Summary: The previous post in this series asked why we lose when we’re great. This post gives a deeper answer, and points to two paths that at least make victory possible. It’s a brief review, with links to other sources giving more detail. {2nd of 2 posts today.} {DoD is} ready for wars past and …
Why we lose wars so often. How we can win in the future. Read More »
Summary:  A RAND study examines the victories of foreign armies over insurgents. It holds powerful lessons for us, and deserves more attention. This is the third of series about the history of counterinsurgency. Other chapters: Max Boot: history suggests we will win in Afghanistan, with better than 50-50 odds. Here’s the real story., which discussed 7 …
A look at the history of victories over insurgents. How often do foreign armies win? Read More »
Summary: Andrew Exum points to a new paper deserves attention, about the history of counterinsurgencies.  This insight has been repeatedly discovered in the past 5 years, but ignored. It could radically change the course of US foreign policy — if we paid attention. Contents Foreshadowing a revolution The Two Forms of 4GW Kilcullen unknowingly explains why …
Summary: Advocates for the Af-Pak war often make dubious statements about the past, attempting to rekindle America’s enthusiasm for a war in which we have no meaningful stake. Today Max Boot provides another example. This is the first of series about the history of counterinsurgency. The other chapters: (2) A major discovery! It could change the …
Today we look at “Lies, damned lies and counterinsurgency” by Robert W. Chamberlain (Captain, US Army) in Armed Forces Journal (May 2008) — “Not all insurgencies have been protracted affairs.” Captain Chamberlain’s article in Armed Forces Journal is another cut at replacing the “do insurgencies usually win or lose” debate with something more useful. He sorts insurgencies by placing …
How often do insurgents win? How much time does successful COIN require? Read More »
