls” in Washington, DC. As Eisenhower warned us, the DOD-Congressional-Industrial Complex (DICC) grows rich by preparing for wars with other nations. These are the wars DOD wants, but not the ones it gets.

DOD’s acquisition based strategy requires “peer competitors” to justify the vast wasteland of defense spending, habitual cost over runs, and dysfunctional weapons programs. If other nations don’t play the game, information operations on the US people manufacture the necessary threats.

Unfortunately, this high-tech-high-cost approach to national security against our serious foes (e.g., ISIS, AQ, Hezbollah) consistently fails, or even acts as an enabler.

Congress and DOD with their addiction to all-things-high-tech-high-cost do not recognize nation states have lost their monopoly on violence. We lack an adaptive and comprehensive strategy to cope with emerging 4GW threats. Our current wars fail because the in 4GW the weak confounds the strong. The following essay was written in 2003, but applies today because we have learned almost nothing.

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Using 4GW might give the Islamic State a big future.

Summary:  In this last chapter of his series GI Wilson summarizes how 4GW works for the Islamic State, and forecasts their future.  As he explained in earlier chapters, we have to see the world differently to defeat foes who use 4th generation methods. This is the 4th and final chapter of his 4 part series. {2nd of 2 posts today.}

See The World Differently

To win at 4GW we must learn to see the world differently.

Backward “and” Forward: 4GW Orientation On War – part 4

Our 4GW foes organize in innovative ways

The success of ISIS and allied extremists is more than just uncovering creative tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs). ISIS in many ways reflects the metamorphosis we witness with the appearance of third generation street gangs. Third generation street gangs with global networks, reach, and sustaining revenue streams to support gang operations (see “Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels, and Net Warriors“, J. P. Sullivan, Transnational Organized Crime, Autumn 1997. Gangs are often the “yellow canary” in the mine shaft offering indicators, warnings, and profile features of emerging 4GW TTPs.

Mitchell Prothero writes a chilling synopsis of the ISIS profile in “How 2 shadowy ISIS commanders designed their Iraq campaign“, McClatchy, 30 June 2014:

Assembling a coherent picture of how ISIS executed its transformation is something U.S. intelligence officials will be striving to do in coming weeks as they examine what happened to the U.S.-trained Iraqi army. But interviews with a wide range of people — including a former British military officer with ties to Saddam-era Iraqi officers, activists with ties to ISIS, and an intelligence officer for the Kurdish peshmerga militia — provide an imperfect but consistent picture of how ISIS became the most powerful and effective non-state military organization on the planet, with access to billions of dollars in military hardware, territory that includes millions of residents, and something few jihadist groups have ever had: a coherent strategy for establishing an Islamic state.

Our current adversaries are ideologically driven, capitalizing on fanaticism, and frequently linked by clan-tribal networks. The linkage also includes loose coalitions of criminal actors, non-state, and failed-state actors. All of whom can make for strange bed fellows operating outside the nation state context. These 4GW bad actors challenge our national security capabilities that are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Beyond that framework, our traditional structures and conventional military have great difficulties engaging such threats.

Our adversaries’ operational theme emphasizes people and ideas not just high tech hardware. ISIS is successfully operationalizing beheadings and the psychology of fear — much like Al Qaeda did with improvised explosive devices in Iraq. With ISIS we again will re-learn it is far more difficult to kill an idea and ideology than the enemy itself.

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4GW allows ISIS to fight and win against more powerful armies. Like ours.

Summary:  Today GI Wilson explains how one of our foes, calling itself the Islamic State, uses 4GW to match their strengths against the weaknesses of our far more powerful military. Earlier generations of jihadists using 4GW methods changed the course of America (9/11 was one of the most effective military operations ever). ISIS is better. There are interesting times ahead for us all.  This is the 3rd chapter of his 4 part series. {2nd of 2 posts today.}

Islamic Jihad Movement fighter

Islamic Jihad Movement fighter.

Backward “and” Forward: 4GW Orientation On War – part 3

The strengths of our 4GW foes; above all they learn faster.

Our adversaries recognize that America’s predilection for high-tech conventional warfare where the assumption is that the technologically strongest wins. Our foes nevertheless prefer low-cost-low-tech (i.e. Improvised explosive devices) 4GW tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) — leveraging our addiction to high-tech hardware against ourselves.

Similarly, our adversaries leverage our own bureaucratic weight against ourselves (e.g. Congressional grid lock). The United States government (USG) is a burgeoning bureaucracy on steroids that thrives on political correctness, politically sanctioned incompetence, and high-technological-high-cost solutions for everything. For a horrifying description see “America’s Defense Meltdown“ (Center for Defense Information, 2008). All of which contribute to the money slathering in Washington, DC in the name of technological advantage.

Our enemy’s “technological advantage” as exemplified in the 9/11 attacks consisted of box cutters, ceramic knives, a steely determination to die for a cause, while creatively turning commercial airlines into field expedient cruise missiles to attack the U.S.. It worked, and our vast military-security-law enforcement bureaucracy was virtually helpless to stop it. Today little has changed as ISIS trees the USG where again incompetence is enshrined. The USG’s universal solution to everything remains one of money slathering inextricably linked to the politically correct notion that no one in power is ever to be held accounted or responsible.

We are literally underwriting our radicalized foes’ success by not recognizing that our own lumbering, incompetent and money slathering bureaucracies keep us from operationally and strategically adapting in order to defeat our foes. In fact our adversaries count on our fetish for obese wasteful bureaucracies, excessive regulations, high-tech-high-cost hardware, political correctness, and ballooning debt thus pave the way for our enemies’ operational successes. Clayton L. Niles (USMC) writes in his 2008 thesis “Al Qaeda and Fourth Generation Warfare as its Strategy“:

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