Summary: In this last chapter of "On Counterinsurgency" Martin van Creveld sums up the results of the post-WWII history of counterinsurgency. this was first published in 2005; hopefully we'll learn these lessons soon. As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of our mad foreign wars winds down -- and the second phase expands -- we can … Continue reading On counterinsurgency: Conclusions. Let’s hope we learn soon.
Summary: In this third chapter of "On Counterinsurgency" Martin van Creveld describes the operational differences between winning and losing methods of counterinsurgency. Victory comes to those who take difficult paths. Most nations take the easier path, and lose. As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of our mad foreign wars winds down -- and the second … Continue reading On Counterinsurgency: On Power and Compromises, the difference between victory & defeat
Summary: In this second chapter of "On Counterinsurgency" Martin van Creveld describes the two methods of crushing insurgencies. We have tried neither; we might lack the capacity to use either method. Note that both successes were, like almost all defeats of insurgencies, done by governments fighting domestic insurgencies. As the first phase (Iraq, Af-Pak) of … Continue reading On Counterinsurgency: The Two Methods that Win
Summary: Advocates for the Af-Pak war often make dubious statements about the past, attempting to rekindle America's enthusiasm for a war in which we have no meaningful stake. Today Max Boot provides another example. This is the first of series about the history of counterinsurgency. The other chapters: (2) A major discovery! It could change the … Continue reading Max Boot: history suggests we will win in Afghanistan, with better than 50-50 odds. Here’s the real story.